ETHIOPIA STRATEGY SUPPORT PROGRAM II (ESSP II)

EDRI

EVALUATION OF ETHIOPIA'S FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM:
DOCUMENTING PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NETS PROGRAMME AND THE HOUSEHOLD ASSET BUILDING PROGRAMME

ESSP II – EDRI REPORT

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Ethiopia Strategy Support Program II (ESSP II)
International Food Policy Research Institute
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THE ETHIOPIA STRATEGY SUPPORT PROGRAM II (ESSP II)

ABOUT ESSP II

The Ethiopia Strategy Support Program II is an initiative to strengthen evidence-based policymaking in Ethiopia in the areas of rural and agricultural development. Facilitated by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), ESSP II works closely with the government of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI), and other development partners to provide information relevant for the design and implementation of Ethiopia's agricultural and rural development strategies. For more information, see http://essp.ifpri.info, http://www.ifpri.org/book-757/ourwork/program/ethiopia-strategy-support-program or http://www.edri-eth.org.

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Evaluation of Ethiopia's Food Security Program: Documenting Progress in the Implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme and the Household Asset Building Programme

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Acronyms

ACSI	Amhara Credit and Savings Institute
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development
BOARD	(Regional) Bureau of Agriculture and Regional Development
BOFED	Bureau Office of Finance and Economic Development
CBPWD	Community-based participatory watershed development
CCI	Complementary community investment
CFI	Chronically food insecure
CFSTF	Community Food Security Task Force
CIS	Corrugated iron sheets
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSA	Central Statistical Agency (Ethiopia)
DA(s)	Development Agent(s)
DPO	Disaster Prevention Office
DPPA	Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency
DPPO	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office
DS	Direct support
EAs	Enumeration areas
EW	Extension Worker
EWR	Early warning and response
FFT	Full family targeting
FG	Focus Group
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FSCD	Food Security Coordination Directorate
FSP	Food Security Program
FSS	Food Security Survey
FSTF	Food Security Task Force
GOE	Government of Ethiopia
HABP	Household Asset Building Programme
HVFB	High Value Food Basket
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
KAC	*Kebele* Appeals Committee
KFSTF	*Kebele* Food Security Task Force
KII	Key Informant Interview
MFIs	Microfinance institutions
MOARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OFSP	Other Food Security Program
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PA	Peasant Association
PIM	Project Implement Manual
PSNP	Productive Safety Nets Programme
PW	Public Works
RPWFU	Regional public works focal units
RRT	Rapid response team

RUSACCO	Rural savings and credit cooperatives
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region
SWC	Soil and water conservation
TC	Technical Committee
TLU	Tropical Livestock Unit
TOR	Terms of reference
TOT	Training of trainers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WARDO	*Woreda* Agricultural and Rural Development Office
WFSD	*Woreda* Food Security Desk
WFSO	*Woreda* Food Security Office
WFSTF	*Woreda* Food Security Task Force(s)
WOARD	*Woreda* Office of Agriculture and Rural Development
WOFED	*Woreda* Office of Finance and Economic Development
WPWFU(s)	*Woreda* Public Works Focal Unit(s)

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Executive Summary

This report documents progress in the implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) and the Household Assets Building Programme (HABP) and assesses trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients. It also describes how living standards are evolving in PSNP and non-PSNP beneficiary households. The report addresses the following evaluation objectives found in the Food Security Program (FSP) Log Frame and the Terms of Reference for this study.

Table E.S.1. Evaluation objectives covered in this report

Evaluation objective	Issue	Chapter in this report	Link to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP			
	Are public works payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	4, 5, 6, 8	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 39
	Are direct support payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	4, 5, 6, 8	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 35
	Pregnant female participants are moved from public works to direct support	6	PSNP Log frame Output 1.4
	Transfers are received at a place no more than three hours from home	5	PSNP Log frame Output 1.5
	Households participate in PSNP for at least three consecutive years	6	PSNP Log frame Output 1.6
	Why are there *woreda* level differences in timeliness of transfers?	4	TOR, para 36
	How are contingency budgets used, including as a response to the *kebele* Appeals system?	4	TOR, para 41
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	6, 7, 8	TOR, para 42
Document progress in the implementation of the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP)			
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	10	HABP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 42
	HAB clients have access to financial services	10	HABP Log frame Output 2.1
	HAB clients have access to desired input	10	HABP Log frame Output 3.2
Assess trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients			
	Beneficiaries understand how the program works	5, 6, 7, 9	PSNP Log frame Output 4.4
	Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries report that targeting and graduation processes are fair	6, 11	PSNP Log frame Output 4.5

Source: Authors' compilation.

Several recurring themes emerge in this report:

- A number of positive aspects of program implementation identified in previous reports have remained in place or have improved further. Targeting remains good, the appropriate administrative structures exist, and beneficiary participation in the selection of public works has stayed the same in some regions and improved in others.
- A number of important capacity strengthening initiatives are evident. More than 90 percent of surveyed *woredas* use the payroll and attendance sheet system (PASS). Considerable effort has been made to increase the number of development agents at the *kebele* level. There is widespread acknowledgment that this has led to an improvement in support provided by development agents.
- Apart from these positive aspects, there is considerable evidence of regional differences in the implementation of the PSNP. Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR), Tigray, and Amhara-HVFB outperform Amhara and Oromiya across a range of activities, most notably those related to the provision of work, payment levels, and the processing of payments. Self-reported payments data indicate that Full Family Targeting has not been implemented in Amhara. These data also show that direct support payments in Oromiya are considerably below what is envisaged in the PIM.
- Payment predictability has been a major concern. The evidence provided here shows a mixed picture. On a year-to-year basis, predictability has improved. For example, access to public works has become more consistent over time. Between 50 and 72 percent of current public works participants received payments for public works in 2008, 2009, and 2010. However, many beneficiaries indicate that there is considerable uncertainty regarding payment dates.
- Gender dimensions also present a mixed picture. In nearly all (98 percent) surveyed *kebeles*, there is at least one woman and at least one development agent on the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF) and women are fairly represented (at least one woman per *kebele*) in the *Kebele* Appeals Committee (KAC). Male- and female-headed households reported similar perceptions of benefits of public works activities. But both women and men report that women experience significant difficulties in balancing required participation in public works with other household responsibilities. Relative to male-headed households, female-headed households were less likely to lodge a complaint if they perceived that selection processes were unfair, had less contact with development agents, and were less likely to use the credit facilities established under the HABP.
- Understanding of the objectives and operations of the PSNP is good at the regional level but becomes progressively poorer at the *woreda*, *kebele*, and household level. In particular, we highlight the poor understanding of the concept of graduation. Below *woreda* level, the understanding of the concept becomes very loose, at times completely uninformed, and at times completely incorrect. Most disconcertingly, many graduates interviewed had no understanding of why they had been graduated.

Chapter 3 describes price trends, incidence of shocks, and summary statistics of key outcomes of interest.

- In 2010, food prices continue to rise, but the rate of increase is much slower than 2008. SNNPR experienced a decline in food prices.
- Drought is the most important shock that affects a large fraction of households every year and causes income and consumption shortfalls.
- The incidence of shocks differs across regions, but does not vary much across beneficiary status.
- When looking at households' primary source of food, we find that a large fraction constitutes food from own production. However, this fraction has steadily declined. The fraction sourced from PSNP has increased steadily over the period.
- The food gap as measured by the number of months that the household is unable to satisfy its food needs fell from 3.6 months to 2.3 months among all households.
- FSP beneficiary households, on average, hold lower levels of assets compared to non-beneficiaries. This is reasonable, since the FSP beneficiaries were selected to be the more vulnerable and poor.
- Over the period 2004–2010, asset levels have increased. Although beneficiary households have not experienced accumulation of assets at a fast pace, they have shown a steady increase.
- There has been a decline in distress sale of assets, irrespective of beneficiary status.
- On subjective measures of well-being, also households have fared better in 2010 as compared to 2008. In particular, when asked about how they felt their overall economic condition was as compared with last year, in 2010, 70 percent of households feel that they are either the same or a little better-off as compared to 41 percent in 2008.

Chapter 4 assesses whether concerns over capacity to implement the PSNP have been addressed and whether this has contributed to more timely transfers to beneficiaries. There are several noteworthy findings.

- *Woreda* level offices are increasingly well-resourced with trained staff. Nearly all now use the PASS system and nearly all have functioning computers. Most, but not all, have manuals that can be referred to. Training has occurred, although this could be more widespread.
- On average, it takes 38.9 days (as measured by the mean) or 32 days (as measured by the median) from the time a *woreda* receives its first attendance sheet to the last payment.
- There is considerable variation in these times across *woredas*. The best performing *woredas* manage to complete all activities associated with making payments in 21 days. By contrast, the worst performers take nearly two months.

Factors that explain *woreda* level differences in the timeliness of payments include lack of training on the PASS, the absence of frontloaded transfers, and a lack of transport.

Chapter 5 assesses implementation from the perspective of *kebeles* and households. It finds that:

- *Kebele* FSTFs exist in all surveyed localities. Broadly speaking, these match with what was set out in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM). There appears to be a slight improvement in their composition in Oromiya, where, in 2006, the KFSTFs deviated most from the guidelines set out in the PIM. In nearly all surveyed *kebeles*, there is at least one woman and at least one development agent on the KFSTF. Participant lists and minutes of meetings are well-kept, but there appears to be a drop in the number of KFSTFs that keep progress reports.
- In both 2008 and 2010, PSNP beneficiaries were asked directly if they felt that they had received all information needed to understand how the program works. There have been noticeable improvements in self-reported understanding of the program in Amhara (from 65 to 83 percent), Amhara-HVFB (74 to 84 percent), and SNNPR (from 80 to 88 percent). There are slight declines in understanding in Tigray and a considerable percentage of beneficiaries (45 percent in 2008 and 47 percent in 2010) in Oromiya who do not feel that they have sufficient information about the PSNP.
- In Oromiya, considerable concern was expressed about timeliness of payments. Only 14 percent of beneficiaries agree or strongly agree that they receive payments on a timely basis and 37 percent strongly disagree. While Oromiya performs poorly by this measure, it is worth noting that this concern is voiced by beneficiaries in all regions.
- Beneficiaries are supposed to receive their transfers in a place no more than three hours from home. This goal is largely met in Tigray, Oromiya, and SNNPR. However, a considerable proportion of beneficiaries in Amhara and Amhara-HVFB must travel more than three hours.
- Across all surveyed beneficiaries, 43.6 percent report receiving a client card.

Chapter 6 assesses targeting performance and constancy of program participation.

- The provision of an administrative quota begins at the federal level and extends all the way down to the sub-*kebele* level. Regional and *woreda* officials broadly follow the targeting criteria outlined in the PIM to determine administrative quotas, determining allocations on the basis of previous relief caseloads, agroecological conditions, malnutrition levels, the average size of landholdings, and the estimated population of chronically food-insecure households in particular administrative areas. The upstream budget review process, starting at the *kebeles* and moving upward to the *woredas*, the regions, and the federal level to decide the total number of the PSNP beneficiaries, has not been practiced.
- Most exclusion errors are due to inadequate administrative quotas. Full family targeting is practiced in most areas, even though officials acknowledge that it implies that fewer households are targeted. *Kebele* officials frequently request additional funds, but invariably these requests are denied.

- Officials have used the contingency budget and stricter, locally-specific targeting criteria to manage the limited administrative quota compared with the larger population of chronically food-insecure that require support.
- The labor cap and Full Family Targeting appear to be widely understood. However, there has been a fall in the percentage of respondents who can identify specific criteria for access to the PSNP and a rise in the percentage who perceive these are a consequence of a quota system or a random allocation. Despite this, a majority of focus groups agreed with the targeting process as well as the selection criteria used to determine public works and direct support beneficiaries.
- Access to public works and direct support has become more consistent over time. Between 50 and 72 percent of current public works participants received payments for public works in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Between 26 and 44 percent of current recipients of direct support received direct support in 2008, 2009, and 2010.
- Both the public works and direct support components of the PSNP are well targeted as evidenced by estimates of the correlates of access to public work and direct support.
- Outside of Tigray, there is no evidence of households being shifted from public works to direct support or vice versa. However, focus group discussions with women indicated that, when pregnant, they are switched out of public works and into direct support.

Chapter 7 explores aspects of the implementation of public works projects under the PSNP.

- There is considerable variation in the extent of community involvement in the selection of public works projects. There are clearly cases where these have been decided upon by the *woreda* and consultation with *kebeles* and communities seems notional. But there are other instances where development agents and community members have had a significant say in deciding priorities and plans for public works.
- Public works projects are generally perceived to assist in supporting livelihoods. Work on roads is seen as particularly positively. Views on other activities, such as soil and water conservation and natural resource management, are more mixed.
- A number of implementation problems associated with lack of technical skills, difficulties in supervision, and delays in receipt of funds for capital expenditures were noted. The tension between the use of public works as a means of transferring funds to poor households and as a means of strengthening community assets was also highlighted.
- Participation in public works activities puts considerable strain on women. There appears to be little willingness to address this.

Chapter 8 provides information on days worked and self-reports of payments for public works employment, and direct support transfers.

- In SNNPR and, to a slightly lesser extent in Tigray and Amhara-HVFB, there are clearly efforts being made to ensure that work is available, that beneficiaries are paid for this work, and that these payments reflect the amount of work undertaken. In 2009,

significant levels of transfers were made to public works beneficiaries in these regions and to ensure that payments bear some relationship to entitlements.

- In Tigray and SNNPR, there are clearly serious attempts to provide direct support transfers, although the regions differ in how they implement this. In Tigray, there are more beneficiaries, but with low levels of transfers; in SNNPR, the converse appears to be the case.
- By contrast, this dimension of program implementation lags in Amhara and Oromiya. Total public works payment levels are lower as are the proportion of beneficiaries receiving their entitlement.
- Self-reported payments data indicate that Full Family Targeting has not been implemented in Amhara.
- These self-reports also show that direct support payments in Oromiya are considerably below what is envisaged in the PIM.
- There exists a very strong preference for food payment, given uncertainty about prices, lack of food availability on the market, deliberate price hiking by traders when cash payments are being disbursed, and nonequivalent value of food basket and current cash payment. Beneficiaries were more likely to prefer cash when grain prices were below 3.5 Birr/kg.

Chapter 9 presents findings on the appeals and complaints process in the PSNP. It describes the reasons for appeals, who people appeal to, how these are presented, whether the appeals process is easy and transparent, and how long the appeals and complaint cases take to be resolved.

- Exclusion from the PSNP is the principal cause of appeals. Partial family targeting, inclusion errors, deduction of payment, and delay of transfers are other reasons for appeals and complaints.
- Appeals are made to the KFSTF, *kebele* cabinet, the development agents, KAC, village leaders, and others. Although *Kebele* Appeal Committees are widespread, they are not perceived as being effective.
- Women are fairly represented (at least one woman per *kebele*) in the KAC.
- It appears that, relative to concerns raised about the selection process, relatively few households appeal. There is a sense that the chances of appealing successfully are limited and this may discourage use of appeal mechanisms.
- Appeals are largely made verbally. It appears that decisions are made about these somewhere between two weeks and two months after the complaint has been lodged. The lack of written documentation surrounding appeals means that this figure represents a “best guess.”

Chapter 10 presents an overview of the Household Assets Building Programme (HABP), and explains the current rollout progress, challenges encountered thus far, its linkage with other food security programs, and its role in facilitating the graduation process.

- The roadmap for the HABP implementation at the regional levels is almost complete and all necessary technical committees are established. The general comprehension about the objectives and purpose of the program among the regional actors is very strong.
- Significant variations were observed in the degree of knowledge among the actors, such as the *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces and development agents at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels. In particular, considerable confusion exists in terms of differentiating the two programs (Other Food Security Program [OFSP] and HABP) among these actors. Knowledge about HABP among the PSNP beneficiaries at the community level is nearly nonexistent.
- The links between the HABP and other food security programs is clear at the regional level. However, considerable differences are observed between regional and *woreda* actors in terms of understanding the relationship between the PSNP, OFSP, HABP, and Complementary Community Investment (CCI).
- Considerable effort has been made to increase the number of development agents at the *kebele* level. There is widespread acknowledgement that this has led to an improvement in support provided by development agents.
- Many households report contact with development agents and, in particular, note that they have received advice about new crops and how crops can be grown.
- Rollout of the HABP below the regional level is uneven. In particular, development agents and households who were surveyed have limited awareness of the HABP. In the case of development agents, there is uncertainty as to how the HABP differs from the OFSP.
- Advice and assistance remains concentrated on crop production. There is limited capacity to assist nonagricultural enterprises.
- Access to new forms of credit, such as rural savings and credit cooperatives (RUSSACOs), has been limited. Relatively few households report borrowing money to purchase inputs or buy livestock.
- Female-headed households and households receiving direct support rarely access formal sources of credit.

Chapter 11 examines how graduation is understood and how it is applied in practice. Issues surrounding premature graduation, incentives and disincentives for graduation, and support needed at graduation and postgraduation are also discussed.

- There appears to have been relatively little graduation to date.
- There is a solid understanding at regional levels of the concepts and mechanisms of graduation; however, only one mention of two-tiered graduation. Understanding at *woreda* level is also fairly consistent. Below *woreda* level, the understanding of the concept becomes very loose, at times completely uninformed, at times completely

incorrect. Perhaps most disconcerting is the finding that the graduates to whom we spoke appeared to be the least informed of why they were graduated.

- The knowledge of the process by which people graduate was very varied at the community levels, with some thinking that it was time-dependent, others believing it to be political, quota-driven, and others knowing the specific benchmark value for graduation. The experience of graduates themselves indicated that the process was in most cases not transparent or well-explained.
- Officials at most levels are well informed of the actual graduation benchmarks. However, when the official regional benchmarks are translated into specific criteria for targeting potential graduate households at the *kebele* and community levels, a plethora of criteria result.
- Given FSP graduation targets, there is an imperative that graduates are increasingly identified and taken off the program. This imperative is felt and discussed at all levels, from regions right down to the communities. Sometimes respondents, particularly at the regional level, discuss these targets in relation to quotas and required future rates of graduation. However, at lower levels, these “quotas” are often seen as administratively imposed and at odds with the time required for sustainable graduation.

1. Introduction

1.1. Introduction

The introduction to the document describing the government of Ethiopia's Food Security Programme 2010–2014 (GFDRE 2009a) notes that persistent food insecurity remains a major problem in many parts of Ethiopia. To address this, the last ten years has seen a shift away from ad hoc responses, such as those that characterized the major drought in 2002, to a planned, systematic approach. This was embodied in the government of Ethiopia's Food Security Programme launched in 2005. The government of Ethiopia has noted that this program had a number of significant achievements, inter alia:

> More than seven million people have received PSNP transfers enabling them to meet consumption needs, reducing the risks they faced, and providing them with alternative options to selling productive assets. In addition, between 692,002 households (around 3.5 million people) received credit financed by the government's Federal Food Security Budget Line between 2005 and 2007 …/… There is also significant evidence that the programme is having an impact. The PSNP is smoothing consumption and protecting assets and a growing number of PSNP clients are having growing access to household building efforts. Where the two programmes are combined, particularly in areas where programmes were well implemented (indicated by a high level of transfers), household asset holdings have increased and crop production appears to have improved.

Despite these achievements, considerable food insecurity remains across much of Ethiopia and graduation from the program—a major policy goal—has been limited. Consequently, in 2009 the government of Ethiopia relaunched the Food Security Programme with enhanced efforts being made to improve a key component, the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) and a replacement of the Other Food Security Programme (OFSP) with an enhanced set of activities to strengthen the capacity of households to generate income and increase asset holdings. The replacement to the OFSP, called the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP), includes a demand driven extension and support component and improvements in access to financial services.

The document describing the Food Security Programme (FSP) 2010–2014 notes that a strength of the program has been the willingness of all stakeholders to ongoing learning processes, taking information from monitoring reports and evaluation studies to strengthen implementation. In this spirit, the new phase of the Food Security Programme pays particular attention to ensure that this learning continues through a mixture of monitoring and evaluation work.

This report has its origins in the intention of the government of Ethiopia (GFDRE 2009a, 77) to carry out a biannual household survey to assess outcomes and impacts of all components of the FSP in chronically food-insecure *woredas*. This biannual survey was first carried out in 2006 and again in 2008. In 2006, the sample consisted of approximately 3,700 households located in 66 food-insecure *woredas* served by the PSNP. In 2008, these households were resurveyed and an additional 1,300 households—located in *woredas* in Amhara that implement the PSNP with support from NGOs—that received a High Value Food Basket

(HVFB)[1] were also included. A strength of the quantitative data used in this report is that it is longitudinal—that is, it tracks the same communities and households, allowing us to see how the program evolves and how household well-being changes over time.

An important fact is that, in 2010, this strength is complemented by the inclusion of a suite of qualitative data collection techniques conducted in ten *woredas* where the quantitative survey was fielded. There are considerable benefits to combining quantitative and qualitative research methods. Doing so maximizes the advantages of the relative strengths of each method, and provides a richer pool of data and greater analytic power than would have been available with either of these methods alone. The main motivations for use of qualitative research is the recognition that (1) processes of program implementation and how these are received at the local level involve complex interactions, and may be different than anticipated by program planners; understanding these interactions and their effects on outcomes requires the use of qualitative research methods that develop trust and rapport between researchers and respondents, allow for open-ended responses, and triangulation through multiple respondents and participant observation; and is the recognition that (2) qualitative methodologies can provide insights into the reasons and causes of certain impacts that will not necessarily be uncovered by quantitative approaches alone; and that (3) views, opinions, and interpretations of the program held by beneficiaries are important, credible, and worth listening to.

1.2. Objectives and Structure of the Report

This is the first of three reports that will be produced, using data collected in 2010. The objective of this report is to document progress in the implementation of the PSNP and the HABP and assesses trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients.[2] A second objective is to describe how living standards are evolving in PSNP and non-PSNP beneficiary households.

The report addresses the following evaluation objectives found in the FSP Log Frame and the Terms of Reference for this study.

[1] This refers to the 'full food basket' provided to areas supported by USAID. This full food basket is based on the Sphere Standarsd of 3 kgs of cereals, plus pulses and oils.

[2] A second report will use double difference matching methods that measure the impact of the PSNP on the well-being of the chronically food-insecure population and the complementary roles played by the PSNP and HABP in achieving positive and negative outcomes for the food insecure and the reasons behind this. The third report will document livelihoods and the implementation of the PSNP and HABP in Afar, Somali, and pastoral localities in Oromiya.

Table 1.1. Evaluation objectives covered in this report

Evaluation objective	Issue	Chapter in this report	Link to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP			
	Are public works payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	4, 5, 6, 8	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 39
	Are direct support payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	4, 5, 6, 8	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 35
	Pregnant female participants are moved from public works to direct support	6	PSNP Log frame Output 1.4
	Transfers are received at a place no more than three hours from home	5	PSNP Log frame Output 1.5
	Households participate in PSNP for at least three consecutive years	6	PSNP Log frame Output 1.6
	Why are there *woreda* level differences in timeliness of transfers?	4	TOR, para 36
	How are contingency budgets used, including as a response to the *kebele* Appeals system?	4	TOR, para 41
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	6, 7, 8	TOR, para 42
Document progress in the implementation of the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP)			
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	10	HABP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 42
	HAB clients have access to financial services	10	HABP Log frame Output 2.1
	HAB clients have access to desired input	10	HABP Log frame Output 3.2
Assess trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients			
	Beneficiaries understand how the program works	5, 6, 7, 9	PSNP Log frame Output 4.4
	Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries report that targeting and graduation processes are fair	6, 11	PSNP Log frame Output 4.5

Source: Authors' compilation.

Below we summarize the topics covered in each chapter.

Chapter 2: Data Sources and Methods. This chapter describes the data sources and methods that underpin this report.

Chapter 3: Food Security, Assets, and Coping Strategies. This chapter presents statistics that describe the context in which the Food Security Programme has operated and trends in outcomes of interest. In particular, we examine the price changes of main staple food crops, livestock, and labor over the period 2006–2010. We use information from the quantitative surveys to examine the extent of shocks experienced by households. It also examines changes in asset levels, food security, and coping strategies; and subjective measures of well-being.

Chapter 4: Woreda Perspectives on Implementation. This chapter examines whether concerns regarding *woreda* level capacity to implement the PSNP have been addressed and whether this has contributed to more timely transfers to beneficiaries. It also considers the role played by early warning systems and the use of contingency funds.

Chapter 5: Kebele and Household Perspectives on Implementation. This chapter focuses on implementation, but here the perspective is largely that of the *kebele* and the household. It considers the following topics: Are local administrative structures such as *Kebele* and Community Food Security Task Forces in existence and functioning as envisaged in the Program Implementation Manual (PIM). Are households aware of these Task Forces and do they understand their role in the implementation of the PSNP? How do beneficiaries perceive their experiences with the payment process? Have client cards been distributed?

Chapter 6: Targeting. This chapter covers the following topics: How is targeting supposed to work in the PSNP? How is this understood and implemented at the regional level? How is this understood and implemented at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels? (As part of this discussion, it examines whether pregnant women are moved from public works to direct support.) How is targeting understood at the household level? Who actually participates in the PSNP? In public works and direct support? How consistent is this with the PIM? Do households actually participate in the PSNP for three consecutive years? Does this contribute to predictability in transfers?

Chapter 7: The Implementation of Public Works Projects. This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with the implementation of public works projects under the PSNP. It explores whether there have been administrative improvements in the coordination of public works activities planning and implementation. It assesses the extent to which those activities that are chosen have incorporated feedback from communities and whether these activities are linked to livelihoods. It summarizes perceptions regarding implementation problems and the extent to which gender considerations have been incorporated into the implementation of public works activities.

Chapter 8: Payments for Public Works and Direct Support. This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with payments for public works employment and direct support. We provide information describing public works participation by gender, age, and region. Based on self-reported payments data, we review the levels of transfers, the frequency with which they are made, and the extent to which these reflect beneficiaries' entitlements as outlined in the PIM. We examine transfer levels given to direct support beneficiaries. We also present findings on household preferences for modality of payment (food and cash) and whether these preferences are season or location dependent.

Chapter 9: Appeals and Complaints. This chapter presents the qualitative findings of the appeals and complaints management of the PSNP in the highland areas of Ethiopia. It describes the reasons for appeals, who people appeal to, how these are presented, whether the appeals process is easy and transparent, and how long the appeals and complaint cases take to be resolved. It also includes a discussion of the views and perception of the *Woreda* and *Kebele* Food Security Taskforce on visits by the Rapid Response Team (RRT).

Chapter 10: The Household Asset Building Programme. This chapter presents an overview of the Household Assets Building Programme (HABP), and explains the current rollout progress, challenges encountered thus far, its linkage with other food security programs, and its role in facilitating the graduation process, as well as the role of development agents in implementing the HABP.

Chapter 11: Graduation. This chapter examines how graduation is understood and how it is applied in practice, issues surrounding premature graduation, incentives and disincentives for graduation, and support needed at graduation and postgraduation.

2. Data Sources and Methods

2.1. Introduction

There are three distinguishing features of the data sources and methods used in this report. First, nearly all results are based on primary data collection undertaken between July and August, 2010. Second, mixed methods—data collection techniques using both qualitative and quantitative methods—have been employed. Doing so provides a richer pool of data and greater analytic power than would have been available with either of these methods used alone. Third, we adopt a "cascading" approach whereby data are collected at all levels: federal, regional, *woreda*, *kebele*, household, and individual. Fourth, much of the quantitative data at the household level is longitudinal—the same households have now been surveyed three times, in 2006, 2008, and 2010.

The two qualitative methods used most frequently were focus groups and key informant interviews. Key informant interviews were carried out at federal, regional, *woreda*, and *kebele* levels. Focus groups were held at the *kebele* level. Quantitative surveys were undertaken at the *woreda* level, in *kebeles*, and with households. We begin with a description of the quantitative survey instruments and their implementation. We then describe the qualitative fieldwork.

2.2. Quantitative Methods

The following quantitative survey instruments were fielded: a *woreda* level quantitative capacity survey; a quantitative community survey; a community price questionnaire; and a household survey instrument. We describe these in turn. Figure 2.1 shows the locations of the quantitative survey.

Figure 2.1. *Woredas* surveyed in the quantitative surveys



The Woreda Quantitative Capacity Survey

A number of prior evaluations of the PSNP have raised concerns regarding the timeliness and levels of payments received by beneficiaries. These studies, however, have not been able to pinpoint why there are delays in payments. A novel component of this study is the introduction of a *woreda* level quantitative capacity survey. The objective of this instrument was to provide data that clarify how the flow of funds from regions to beneficiaries works in practice. It included questions on

- Staffing and resources (number of cashiers and accountants dedicated to the PSNP; use of the automated payroll and attendance sheet system (PASS); availability and training on computers; transport constraints, and so on);
- Interface with the banking system (information exchange on availability of funds; liquidity constraints at local bank branches);
- Interactions between WOFED (*Woreda* Office of Finance and Economic Development) staff and the Food Security desk;
- Planning and management of cash flow;
- Flow of funds—"following the money" from the region to the *woreda* to the beneficiaries.

This survey instrument was implemented in all 85 *woredas* where the quantitative household survey was implemented: 13 in Tigray; 30 in Amhara; 21 in Oromia; and 21 in Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (SNNPR). Interviews were completed by experienced survey supervisors who were instructed to meet with staff associated with the *Woreda* Food Security Office as well as with those knowledgeable of the payment system. Ideally, they were supposed to speak with the Head of the Food Security Office, the WOFED chief accountant, the PSNP accountant, and the PSNP cashiers. On average, 3.9 persons were interviewed per *woreda* located in Tigray; 4.9 in Amhara; 5.4 in Oromiya; and 5.1 in SNNPR. Table 2.1 shows who was interviewed.

Table 2.1. Informants participating in the quantitative woreda survey (percentage)

	Tigray	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNPR	All
Head, *Woreda* Food Security Office	76.9	86.7	85.7	90.5	85.9
WOFED Chief Accountant	38.4	43.3	90.5	52.4	56.5
Other member, *Woreda* Food Security Office	84.6	86.9	100.0	88.2	89.9
PSNP Accountant	53.8	93.3	71.4	95.2	82.4
PSNP cashier1	30.7	70.0	80.9	95.2	72.9
PSNP cashier2	23.0	56.7	57.1	52.4	50.6
Other	84.6	66.7	76.2	71.4	72.9
At least one member of the WOFED Food Security Office	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
PSNP accountant or cashier	61.5	93.3	90.5	100.0	89.4

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

The principal reason why key individuals were not interviewed was that they were not available for interview. In a few cases, interviews with key individuals did not occur because the position was vacant.

Quantitative Community and Price Questionnaire

In this questionnaire, the community is defined as the *kebele* or peasant association. Enumerators were instructed to interview at least five people, perhaps together, who are knowledgeable about the community (e.g., community leaders, peasant association chairmen, elders, priests, teachers). They must include at least one member of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force and at least one woman and they are told that they may need to meet with other members of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force in order to complete some sections of this questionnaire.

The community questionnaire covers the following topics: location and access; water and electricity; services; education and health facilities; production and marketing; migration; wages; prices of foodgrains in the last year; operational aspects of the PSNP, including questions about the operations of the FSTFs, public works (PW), and direct support (DP). In addition, a price questionnaire obtains detailed information on current food prices.

The community questionnaire builds on similar instruments fielded during the 2006 and 2008 evaluations. Two broad sets of changes were introduced in 2010. First, there was a need to revise this instrument to include more information on operational aspects of the HABP (for example, presence and skill-sets of development agent staff; presence and access to financial institutions), a more nuanced understanding of beneficiary selection into direct support, and decisions regarding allocation of labor days under the public works component. Second, the 2006 and 2008 evaluations made relatively little use of background information on these communities that had been collected. To ensure that the community questionnaire was not longer than the one fielded in previous years, questions that had not proved informative in past years were carefully reviewed and a number of them dropped.

The Quantitative Household Survey and Questionnaire

The design of the first Food Security Survey sample, fielded in 2006, was based on power calculations conducted to determine the minimum number of sample enumeration areas and households needed to be able to identify impacts of the Food Security Program.[3] We used the share of chronically food-insecure (CFI) households as the outcome for the power calculations because this is the primary targeting criterion for the program and because FSP documents identify reducing the number of CFI households as a major goal of the program. According to the PSNP Implementation Manual (GFDRE 2004, 4), a household is considered CFI if it had three or more months of unmet food needs per year in each of the past three years.

We clustered the sample at the *woreda* level, the administrative unit at which program participation is assigned. Based on discussions with the Central Statistical Agency (CSA), we assumed the sample design would include two *kebeles* or enumeration areas (EAs) per *woreda* in Amhara, Oromiyia, and SNNPR, and three EAs per *woreda* in Tigray. We also assumed 25 households would be sampled in each EA. Using 50 households per *woreda* as the desired cluster size, we calculated the number of clusters needed to obtain the desired level of statistical power, using the Optimal Design software available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/group-based/optimal_design_software. Treating “success” as the

[3] See Gilligan et al. (2007) for a complete description of the sample and 2006 survey.

absence of chronic food insecurity, we assumed initially that 30 percent of the sample was not chronically food insecure. We assumed that the sample size should be large enough to identify an effect size equivalent to a 10-percentage-point increase in non-CFI; that is, raising the proportion of households that were not food insecure to 40 percent. Seeking statistical power of 80 percent and a significance level of 0.05, we found that 62 sample clusters would be required. To account for additional sampling of *kebele* subclusters within the EA and unbalanced samples of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, it was decided to be conservative and include 68 *woredas* as sample clusters.

Woredas were randomly sampled proportional to size (PPS) from a list of 153 chronically food-insecure *woredas* (excluding the sample surveyed for USAID), stratified by region. Within each *woreda*, sample *kebeles* serving as EAs were randomly selected from a list of *kebeles* with active Productive Safety Net Programs. Within each EA, 15 beneficiary and 10 non-beneficiary households were sampled from separate lists for each group, yielding a sample of 25 households per EA. This procedure yielded the following sample:

Table 2.2. Number of woredas, kebeles, and households sampled, by region

Region	Number of *woredas*	Number of *kebeles/woreda*	Number of households per *kebele*	Number of households per region
Amhara	18	2	25	900
Oromiya	19	2	25	950
SNNPR	19	2	25	950
Tigray	12	3	25	900
Total	68			3,700

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

In 2005, a survey was conducted to study the impact of the PSNP in areas where USAID supported the provision of the PSNP through a High Value Food Basket (HVFB). Most of the sample for this survey covered *woredas* in Amhara, where USAID had its highest concentration of PSNP-related activities, although *woredas* in other regions were also included in the sample. It was decided to add part of this sample to the data collection for the second round of the Food Security Survey fielded in 2008. This would make it possible to compare beneficiaries in these "HVFB *woredas*" (as we refer to them) with beneficiaries served solely by the government of Ethiopia. Because there may be differences in intensity of contact between beneficiaries in these *woredas* and beneficiaries served by other executing agencies, this comparison improves understanding of whether more intensive interactions generate larger impacts.

In order to avoid having a very small sample of *woredas* in some regions and to control survey costs and logistical difficulties, we decided only to revisit the sample of households from the 2005 survey of the *woredas* in Amhara. There is a large sample of households there that would permit a careful comparison with other households from Amhara in the Food Security Survey (FSS) sample from 2006. Also, although the survey instrument used in the 2005 survey of NGO *woredas* differed from that used in the 2006 Food Security Survey, there is enough similar information to assist the analysis across the two samples. Moreover, the questionnaire for the 2008 FSS was designed with both baseline survey instruments in mind, and the same questionnaire was implemented in both samples in 2008, facilitating comparison of outcomes in this year.

Before finalizing fieldwork arrangements for the 2008 survey round, we investigated the statistical properties of the sample of HVFB *woredas* and other *woredas* in Amhara from the 2006 FSS to be sure that the sample would be large enough to be able to identify differences in impact between PSNP beneficiaries in these two groups. We sought a sample size that gives an 80-percent chance (the power of the test) of identifying a reasonable expected difference in outcomes between HVFB and government *woredas* as statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In both samples, sampling involved selection of beneficiary *woredas* and then selection of EAs, which are selected *kebeles* or subregions of *kebeles*. For these power calculations, we assumed clustering at the level of the EA because intra-cluster correlations are typically higher at the EA level than those that are at the *woreda* level.

We considered the power of the sample if the survey was fielded in all 11 HVFB *woredas* in Amhara and assuming we surveyed three EAs within each *woreda*. In each EA, we assumed we would survey 17 beneficiary households, yielding a sample of 561 households (11 *woredas* x 3 EAs per *woreda* x 17 households per EA). We determined that this would provide sufficient statistical power to detect the following differences in outcomes between *woredas* with NGO- versus government-run programs:

- A 30-percent difference in per capita consumption expenditure.
- A 50-percent difference in the size of the food gap.
- A 25-percent difference in per capita caloric availability.
- A 35-percent difference in the value of livestock holdings.

In fact, the Amhara HVFB sample should have somewhat greater statistical power than described above, because the 2008 survey included four EAs rather than three in each of the 11 *woredas* being surveyed and each of these EAs included 28 households, as summarized in Table 2.3. A few EAs had one or two more households than the average of 28, yielding a total sample size of 1,237 households.

Preparations for the 2010 survey were guided by the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this study. These made explicit reference to the design of the quantitative household questionnaire. Paragraph 22 of the TOR stated:

> The format, structure, and questions should, as much as possible, be identical to those used in the 2006 and 2008 surveys. This will maximize comparability across survey rounds. There is no need to repeat questions on individual or household characteristics that do not change over time. All survey instruments should be carefully reviewed, and modules added as required, so as to ensure that the issues described under the Methodology section below are adequately captured.

Table 2.3 describes the structure of the 2010 quantitative household questionnaire and how it had been changed.

Table 2.3. Design of the 2010 household questionnaire

Module	Section Number	Heading	Comments
1: Basic household characteristics	1A	Household demographics, current household members	No change
	1B	Characteristics of the household	No change
	1C	Former household members	No change
	1D	Children's education and labor	No change
2. Land and crop production	1	Land characteristics and tenure	No change
	2	Input use and crop production	Edited to ensure consistency with HABP log frame
	3	Disposition of production	No change
	4	Use of household labor in crop production	No change
3. Assets	1	Production, durables	No change
	2	Housing	No change
	3	Livestock ownership	No change
	4	Income from livestock	No change
	5	Distress sales	No change
4. Nonagricultural income and credit	1	Wage employment	Edited to ensure consistency with HABP log frame
	2	Own business activities	Edited to ensure consistency with HABP log frame
	3	Transfers	No change
	4	Credit	Coding edited to ensure consistency with HABP
5. Access to the PSNP and HABP	1	Access to the PSNP—public works	Introductory questions revised
	2	Access to the PSNP—direct support	Editing changes
	3	Access to the HABP	MAJOR revision (previously, this section focused on the OFSP)
	4	Perceptions of benefits of assets created by the PSNP	Review further
	5	Perceptions of operations of the PSNP	Review further (e.g., add questions on knowledge of when payments are coming) questions added on client cards
6. Consumption	1	Expenditure on durables and services	No change
	2	Expenditure on consumables	No change
	3	Food consumption	No change
	4	Food availability, access, and coping strategies	No change
7. Health, shocks and perceptions	1	Long term shocks	Shortened, with questions on health status and illness (had been separate sections)
	2	Recent shocks to crops and livestock	No change
	3	Poverty perceptions	No change
8. Anthropometry	1	Height, weight of children 6m to 7y	No change
	2	Access to water and sanitation, child feeding, women's perceptions	Some questions from Module 7, Section 3 of 2008 questionnaire now included here

Source: Authors' compilation.

All three quantitative survey rounds have been fielded at approximately the same time. The first round was fielded in July and early August, 2006. The second round was fielded

between late May and early July, 2008 and the third round in June and July, 2010. Consequently, seasonality considerations are unlikely to confound comparisons made across rounds.

Discussions surrounding the design of the 2010 quantitative survey instruments began with a series of dialogues involving the Food Security Coordination Directorate (FSCD), members of the Donor Working Group, and the CSA. Following the conclusion to these, a CSA technical team, formed specifically to coordinate the survey, began work with our team. Tasks completed included:

1. Translation of survey instruments into Amharic. The process involved an intensive question-by-question discussion and some modifications. The fidelity of the translation to the original was thereby assured.
2. The preparation of the Enumerator's Manuals (one each for the community questionnaire and the household questionnaire) went hand-in-hand with the translation of the questionnaire. The draft manuals were modified and finalized through the simultaneous discussion.
3. Training of trainers followed the completion of both the survey instruments and the manuals. It took place at CSA's headquarters in Addis Ababa during the second half of May, 2010.
4. Training of enumerators was subsequently conducted by trainers from the zonal CSA offices with the help of the technical team from the CSA head office.
5. The administration of the survey followed. Enumeration and data collection took place during June and July 2010. A team of IFPRI-supported supervisors (including members of the IFPRI survey team) participated in the fieldwork, providing in-situ technical support.

The 2006 survey generated data on 3,688 households in 148 EAs within 68 *woredas.* In 2008, the CSA enumerator assigned to each EA was provided with the list of households interviewed during 2006 and used these along with (in some cases) maps and assistance from local officials and residents in locating households for reinterview. Attrition was low. Only 137 households (or 3.7 percent of the baseline sample) were not reinterviewed during the 2008 survey. About a third of these households are from two EAs within Oromiya, where the survey could not take place. The 2008 resurvey covered 3,551 households in 146 EAs within 68 *woredas*.

As discussed above, in 2008, CSA also resurveyed households that where covered by a USAID-organized baseline survey in 2005. That baseline sampled 41 *woredas* in which the implementation of the PSNP was facilitated by eight NGOs that, in turn, were supported by USAID/Ethiopia. From among these, the 2008 survey collected data from the Amhara subsample alone. Again, attrition was rather small (69 households or 5.6 percent of the original subsample). Consequently, data were collected from 1,167 households within 44 *kebeles* located in 11 *woredas*. In total, the 2008 survey generated data on 4,718 households.

Data on interviews conducted in 2010 are reported in Table 2.4. There were 3,366 households interviewed who form the 2006–2008–2010 panel. Across all three rounds,

3,140 households appear in all rounds, yielding an attrition rate of 14.8 percent or, over five years, just under 3 percent. In the HVFB *woredas*, of 1,297 households sampled in 2005, 1,137 were interviewed in 2008 and 1,146 households were interviewed in 2010. The effective sample of households for analysis in the impact report will be those households for which we have baseline household characteristics. We have this information for 3,038 households across all three rounds.

Table 2.4. Sample numbers by round

	2005	2006	2008	2010	All three rounds
Number of households in the 2006–2008–2010 panel	-	3,688	3,288	3,366	3,140
Attrition rate	-	-	10.8%	8.7%	14.8%
Number of households from HVFB *woredas*	1,297	-	1,137	1,146	0
Number of FSS households that we have full range of baseline characteristics for (overlap with later rounds)		3,475	3,190	3,193	3,038
Attrition rate			8.2%	8.11%	12.57%

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 2.5 presents the attrition rate by region. There is some regional variation where households in Tigray and SNNPR are less likely to leave the sample across the three rounds compared to Amhara and Oromiya.

Table 2.5. Attrition by region

	2006	2008	Attrition rate between 2006–08	2010	Attrition rate between 2006–10	Panel household (across all three rounds)	Attrition rate across all three rounds
			(percent)		(percent)		(percent)
Whole sample	3,475	3,190	8.2	3,193	8.1	3,038	12.6
Tigray	843	807	4.3	776	7.9	770	8.7
Amhara	806	703	12.8	742	7.9	665	17.5
Oromiya	921	813	11.7	828	10.1	770	16.4
SNNPR	905	867	4.2	847	6.4	833	8.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Lastly, we investigate whether potential differences in attrition rates can be attributed to differences in baseline characteristics. In particular, we would like to know whether households that are beneficiaries under the FSP are more likely to stay in the sample than their neighbors. We examine the correlation of the probability of attrition with household characteristics and region dummies. This is presented in Table 2.6 and shows that being a beneficiary is not highly correlated with the probability of attrition. (This was also true when we analyzed attrition between 2006 and 2008.) The only coefficients that are significant are those that relate to the age of the household head and household composition, and the magnitude of these is small.

Table 2.6. Probit showing marginal effects of the factors affecting the probability of attrition

Factor	Effect
PSNP beneficiary in 2006	-0.008
	(0.016)
Age of household head	-0.001**
	(0.001)
Gender of household head (1 = Male, 0 = Female)	-0.021
	(0.018)
Highest grade obtained by household head	0.000
	(0.001)
Number of male household members aged 0-6 years	-0.019**
	(0.009)
Number of male household members aged 7-15 years	-0.008
	(0.007)
Number of male household members aged 16-60 years	-0.028***
	(0.010)
Number of male household members aged > 60 years	-0.004
	(0.028)
Number of female household members aged 0-6 years	-0.009
	(0.007)
Number of female household members aged 7-15 years	-0.009
	(0.007)
Number of female household members aged 16-60 years	-0.009
	(0.010)
Number of female household members aged > 60 years	-0.029
	(0.020)
Value of production assets owned in 2006	-0.000
	(0.000)
Value of livestock owned in 2006	0.000
	(0.000)
Land area owned in 2006	0.007
	(0.008)
Amhara Region Dummy	0.085
	(0.071)
Oromiya Region Dummy	0.084
	(0.052)
SNNPR Region Dummy	-0.005
	(0.028)
Observations	3,153

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at *woreda* level. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.

2.3. Qualitative Methods

Site Selection

Ten *woredas* were selected for in-depth qualitative work. These were allocated across the four regions as follows: Amhara (3), Tigray (2), Oromiya (2), SNNPR (3). These were chosen based on the following criteria:

1. Representation of livelihood zones
2. Comparability of similar livelihoods across regions
3. Coincidence with quantitative household survey work
4. Extent of graduation (indicated by administrative data)
5. At least one *woreda* will be a locality where the FSP is supported by USAID.

Table 2.7 lists the *woredas* included in the qualitative studies. Annex B provides a description of these.

Table 2.7. Location of qualitative studies

Region	Zone	*Woreda*	*Kebele*	Implementation arrangement
Amhara	South Gondar	Ebinate	Serawudi	Government
	South Wollo	Sayinte	Shengodefer	Government
	Waghimra	Sekota	Wal	NGO
Oromiya	East Hararge	Gursum	Barite	Government
	East Arsi	Zeway Dugda	Dimitu Raretti	Government
SNNPR	Gomogoffa	Demba Goffa	Gurade	Government
	Sidama	Shebedino	Hula	Government
	Kembata	Tembaro	Soyame	Government
Tigray	Central Tigray	Aferom	Adizata	NGO
	Eastern Tigray	Saesi Tseda	Sendeda	Government

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Once sample *woredas* were identified, the field research teams were responsible to select study *kebeles* through discussions with *woreda* officials. The teams selected *kebeles* with a high number of PSNP graduate households, since an important objective of the evaluation was to better understand the situation of PSNP graduates. In places where graduation was not exercised, *kebeles* with large PSNP beneficiaries were taken into account. Moreover, since the time of this study coincided with the main rainy season, accessibility of *kebeles* was considered as a secondary criterion for selecting study *kebeles*.

Key informant interviews were held at the federal level and at all four regional levels. These were designed to deepen contextual understanding of implementation and outcomes (such as the use of contingency funds, policies regarding the allocation of PSNP funds to the direct support component, allocation of funds between the HABP and CCI) as well as learn from institutional perspectives across different levels of administrative input and responsibility. At the *woreda*, *kebele*, and community level, a "cascading" interview approach was used involving interviews with officials and knowledgeable observers to build up a detailed understanding of issues around implementation of PSNP and HABP and food security outcomes. Key informant interviews were also used to triangulate findings from the focus

group discussions as well as to add nuance and texture to these. A structured interview format was used to obtain information on a range of issues, including targeting procedures, appeals and grievances processes, and gender representation at local level.

Table 2.8 describes the identity of individuals participating in key informant interviews.

Table 2.8. Key informant interviews

Level	Number of interviews	Who was interviewed
Regional	2-3	One interview with the chair or a member of the Food Security Task Force. Two Interviews with a member (or more) of the PW committee, or HABP committee or EW committee. If committees had not yet been formed, two interviews with other relevant people (e.g., the PW focal person/or the OFSP person, or a direct support person).
Woreda	3	One interview with the chair or a member of the *Woreda* Food Security Task Force. Two Interviews with a member (or more) of the PW committee, or HABP committee or EW committee. If the committees had not yet been formed, two interviews with other relevant people (e.g., the PW focal person/or the OFSP person, or a direct support person).
Kebele	2-3	One interview with the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (this could have multiple people in the group). One or two interviews with development agents.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Focus group discussions were held at the *kebele* level in all regions. Four types of focus groups were interviewed.

1. *Chronically dependent households*: The main purpose of this group is to investigate issues around direct support. Topics covered will include access constraints to the PSNP, targeting experience, dependency, and graduation trajectories; shifts between public works and direct support; labor constraints, labor caps, and full household targeting; dilution and reciprocity. These groups usually consisted of six individuals from "permanent" direct support households (such as those containing elderly, disabled, or chronically sick persons), two participants from non-beneficiary households (i.e., were chronically poor and should be receiving direct support), and two participants from "temporary" direct support households.
2. *Transitioning households*: The main purpose of this group is to understand better the linkages between PSNP and OFSP/HABP programs. We purposely selected a focus group composition that may allow us to understand the interactions between PSNP and other livelihood programs. Our aim was to interrogate the conditions by which the activities related to the "livelihood activities" are able to strengthen livelihoods and pathways of transition off the safety net. These groups typically included three PSNP public works households, two PSNP households who received HABP/OFSP support, three PSNP graduates, and two participants from non-eligible households (i.e., those who are "better-off" according to locally-specific criteria).
3. *Women's group*: In this group, we are interested in understanding a range of issues related to (1) the gendered use of and access to PSNP cash and in-kind transfers; (2) the gendered labor requirements of the public works and whether there are labor substitution effects from the public works labor requirements; (3) perceived effects on

child outcomes in relation to education and feeding in relation to payment type; (4) reasons for preferences concerning payment type; (5) whether access opportunities and constraints to PSNP participation at all levels are gendered; and (6) the impact of program participation on women's welfare in terms of access to households resources and gender relations inside the household and in the community. Women's groups consisted of two participants from female-headed households who receive temporary direct support, two participants from female-headed households who do public works, two participants from female-headed households who are HABP/OFSP clients, and four participants from male-headed households who are PSNP/HABP/OFSP clients.

4. *Men's group*: The discussion in this group will mirror the one held in the women's group. Men's groups usually consisted of three men who were recipients of direct support, three who were active in public works projects, and three who received HABP/OSFP support.

Discussion in focus groups covered the following topics, although not all topics were covered in all groups:

- **Gender/intrahousehold dynamics:** What is the gender division of labor on public works? Who collects the payment for public works and direct support? Who decides the use of cash and food? What are preferences for food or cash between the sexes? What is the experience of female-headed households? In polygamous households, are there tensions between wives? Are there instances where not all wives from the same polygamous household are included?
- **Institutional access constraints:** What difficulties do households face when applying for/collecting their PSNP payments (administration, information, physical, cultural, discrimination constraints)? Does this differ between the type of payment received (food or cash)? Does this differ between who applies for/collects the payments? In regard to credit access/OSFP/HABP, are people aware of the procedures for applications and the institutions responsible? What are the perceived and actual difficulties in accessing these services?
- **Appeals and grievances:** What is the composition of the Appeals Committee? Who decides who is on the committee? Are complaints handled in a satisfactory manner? Do people know how to appeal? If they choose not to appeal, why not? Are people's voices heard through existing institutional arrangements? Are there differences between men and women concerning their voice being heard in appeals processes?
- **Targeting and graduation procedures:** What is the composition of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force? What is the level of women's participation (e.g., are women chairs?)? Are women's voices heard in any meaningful way? Is targeting done in a transparent and fair way? Are exclusion errors perceived to be widespread? If such exclusion errors exist, who is left out and why? How prevalent are exclusion errors in targeting? Are households being graduated too early? What are the reasons for this happening? Have households become overly dependent on PSNP support?
- **Household Asset Building Program/Other Food Security Programs:** How do people access credit and the processes through which this happens? Is HABP/OFSP demand-

driven? Are PSNP graduate households seeking credit through the HABP or other existing sources? How are the *kebele* and *woreda* level FSTFs involved in the selection process of HABP beneficiaries? How will business plans be evaluated? What is the technical capacity of development agents to provide training and ongoing support for HABP beneficiaries? How gender sensitive is the HABP? Given the direct support beneficiaries of the PSNP are mainly women-headed, elderly, and disabled households, how will the HABP be fine-tuned to target these groups?

- **Direct support:** Are there instances of chronically food-insecure households that do not receive direct support? What is the understanding of direct support guidelines on the ground? Are households eligible for direct support being covered under public works? How widespread is this?
- **Public works:** What are household experiences of meeting their obligations to contribute labor to public works as a condition for receiving PSNP support? Who in the household contributes labor? What is the gender division of labor on public works? Who carries the extra work burdens? What impact do work requirements have on primary school enrolment? Are parents taking their children out of school to meet their labor obligations? What are perceptions of the effectiveness of public works? In pastoralist contexts, what is the appropriateness of public works for making stronger pastoralist livelihoods?
- **Transfer dilution:** What is the importance of informal social support networks alongside PSNP transfers? What proportion of cash/food transfers do clients share, and with whom? What is the significance of these transfers within relations of reciprocity and interdependencies?

In addition to notes taking, these interviews were tape recorded and subsequently transcribed and coded. In the analysis presented in subsequent chapters, qualitative quotes are used when they are representative of broader trends.

3. Food Security, Assets, and Coping Strategies

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter we present some statistics that describe the context in which the FSP operated and trends in outcomes of interest. In particular, we examine the price changes of main staple food crops, livestock, and labor over the period 2006–2010. We also use information from the survey to examine the extent of shocks experienced by households. Finally, we examine changes in asset levels, food security, and coping strategies; and subjective measures of well-being.

3.2. Context

Like the rest of the world, Ethiopia also experienced a dramatic rise in food prices in 2007–08. This had implications for purchasing power of wages as well as food security among households that are net buyers of food. Figures 3.1a–3.1d show the change in main staple food crops prices, livestock prices, and wages between 2006–08 and 2008–10 by region.

As one would expect, there were significant increases in food prices in 2006–08 but not so much in 2008–10. A point to note is that, even though the price increase in the last two years is not as severe as that seen during the food price crisis, there is still quite a significant upward trend (outside of SNNPR). Livestock prices also rose significantly during 2006–08 in all four regions, with the highest increase seen in oxen prices. In the subsequent period, there was not much change in the oxen and cow prices in Tigray and Amhara. However, livestock prices continue to rise in Oromiya and SNNPR.

The labor market response to the sharp increase in food prices in 2006–08 is quite strong in Tigray and Amhara—where the wages almost doubled over the period. This is not true for Oromiya and SNNPR, even though these two regions were hit worse by the crisis. Livestock prices also rose at a slower pace in these two regions compared to Tigray and Amhara. In light of the analysis, it seems households in Oromiya and SNNPR have been more vulnerable than those in Tigray and Amhara. We next examine regional differences in incidence of various shocks experienced at the household level.

Figure 3.1a. Price changes, Tigray, 2006–08 and 2008–10



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.1b. Price changes, Amhara, 2006–08 and 2008–10



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.1c. Price changes, Oromiya, 2006–08 and 2008–10



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.1d. Price changes, SNNPR, 2006–08 and 2008–10



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

3.3. Incidence of Shocks

One of the goals of the FSP is to protect households from shocks. In Figure 3.2 we assess the prevalence of shocks across the three survey rounds. In general, incidence levels of various shocks in 2010 are almost as high, if not higher, as previous years. In particular, we observe that a much larger fraction of households experience weather-related shocks, such as drought, flood, and erosion. We also observe a 9 percent increase in the fraction of households that did not have access to input markets. There is also a sharp increase in the fraction of households that experienced illness (up from 7 percent in 2008 to 17 percent in 2010).

Figure 3.2. Incidence of shocks



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figures 3.3a–3.3e present the incidence of these shocks by regions and show that there are a lot of regional variations in the occurrence of various shocks. In particular, even though drought remains the most important shock in the Amhara region, its extent is less than in the other three regions. A much larger fraction of households in Tigray and Oromiya experienced a drought shock in 2010 compared to 2008, whereas this fraction declined slightly in Amhara and SNNPR. The Amhara-HVFB sample is different from the Amhara FSP sample, where a large fraction of households (88 percent) experienced a drought shock in 2010. Households in SNNPR are more likely to experience flood compared to other regions and the fraction of households affected more than doubled since 2008, as did the fraction of households that experienced losses due to erosion. Lack of access to input markets and increases in input prices are more prevalent in SNNPR.

Figure 3.3a. Incidence of shocks, Tigray



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.3b. Incidence of shocks, Amhara



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.3c. Incidence of shocks, Amhara-HVFB



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.3d. Incidence of shocks, Oromiya



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.3e. Incidence of shocks, SNNPR



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

In terms of idiosyncratic shocks like death and illness, Tigray, even though the fraction of households that were affected in any year is less than 10 percent, has experienced a decline in the incidence of such shocks. All other regions show an increase in the fraction of households that reported experiencing these shocks in 2010 compared to 2008. This increase is the largest in SNNPR, where the fraction of households that experienced an

illness in the household went up from 10 percent to more than 30 percent. This sharp increase is always driving the average results for the entire sample.

Next we examine whether experiencing various shocks differs by beneficiary status under the FSP. We compare households that receive payments under the public works component of the FSP in each year with households that were not part of the FSP at all. Figure 3.4 gives this information. A quick look at these graphs shows that in each year, the average experience of public works beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is similar. The non-beneficiary households are slightly less likely to report experiencing a drought shock. This may seem a bit inconsistent with the fact that a drought is a covariate shock. But when we combine it with the capability to cope with drought, this makes more sense, because non-beneficiary households, which by definition are better off compared to public works beneficiaries, are better placed to protect themselves.

Figure 3.4. Incidence of shocks, by public works (PW) beneficiary status and year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

We asked households in the survey about consequences of shocks experienced. Figure 3.5 gives the response of households for having experienced a drought. A large fraction of

households have to incur a loss in income or consumption as a result of a drought shock. This shows that a drought not only has negative implications for household income, it also adversely affects household consumption. About 10 percent of households affected by a drought experienced a loss of productive assets. The pattern of responses has remained more or less constant over the period between 2006 and 2010.

Figure 3.5. Consequences of experiencing a drought, all households



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

3.4. Food Security

An important objective of the FSP is to enable households to smooth their consumption by bridging periodical food gaps and eventually reduce food insecurity. In this section, we assess the food security situation of households by examining the food availability, food gaps, and coping strategies of households observed over the last three rounds of the survey. We begin by analyzing the main sources of food available to households. This is essential to understand the patterns and trends of the sources of food consumption as well as understand how households have fared in their food security situation over the last few years.

Food Availability

To assess the above, households were asked to indicate which sources contributed primarily to their food consumption over the 12 months before each survey. Figure 3.6 summarizes primary income sources by month. The figure shows that households report consistent monthly patterns of the composition of their primary food sources over the three years observed. Particularly, for households that participate in the food security program, the primary food source comprises own production, purchases, and the food security program (public works and direct support) itself. Note that the patterns of the compositions of these primary food sources clearly follow the annual food production-food availability cycle of a typical Ethiopian rural household. A striking observation from this figure is that the proportion of primary food sources contributed from own production declines, while the portion contributed by the PSNP increases over the three survey years. Clearly, comparing over the

three years, there is a decline in the proportion of households who reported own production as their primary sources, which would mean an increased need for food purchases. While these patterns suggest the food security program has become increasingly important for the PSNP areas over the three years considered, it would be important to investigate these relationships further using more rigorous methods.

Figure 3.6 raises several empirical questions. What happened to these households over the years? What does this picture look like for the average household and for how many months in a year do households fail to fulfill their food requirements from their own production. Can shocks partly explain the declining trend in the contribution of own production to primary food sources? Figure 3.7 helps to answer some of these questions by giving the average number of months households reported to have run out of home-grown food over the year covered by each survey and whether or not households suffered drought shocks in that particular year.

Figure 3.7 shows that, on average, households had difficulty satisfying their food needs from all production for 3.6 months in a year in 2006. The number fell to 2.2 in 2008 and remained stable. For households that did not experience a drought, the average number of months households fail to fulfill their food requirements from home-grown sources has declined from a little more than 2.5 months in 2006 to about 1.5 months in 2010. The average has declined even more dramatically for households that faced the shock (from about 4 months in 2006 to about 2.5 months in 2010), but still remains higher than for those that did not face a drought.

This picture remains fairly similar even when disaggregated by PSNP status of households (Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.6. Primary source of food, by month and year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.7. Average number of months households run out of home-grown food. by drought conditions



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.8. Average number of months households run out of home-grown food, by drought conditions and PSNP beneficiary status



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

This result seems rather contradicting to the previous result reported from Figure 3.6 that the percentage of households that reported their own production contribution consistently declined from 2006 to 2010. This may not necessarily contradict to the result here, however, because the average number of food shortage months from home-grown food could be declining while, at the same time, the number of people reporting declines in own production are increasing.

Household Food Gaps

It is now common knowledge that households face severe food shortages around the rainy and planting season in Ethiopia. To assess this, households were asked if they suffered any food shortage in the rainy season, which is summarized in Figure 3.9. It can be observed from the figure that the rainy season food gap situations vary across regions and over the

three years considered. Generally, Oromiya and SNNPR are among the regions with highest proportion (a three-year average of above 25 percent) of households reporting food gaps in the rainy season. However, comparing 2006 and 2010, the proportion of households facing food gaps seem to be decreasing for Amhara and SNNPR, while it increases for Tigray and Oromiya.

Figure 3.9. Percent of households that suffered any food shortages in the rainy season, by region and year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

To get a sense of the bigger picture, we assess the number of months households face difficulty fulfilling their household food requirements throughout the year.[4] Figure 3.10 presents the number of months in a year households were unable to satisfy their food needs. The proportion of households that reported to have problems of satisfying their food needs for a longer period of the year has increased over the years. There is a dramatic increase in the percentage of households that reported having food gaps for the most part of the year in the later years (2008 and 2010). There is a marginal improvement in 2010 over 2008 in terms of the percentages of households facing above 10 months of food gaps. For example, close to 15 percent of households reported they had food shortages for the whole year in 2008, while only a little more than 10 percent of households indicated this in 2010.

[4] A household is considered as food insecure in a given month if the household was unable to satisfy its food needs for at least five days in the month.

Figure 3.10. Percentage of households unable to satisfy food needs of the household



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

To have a sense of which part of the year households are most food-insecure, households were asked in which specific month over a period of one year the food shortage was most acute. The distribution of the most severe food shortage month in 2010 by region is given in Figure 3.11. Clearly, for the majority of households, the most food-insecure months fall between February and September. Differences across regions, mainly due to seasonal differences, are also visible here. While the northern regions (Amhara and Tigray) had their severe food gaps in the rainy season and just before harvest (June, July, and September), this situation occurs in SNNPR and Oromiya much earlier than the north, around March and August, respectively. In particular, households from Amhara and Tigray suffered the most acute food gap in September, while households from SNNPR and Oromiya suffered in May and July, respectively. This situation did not improve much over the years. In fact, for Tigray and Amhara regions, the severe food-gap month has moved from August (in 2006 and 2008) to September (in 2010). Besides, the proportion of households reporting the occurrence of the severe month has slightly increased from a little less than 30 percent in 2006 to a little more than 40 percent in 2010.

Figure 3.11. Most severe food gap months, in 2010, 2008, and 2006



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

A sensible question is whether or not the food gap situation varies by households' participation status in the food security program (both public works and direct support). We break down the distribution of the most acute food-gap month into PSNP and non-PSNP household groups. This is summarized in Figure 3.12. Once again, we observe that the months with the most acute food gap span between February and September, regardless of PSNP status. Perhaps the most important observation from these graphs is that the severity of the food insecurity has declined for the PSNP households between March and June in 2010 compared to the same period of 2006 and 2008. This may be attributed to the food availability through the food security program, which, for the most part, corresponds to these same months.

However, although relatively better off in the dry (PSNP) season, PSNP households seem to suffer more in the end of the rainy season in 2010, particularly in September as compared with other years. About 25 percent of the PSNP (compared to less than 15 percent of the non-PSNP) households reported that September is the most severe food-insecure month. Note that we have observed earlier that September is peculiarly the most severe food-insecure month for households in Amhara and Tigray regions.

Figure 3.12. Most severe food shortage month for PSNP and non-PSNP households



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: PW = public works; DS = direct support.

Number of Meals

Households often adopt negative coping strategies (e.g., reduce consumption) when falling short of meeting their daily food requirements from own or external sources. Assessing the ability of the household to consume the ideal number of meals per day household members eat in a normal day would thus provide a self-assessed picture of household food security. For this purpose, households were asked to report the number of meals adult and child members of their household eat per day on a normal and worst food-insecure day. The results are summarized in the following graphs.

Figures 3.13a–3.13c provide the number of meals per day adult and children members eat during a normal and worst food gap month. The number of meals adults and children eat in a normal month is given in Figure 3.13a and 3.13b for comparison purposes. First we note that the majority (about 75 percent) of households in all the three years reported adults eat three

times a day during months with no food shortages. Similarly, with the exception of 2010, where about 40 percent of households report children eat about 5 times a day, the majority (about 38–45 percent) of households reported children eat 3–4 meals a day in months with no food shortages.

Figure 3.13a. Number of meals per day adults eat (no food shortage)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.13b. Number of meals per day children eat (no food shortage)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.13c. Number of meals per day adults eat (during food shortage)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

With this reference in mind, we look at the number of meals adults eat per day in food shortage months and a considerable number of households reported adults eat two times a day. This proportion slightly declines from 2006 to 2010. In contrast, the proportion of households that reported one meal a day increases steadily over the same period, with PSNP households reporting a slightly higher proportion in each year compared to non-PSNP households. The proportion of households that reported adults eating three meals a day is very small and seems to decline from 2006 to 2010 across both groups of households. Thus, in contrast to the no food shortage situation, households in a food shortage situation eat fewer meals, and this seems to deteriorate over the years among the PSNP households.

In Figure 3.14a–3.14b, we present the average number of meals household adults and children eat in normal and food shortage months by region. This is given by region to assess if averages vary across regions. As reported above, the average number of meals per day in a food shortage month is 2 for adults and 3 for children. In a good month, the average number of meals for adults is 3 and for children it ranges between 3 and 4. Region wise, all regions have improved between 2006 and 2010 for both adults' and children's number of meals except for Tigray and Amhara, which saw a slight decline in meals consumed by adults and children in months with food shortages.

Figure 3.14a. Average number of meals per day—Adults



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.14b. Average number of meals per day—Children



Coping Strategies

When facing acute food shortages, households follow a number of coping strategies that sometimes are negative and unsustainable to the household. One such example is consuming their productive inputs, such as seed stocks, consuming other holdings, or consuming unusual foodstuffs. In the Ethiopian historical context, the latter had happened in situations where food shortage was most acute and survival was at stake. As such, reports of households eating unusual foodstuffs have been considered as an alarm to the food security situation of households in a given area. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that eating wild animals is sometimes part of hunting and may not necessarily indicate an acute food security situation. Bearing these in mind, we assess if there was any likelihood of households consuming such unusual foods.

Figure 3.15 gives the percentages of households that reported having consumed unusual food, wild animals/plants, and seed stocks. Clearly, some households in all regions have reported they had consumed three of these items, but in different proportions across regions and years. It appears that a considerable number of households from Oromiya and SNNPR in all years, and households from Tigray in 2006 reported they consumed unusual foodstuffs. This should be taken carefully though, because what is unusual food in the other parts of the country could be a normal food in the southern part of the country (SNNPR).

A case in point is that root crops are commonly consumed in SNNPR, which could be considered as unusual food in some other regions. What is somehow worrying is, however, a considerable proportion of households have reported to have eaten their seed stocks, which appears to be slightly higher in 2008 in Amhara and SNNP than in the rest of the years.

Figure 3.15. Percentage of households reporting different coping strategies, by year and region



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Does this situation remain the same in both the PSNP and non-PSNP areas? Figure 3.16 helps to answer this question. The proportion of the PSNP households consuming seed

stocks increases from 2006 to 2008 but marginally declines between 2006 and 2010, while the proportion of non-PSNP households consuming seed stocks increases between 2006 and 2010. The consumption of unusual food by all types of households declines between 2006 and 2010 with slight increases in 2010 from that of 2008. The consumption pattern of wild animals/plants remains fairly irregular over the years with a slight decrease for the non-PSNP households in 2008 and PSNP households in 2010.

Figure 3.16. Percentage of households reporting different coping strategies, by PSNP beneficiary status and year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

3.5. Asset Levels

Households experienced widespread drought and other weather related shocks, large increases in input prices, as well as difficulties in accessing input markets in 2010. These conditions have prevailed for most of the period since 2006 and have worsened in many cases. Such an environment is far from conducive to maintain asset levels, let alone growth in their levels. We now turn to some trends in various types of assets held by households and the likelihood that they incurred distress sale of assets for satisfying food needs.

Figure 3.17 gives the average real value of production assets (hoes, sickles, ploughs, water pumps etc., but not livestock) held by households for the whole sample and by region.[5] This shows that, on average, the value of production assets has fluctuated around 150 Birr between 2004 and 2010, with a small increase observed from 2004 to 2006, followed by a small decrease observed in 2008, and then, finally, a small increase in 2010. The regional graphs show a very different picture and emphasize the regional differences. On the whole, households in Tigray hold a much higher value of production assets and have experienced a steady decline over the six-year period for which we have data. The average value of production assets held in Tigray in 2004 was close to 272 Birr, which fell to 199 Birr in 2010—a decline of 27 percent. Oromiya, on the other hand, experienced a steady increase

[5] We deflate nominal values with the regional CPIs published by the Central Statistical Agency, Ethiopia.

in the average value of production assets held over this period. Even though the absolute value of assets held in Oromiya is much lower than that in Tigray, the asset growth over this period was close to 32 percent. Value of production assets among households in Amhara and SNNPR fluctuated from positive to negative and then again positive in the periods 2004–2006, 2006–2008, and 2008–2010, respectively.

Figure 3.17. Value of production assets owned (Birr)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

We examine the average real value of production assets by beneficiary status in Figure 3.18. This figure shows that, on average, public works beneficiaries hold a lower value of production assets compared to non-beneficiaries. However, public works beneficiaries have experienced a slow and steady increase in the value of these assets, whereas the non-beneficiaries' asset growth has fluctuated.

Figure 3.18. Value of production assets owned (Birr), by beneficiary status



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: PW = public works beneficiaries.

Livestock is a very important asset in the rural Ethiopian context; therefore we now examine movements in livestock held by households in our sample. In each survey round, we asked households to give detailed livestock ownership for the survey year as well as the previous two years. This allows us to construct annual values of livestock held from 2004–2010. Figure 3.19 gives the average real value of livestock held by households over the period 2004–2010. Value of livestock held remained more or less constant around 3,500 Birr between 2004 and 2006, it fell to 3,000 Birr in 2008, and then again went up to 3,500 Birr in 2009–2010. These findings can be rationalized on the basis of findings described in subsection 3.2. We know that the period between 2006 and 2008 saw sharp increases in food prices that were not accompanied with similar increases in livestock prices or wages. As a result, households may have been forced to sell off assets (mostly livestock) at a faster pace in 2008 to overcome food shortages.

The graphs for the four regions (Figure 3.19) give a much different picture. First, the average levels of value of livestock held differs across the regions—they are much higher in Oromiya and much lower in SNNPR than in the other two regions. Second, trends in value of livestock held vary by region. In Tigray (except for 2004–05), there is a downward trend over the period. The trend in Amhara mimics somewhat a business cycle—where it increases from 2004 to 2005, then decreases between 2005 and 2006, reaches an all-time low in 2008, and then starts to increase from 2009 onward. Oromiya experiences a decline in value of livestock held from 2004–2008, then a rise in 2009 followed by a slight decline in 2010. Households cite pests and diseases that affect livestock as a major shock in this region over the past six years (Figure 3.2), which improved significantly in 2010. Oromiya was also the hardest hit in terms of the food price crisis that led to a significant increase in food prices but a small increase in livestock prices. These two factors may explain the decline in livestock value up until 2008. The food price situation has improved significantly in that region and livestock prices continue to rise in 2010—thereby enabling households to accumulate livestock.

Figure 3.19. Value of livestock owned (Birr)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.20 presents the real value of livestock owned by beneficiary status. This shows that, on average, public works beneficiaries own a lower value of livestock compared to non-beneficiaries. Another interesting feature of this graph is the extent to which livestock value fell from 2006 to 2008 in the wake of the food price crisis. Both groups experienced large losses, although the absolute and relative magnitudes of these losses are much lower for the public works beneficiaries. Livestock value fell by 9.6 percent among public works beneficiaries, whereas the corresponding number for non-beneficiaries was 19.6 percent. That said, non-beneficiary households seem more resilient to the shock compared to public works beneficiaries, as they were able to get back to pre-crisis levels by 2009. Although public works beneficiaries have yet to go back to pre-crisis levels in terms of livestock value, their asset levels have been consistently raising since 2008, which is not true for the non-beneficiaries. We will be able to say more about the impact of the FSP on livestock holdings in the impact report.

Figure 3.20. Value of livestock owned (Birr), by beneficiary status



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: PW = public works beneficiaries.

The value of livestock held gives a good measure of value of livestock but does not throw much light on the number of livestock held. To get around this issue, we present the total tropical livestock units (TLU) held by households over the period.[6] These are presented in Figure 3.21. We observe a steady increase in TLU held by households in the sample from 2004–2007, then a slight decline in 2008, and then a rise in 2010. There are regional variations as indicated by the regional graphs. Figure 3.22 gives the average TLU held by beneficiary status. Not surprisingly, given the targeting of the PSNP, non-beneficiaries have higher livestock holdings than public works beneficiaries.

[6] TLU equals one for cattle, horses, and mules, 0.15 for sheep and goats, 0.005 for poultry, 0.65 for donkeys, and 1.45 for camels (Ramakrishna and Demeke 2002).

Figure 3.21. Tropical Livestock Units owned



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.22. Tropical Livestock Units owned, by beneficiary status



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: PW = public works beneficiaries.

Distress Asset Sales

A major cause for households to draw down assets is to satisfy food needs when faced by a shock. One of the objectives of the FSP is to promote asset accumulation among its beneficiaries so that they can survive shocks, such as drought, that affect their income and agricultural output. Because these households are also the ones that are most vulnerable to shocks, asset accumulation would happen at a much slower pace as compared to non-beneficiaries that start off with a much higher base of stock of assets. The FSP, by providing a means of income during the lean season, aims to protect households from drawing down their assets in order to fulfill food needs. Figure 3.23 shows the average fraction of households that incurred distress sale of assets over the period 2006–2010. On the whole, this fraction has declined steadily from about 48 percent in 2006 to 43 percent in 2008 and 30 percent in 2010. The regional graphs show that there is some variation across the four regions. In Tigray, even though a bit steeper than average, the pattern is the same as the sample as a whole. Oromiya started out with a largest fraction of 61 percent households

incurring distress sale of assets in 2006, which fell to 47 percent in 2008 and remained stable thereafter. Amhara and SNNPR experienced an increase in distress asset sales in 2008 compared to 2006 and then a sharp decline in 2010 compared to 2008.

Figure 3.23. Distress sale of assets for satisfying food needs (proportion of households)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Is there a difference between distress asset sales across public works beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? Figure 3.24 throws some light on this question. On average, the pattern of distress asset sales has been similar across rounds. Public works beneficiaries started with an average fraction of 51 percent of households incurring distress sale of assets, which has gone down steadily and was observed to be 34 percent in 2010. The corresponding figures for non-beneficiary households were 44 percent in 2006 and 28 percent in 2010. This shows that the decline in the fraction of households that incurred distress asset sales is not too different for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, in combining this finding with the finding on asset levels among the two groups, we can say that even though beneficiaries have much lower levels of asset holdings compared to non-beneficiaries, they have been able to fulfill their food needs without having to sell off their assets.

Figure 3.24. Distress sale of assets (proportion of households), by beneficiary status



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: PW = public works beneficiaries.

3.6. Subjective Well-being

Next, we turn to data on households' perception of poverty and well-being. In the survey, we asked households to rank themselves as compared to other households in the village. Figure 3.25 gives responses for the 2008 and 2010 surveys. A larger fraction of the beneficiary households describe themselves as amongst the poorest in the village in 2010 (39 percent) as compared to 2008 (33 percent). At the same time, the fraction of beneficiaries that described themselves as the poorest has gone down.

Figure 3.25. Compared to other households, you describe your household as…



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

An important means of coping with shocks is by borrowing. In the survey, we ask whether the household would be able to borrow easily 100 Birr within a week. Figure 3.26a shows that the fraction of households that can easily borrow 100 Birr has gone up slightly from 54 percent to 57 percent between 2008 and 2010. However, the fraction of beneficiary households that are able to borrow remained constant at 52 percent over this period. On average, beneficiaries are less likely to be able to borrow 100 Birr as compared to non-beneficiaries.

Figure 3.26a. Proportion of households able to borrow 100 Birr



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

In the survey, we also asked households if they were given 100 Birr, how they would spend it? Figure 3.26b shows that, on average, 50 Birr would be spent on food, with FSP beneficiaries spending slightly more on food than non-beneficiaries. Shares on education and other nonfood expenses are almost identical across households, whereas non-beneficiaries are slightly more likely to save from the 100 Birr.

Figure 3.26b. Average share spent on . . . if given 100 Birr



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

When asked about the household's food consumption over the year, overall, in 2010 households are more likely to respond that they had just enough as compared with 2008 (Figure 3.27a). Although all household groups have improved on this account, the fraction of households that reported the positive outcome is larger among the non-beneficiaries. In terms of housing needs, conditions have remained more or less static over the two rounds (Figure 3.27b). On average, as shown in Figure 3.27c, 32 percent of households feel that their household incomes were just adequate in 2010 as compared to 26 percent of households that felt the same in 2008. The gain is higher among non-beneficiary households (29 percent to 36 percent) as compared to beneficiaries (23 percent to 28 percent).

Figure 3.27a. Households' food consumption (percent of households)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.27b. Household's housing needs (percent of households)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 3.27c. Household's income (percent of households)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Lastly, households were asked about their perception of the overall economic situation of their household as compared to one year ago. The results are shown in Figure 3.28 and are very encouraging. Responses from 2008 possibly reveal the impact of the food price crisis, where a large fraction of households irrespective of beneficiary status said that they were much worse off now (i.e., in 2008). The situation is much better in 2010, where the fraction of households that feel that they are either the same or a little better off is 70 percent as compared to 41 percent in 2008. Here, the PSNP beneficiaries feel a little better about their economic situation as compared to the non-beneficiaries. In other words, 72 percent of the beneficiaries feel that they are either the same or a little better off now, as compared to 68 percent among non-beneficiaries.

Figure 3.28. Overall economic situation of household compared with one year ago... (percent of households)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

3.7. Summary

In this chapter we examined the price trends, incidence of shocks, and summary statistics of key outcomes of interest. There are several important findings.

- There were sharp increases in food prices in 2008, with some regional variation. This sharp increase in food prices was not accompanied with a comparable increase in livestock prices or wages. Oromiya and SNNPR were worse hit by this crisis as compared to the two northern regions in our sample.
- In 2010, food prices continue to rise, but the rate of increase is much slower. SNNPR experienced a decline in food prices.
- Drought is the most important shock that affects a large fraction of households every year and causes income and consumption shortfalls.
- The incidence of shocks differs across regions, but does not vary much across beneficiary status.
- When looking at households' primary source of food, we find that a large fraction constitutes food from own production. However, this fraction has steadily declined. The fraction sourced from PSNP has increased steadily over the period.
- The food gap as measured by the number of months that the household is unable to satisfy its food needs from own production has reduced from 3.6 months to 2.3 months among all households.
- FSP beneficiary households, on average, hold lower levels of assets compared to non-beneficiaries. This is reasonable, since the FSP beneficiaries were selected to be the more vulnerable and poor.
- Over the period 2004–2010, asset levels have increased. Although beneficiary households have not experienced accumulation of assets at a fast pace, they have shown a steady increase.
- There has been a decline in distress sale of assets, irrespective of beneficiary status.
- On subjective measures of well-being, also households have fared better in 2010 as compared to 2008. In particular, when asked about how they felt their overall economic condition was as compared with last year, in 2010, 70 percent of households feel that they are either the same or a little better off, as compared to 41 percent in 2008.

4. Woreda Perspectives on Implementation

4.1. Introduction

The PSNP PIM states that "The *woreda* is the key level of government that determines needs, and undertakes planning and implementation of safety net activities". A partial list of *woreda* responsibilities includes:

- The *Woreda* Office of Agriculture and Rural Development (WOARD) manages both the PSNP and the HABP.
- The *Woreda* Food Security Task Force (WFSTF) reviews *kebele* annual PSNP and HABP plans and budgets, ensures that contingency plans for PSNP risk financing are in place, and provides assistance to *kebeles*.
- The *Woreda* Food Security Desk (WFSD) coordinates safety net and household asset building activities.
- The *Woreda* Office of Finance and Economic Development (WOFED) ensures that the budgets for the safety net and household asset building programs are received in a timely manner at the *woreda* level and subsequent transfers to beneficiaries are undertaken on a timely basis (World Bank 2009, 25).

Under the FSP, there has been a deliberate strategy to increase implementation capacity at the *woreda* level and significant resources have been dedicated to implement this strategy. This chapter assesses the success of this strategy in terms of improvements in measurable dimensions of capacity (for example, training and physical infrastructure) and whether these have resulted in more timely transfers to beneficiaries. It also considers the role played by early warning systems and the use of contingency funds. It draws on the following data sources: the *woreda* quantitative survey, and key informant and focus group interviews at the *woreda* and regional level. As such, it provides a *woreda* level perspective on implementation, complemented in some places with information taken from regional sources. In doing so it addresses the following evaluation objectives described in the inception report (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Evaluation objectives covered in chapter 4

Evaluation objective	Issue	Data sources	Links to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP			
	Are public works payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	3	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 39
	Are direct support payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	3	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 35
	Why are there *woreda* level differences in timeliness of transfers?	3	TOR, para 36
	How are contingency budgets used, including as a response to the *Kebele* Appeals system?	3	TOR, para 41

Source: Authors' compilation.

4.2. Woreda Resources for the PSNP

We begin by describing the characteristics of key *woreda* staff involved in the implementation of the PSNP (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2. Characteristics of key *woreda* staff

	Head, Woreda Food Security Office	PSNP accountant	PSNP cashiers
Sex (percent)			
Male	95	76	65
Female	5	24	35
Age			
Mean years	32	27	27
Schooling (percent)			
University degree	75	40	5
High school plus some post high school education	25	52	48
High school	0	8	20
Less than completed high school	0	0	27
Mean years worked in this:			
Position	2.5	3.4	3.3
Woreda	7.0	3.9	3.9
Occupation	3.2	3.1	3.2
Job status (percent)			
Full-time	94	25	18
Part-time	6	75	82
Received training specific to the PSNP			
Percent	93	95	50

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

Levels of formal education are high; these officials are predominantly male and young. They are relatively new to their positions. The Head of the *Woreda* Food Security Office (WFSO) works full-time while the PSNP accountant and cashiers generally work part-time on the PSNP. Nearly all heads of the WFSO and accountants working on the PSNP have received training—see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for specifics. This was also apparent during the key informant interviews held at the *woreda* level. For example, knowledge and comprehension of the three types of the PSNP budget lines (the Transfer, Capital and Administrative, and the Contingency) among the *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces (WFSTF) was high across all regions. In eight out of ten *woredas* in this study, the key actors of the program (WFSTF/OFSP coordinators) are familiar with the different budget lines of the PSNP. Training of cashiers is less common and focused on financial management (see Figure 4.3).[7]

[7] During the workshops held in August 2011, regional representatives expressed some surprise about the low level of PASS training. They intimated that training is ongoing and that, given the timing of the survey, that staff turnover may have temporarily reduced the number of cashiers trained on PASS.

Figure 4.1. Type of training received: Head, Food Security Office



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 4.2. Type of training received: PSNP accountant



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 4.3. Type of training received: PSNP cashiers



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

The quantitative *woreda* questionnaire contained a series of questions about infrastructure access and quality. Slightly less than 50 percent (40/85) of *woredas* had generators. There were 15 *woredas* that did not have generators and electricity supply was okay, poor, erratic, or non-existent (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. Quality of access to main electricity (percent of *woredas*)

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	All
Excellent	0.0	0.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	3.5
Good	61.5	55.0	40.0	52.4	61.9	55.3
Okay	30.8	25.0	20.0	14.3	19.1	21.2
Poor	7.7	5.0	0.0	4.8	9.5	5.9
Erratic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
No electricity	0.0	15.0	10.0	28.6	9.5	14.1

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.
Notes: Excellent = available all the time; Good = available most of the time; Okay = available about half of the time; Poor = available less than half of the time; Erratic = rarely available.

There are considerable differences in phone access across these four regions. Tigray, and to a lesser extent SNNPR, have excellent or good communications by landline, cell phones, or both (Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). Phone access in Amhara is mixed with about half the *woredas* surveyed having excellent or good access, but a quarter having both landline and cell phone access that is "okay" or worse (Table 4.6). Phone access is poorest in Oromiya. Internet access is largely absent. Seventy-two percent of the *woredas* (61/85) have no internet access at all and of the remainder, only two *woredas* described access as either excellent or good.

Table 4.4. Quality of access to landline telephones (percent of *woredas*)

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Excellent	76.9	50.0	30.0	19.1	10.0	34.5
Good	15.4	25.0	20.0	42.9	65.0	36.9
Okay	0.0	5.0	10.0	4.8	15.0	7.1
Poor	7.7	15.0	10.0	14.3	5.0	10.7
Erratic	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
No landline	0.0	5.0	30.0	19.0	5.0	10.7

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.
Notes: Excellent = available all the time; Good = available most of the time; Okay = available about half of the time; Poor = available less than half of the time; Erratic = rarely available.

Table 4.5. Quality of cell phone coverage (percent of *woredas*)

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara–HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Excellent	15.4	20.0	10.0	10.0	4.8	11.9
Good	46.2	45.0	50.0	35.0	61.9	47.6
Okay	23.1	10.0	20.0	10.0	19.1	15.5
Poor	7.7	15.0	10.0	20.0	4.8	11.9
Erratic	7.7	5.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	3.6
No cell phone coverage	0.0	5.0	10.0	20.0	9.5	9.5

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.
Notes: Excellent = available all the time; Good = available most of the time; Okay = available about half the time; Poor = available less than half the time; Erratic = rarely available.

Table 4.6. Quality of cell phone and landline access (percent of *woredas*)

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Both are excellent or good	61.5	60.0	40.0	38.1	47.6	49.4
Only landline is excellent or good	30.8	15.0	10.0	23.8	23.9	21.2
Only cell coverage is excellent or good	0.0	5.0	20.0	4.8	19.0	9.4
Neither are excellent or good	7.7	20.0	30.0	33.3	9.5	20.0

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

Access to government-owned vehicles is “rare or never available” in more than half the localities (Table 4.7). In principle, *woreda* officials can rent private vehicles when government vehicles are not available. However, in less than 30 percent of the *woredas* where access to government-owned vehicles was “sometimes available” or “rarely or never available” was a vehicle rented.

Table 4.7. Access to government-owned vehicles (percent of *woredas*)

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Always available or available on short notice	15.4	30.0	10.0	14.2	28.6	21.7
Sometimes available	46.2	30.0	20.0	23.8	23.8	28.2
Rarely or never available, not known	38.4	40.0	70.0	61.9	47.6	50.6

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

On average, there are 1.84 computers available for the exclusive use of the PSNP. More than 90 percent were in working order at the time of the survey (Table 4.8).

Table 4.8. Access to working computers and printers (percent of *woredas*)

At least one working		Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Computer	Printer						
Yes	Yes	84.6	95.0	60.0	61.9	90.5	80.0
Yes	No	15.4	5.0	20.0	33.3	9.5	16.5
No	Yes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
No	No	0.0	0.0	20.0	4.7	0.0	3.5

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

Respondents were asked about their access to PSNP-related manuals. Generally, access is good but not perfect (Table 4.9). Out of the 85 surveyed *woredas*, 75 reported that they had the PIM, 75 had the targeting manual, 79 had the graduation manual, 72 had the financial management manual, and 67 had the manual covering watershed management. Access to manuals was most problematic in Oromiya.

Table 4.9. Access to manuals (percent of *woredas*)

PIM	Targeting	Graduation	Financial Management	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	61.5	90.0	80.0	42.9	81.0	70.6
Yes	Yes	Yes/ No	Yes/No	7.7	5.0	10.0	19.1	9.5	10.6
Yes	No	Yes/ No	Yes/No	7.7	0.0	0.0	23.8	0.0	7.1
No	Yes/No	Yes/ No	Yes/No	23.1	5.0	10.0	14.3	9.5	11.8

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

One way of considering these resource data in aggregate is by assessing whether *woredas* have access to manuals, computers and printers, and vehicles—items that the FSP has some control over. Table 4.10 provides these summary data. Several features are apparent. First, relatively few *woredas* have all the resources needed to provide transfers on a timely basis. Across all surveyed *woredas*, only 17.7 percent have all manuals, at least one working computer and printer, and reasonable access to transport. Second, transport emerges as the single largest gap in capacity in many *woredas* in Tigray, Amhara, and SNNPR. Third, access to resources is—by a considerable margin—poorest in Oromiya where nearly a quarter of surveyed *woredas* lacks working computers and/or printers, and has poor access to transport.

Table 4.10. Aggregate PSNP resources (percent of *woredas*)

Transport always available or available on short notice	At least one working computer and printer	*Woreda* has all manuals	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Yes	Yes	Yes	7.7	30.0	10.0	9.5	23.8	17.7
Yes	Yes	No	7.7	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	2.4
Yes	No	Yes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	1.2
Yes	No	No	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
No	Yes	Yes	46.2	55.0	40.0	19.1	52.4	42.4
No	Yes	No	23.1	10.0	10.0	28.6	14.3	17.7
No	No	Yes	7.7	5.0	30.0	14.3	0.0	9.4
No	No	No	7.7	3.3	10.0	23.8	4.8	9.4

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

4.3. Woreda Differences in the Timeliness of Cash Payments

How do *woreda* level resources affect the timeliness of payments to beneficiaries? To answer this, we begin by describing how the cash payments system works and how long it takes for payments to be made. With this information in hand, we look at the relationship between the timeliness of cash payments and *woreda* level resources available to support the PSNP.

The Cash Payment System and the Timeliness of Payments

The system for making cash payments consists of the following steps. *Kebeles* are responsible for forwarding attendance sheets and lists of individuals eligible for direct support to the WFSO. The WFSO enters these data using a payroll software system called PASS. Nearly all *woredas* surveyed, 90 percent, use PASS to enter these data, 6 percent use PASS only for public works participants, and 4 percent do not use PASS. When this is complete, this information is given to the WOFED. The regional Bureau Office of Finance and Economic Development (BOFED) notify WOFED when funds have been transferred to the branch of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia from which the *woreda* can withdraw funds. Once funds are withdrawn, arrangements are made to pay beneficiaries.

The *woreda* quantitative survey asked staff from WFSO and WOFED to construct a time line listing the different dates on which these activities took place for the last month on which a cash payment was made; 71 out of the 85 *woredas* surveyed were able to provide this information.[8] Figure 4.4 summarizes this information showing the cumulative mean number of days taken to deliver payments. This shows that, on average, data entry into PASS begins 3.1 days after the receipt of the first attendance sheet. Data entry is completed 14.6 days later and so the payment information is given to WOFED 17.7 days after receipt of the first attendance sheet. On average, 5.7 days later, staff goes to the Ethiopia Commercial Bank to withdraw funds for payment, and 3.9 days after that makes the first payment trip. It takes 11.6 days to make all payments with the result that, on average, 38.9 days elapse between the receipt of the first attendance sheet and the last day on which payments are made.

[8] In eight cases, the *woreda* had not made a cash transfer since January 2010 and in six cases, information was incomplete.

There are a number of *woredas* where the process of entering data into the PASS continues after payments are made; this is described in Figure 4.4 as "to end of processing."

Figure 4.4. Cumulative mean number of days to deliver payments, by activity



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 4.11 shows how the time taken to complete these activities varies by region showing the time taken by the fastest *woreda*, the *woreda* at the 25th percentile of the regional distribution of processing time, the median, the 75th percentile, and the slowest *woreda*. The rows are ordered from the fastest region—as measured by the median—to the slowest.

Tigray reports the fastest time between receiving the first attendance sheet and the end of processing; the median time being 23.5 days. SNNPR and Amhara-HVFB are close behind with median times of 31 and 33 days, respectively. Median processing times in Amhara are slower at 39 days and the median in Oromiya, 50 days, lags far behind the other regions. Table 4.11 also shows that there is considerable variation *within* regions. If we look at the 75th percentile—which tells us that three-quarters of *woredas* processed payments at or faster than this number—we see that Tigray still outperforms the other regions but that there is now a smaller difference between Amhara and SNNPR. Generally, *Oromiya* processes payments more slowly than other regions, but while it has the *woreda* with the slowest processing time, it also has one of the fastest. This suggests that while a regional disaggregation is informative, it would be helpful to focus on additional factors that are associated with differences in processing cash payments.

Table 4.11. Regional variations in number of days taken to deliver cash payments

	Sample size	Fastest *woreda*	25th percentile	Median	75th percentile	Slowest *woreda*
Tigray	12	13	18.5	23.5	34	123
SNNP	21	14	23	31	44	78
Amhara-HVFB	6	6	30	33	34	42
Amhara	16	17	30.5	39	49	60
Oromiya	16	6	32.5	50	104.6	125

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

To do so, we begin with Figure 4.5. The triangles in Figure 4.5 represent the median cumulative amount of time taken; the lower bubble shows the cumulative time by the fastest (10th percentile) *woreda* and the top bubble shows the cumulative time by the slowest (90th percentile) *woreda*. It shows that the *woredas* that process and pay fastest do so with genuinely impressive speed, taking only 13 days from the start of data entry to the final payment. The median *woreda* completes all these activities in 32 days, while the slowest *woredas* took 90 days.

Figure 4.5. Variations in number of days to deliver payments: 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 4.6 divides this sample of *woredas* into three groups based on the speed at which they completed all activities and shows the median cumulative time taken from the receipt of the first attendance sheet to final payment for each group.

Figure 4.6. Timeliness of payments, by tertiles



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Virtually all *woredas* start data entry immediately on receipt of the first attendance sheet. It is worth noting that, generally, *woredas* do not receive all attendance sheets at the same time. On average, 12 days elapsed between receipt of the first and final attendance sheets, but this hides considerable variation. In 75 percent of the surveyed *woredas*, it took less than 15 days to receive all attendance sheets. In the remaining *woredas*, the time between receiving the first and the last attendance sheets was between 16 and 120 days. When asked for their perceptions of what caused delays, 8 out of 13 *woredas* in Tigray and 17 out of 30 *woredas* in Amhara indicated that delays in receiving attendance sheets from *kebeles* was a problem. In both Tigray and Amhara, a number of respondents indicated that *kebeles* would not send attendance sheets until a specified amount of work had been completed. Few *woredas* wait until receipt of the last attendance sheet before beginning data entry, but in nearly all cases, this resulted in longer (than the median) processing times.

Comparing the fastest and middle group of *woredas*, the amount of time taken from the start of data entry to the first payment trip is approximately the same. The median time taken by the fastest group to complete all payments is 8 days compared to 16 days for the middle group, and this difference largely accounts for the overall difference between the fastest and middle groups. The slowest *woredas* take a long time to submit payment information to WOFED, have to wait 17 days before making the first trip to the bank to withdraw funds, and do not make their first payment before an additional 10 days after that.

BOFED notifies WOFEDs when funds have been transferred to the branch of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia from which the *woreda* can withdraw funds. About 72 percent of *woredas* call BOFED to see if funds have been sent to these branches. In nearly all cases, BOFED sends a letter verifying that funds have been deposited. On average, 16 days elapsed between attendance sheets being given to WOFED and the final trip to the bank to withdraw funds needed for payment. But variation in elapsed time across *woredas* is large. It took five days or less to obtain money for payment in half of the *woredas* surveyed but it took

more than 15 days in 30 percent of *woredas* surveyed. Approximately one-third of all *woredas* reported that they were not able to withdraw the funds they needed to pay all beneficiaries.

Resources and Payment Delays

As part of the *woreda* quantitative survey, respondents were asked to provide their views on what problems affected the timely payment of beneficiaries. These are described in Table 4.12.

Table 4.12. *Woreda* perceptions of problems affecting payments

	Sample size	Delay in receiving attendance sheets	Delay in getting funds from BOFED	Transport	PASS	Donor delays	Lack of cashiers or accountants and staff turnover	Lack of other resources	Too many beneficiaries to pay
Tigray	13	8	2	5	1	2	4	1	3
Amhara	19	8	9	5	6	0	4	3	1
Amhara-HVFB	11	4	6	5	2	0	5	0	0
Oromiya	21	1	19	16	4	0	2	0	1
SNNP	21	7	17	9	4	0	4	3	0

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

These issues were also discussed during the qualitative key informant interviews held in 10 *woredas*. Many of these discussions highlighted significant delays in the release and transfer of budgets from regions to *woredas*. Many, but not all, noted that the system is working better now than it did in the past. In Tembaro *woreda* of SNNPR, the following was noted: "Earlier, the budget delay was a common practice. This year there is no delay in receiving the budget" [SN_T/W-KI-1]. By contrast, in Ebinat *woreda* in Amahara region, a respondent stated: "Most of the time the funds were released on time, but they are delayed this year" [AM_E/W-KI-1]. A similar response was generated in Shebedino *woreda* of the SNNPR: "In earlier times, the money comes on time, but this year it is delayed" [SN_S/KI-1].

The respondent from Gursum *woreda* of Oromiya region noted that the delay resulted from the failure of strictly following the PSNP calendar as it is indicated in the PIM as well as the time-intensive reporting processes from *woredas* to regions[9]:

> The PSNP calendar year is still confusing for us. According to the PSNP PIM, PSNP uses the local (Ethiopian) budget year, while the actual budget transfer is according to the Gregorian calendar year. Delay of transfer (capital, administration, and 5 percent contingency) is mainly due to delay in reporting from the *woreda*. The region is also not timely facilitating the transfer for us [ORO_G/KI-1].

Somewhat surprisingly in light of Table 4.12, of the 10 *woredas* covered in the qualitative study, only two (Afherom and Sasei Tsemba in Tigray) reported that the front-loaded

[9] The PSNP PIM indicates that 80 percent of the capital and the administrative budgets will be front-loaded prior to the first quarter of the season in order to facilitate the implementation of public work activities. However, the capital and the administrative budgets were not front-loaded to the regions and *woredas* on a timely manner. "The region receives the capital budget once in a year and the other budgets are split into three rounds" [SN_R/KI-1].

sources were insufficient to effectively implement the programs. Two others (Zeway Dugda in Oromiya and Shebedino in SNNPR) declined to share their views and experiences whether the resources were sufficient or not. In the remaining cases, the sufficiency of front-loaded (i.e., pre-transferred) resources is treated in association with the timely release/delay of resources. This could be attributed to the misinterpretation or misunderstanding of "front-loading" of resources with the timely transfer. The following various quotes indicate this aspect when asked, "Has the up-fronting of resources been sufficient for you to effectively implement the PSNP in your area?" *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces replied as:

> The capital budget has come here in March. It was also delayed last year; as a result we weren't able to use the capital budget [SN_T/W-FG-1].

> Last year, the capital and the transfer budgets were released early in December for January–March. We, however, did a procurement of materials on accrual/liability in October since we are not able to work on irrigation and natural resources activities if we do not accomplish procurement in October. We then paid back when the budget arrived in December to WOFED [AM_S/W-FG-2].

The *Woreda* Food Security Task Force in Gursum *woreda* in Oromiya region indicated that they did not receive front-loaded resources. The following quote reflects this aspect.

> We didn't receive any front-loading. The region sends us the first 40 percent PSNP resource transfer usually in March after 2–3 months implementation of PSNP. This is inadequate to procure all required items for the public works and other programs. As a result, we are forced to postpone procurement of capital items for public works [ORO_G/W-FG-1].

Are these concerns consistent with what we observe across all *woredas* where we have quantitative data on payment delays? To examine this, we ran regressions in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of days taken by a *woreda* to complete a particular task (Table 4.13). We use logarithms for two reasons: they minimize the influence of outliers; and the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as percentage changes resulting from changing the explanatory variables. Because the dependent variable is (log) days spent undertaking a task, a variable associated with this activity occurring more quickly will have a negative coefficient and a variable associated with this activity occurring more slowly will have a positive coefficient. These characteristics used as regressors are either Yes/No variables or they are expressed in logarithms. Where the characteristic is a Yes/No variable (for example, "Bank not local and more than one trip was required to obtain funds"), the reported coefficients can, to a first approximation, be interpreted as percentage changes. For example, the number 0.611 in column (2) means that, controlling for other characteristics, the time taken from the submission to WOFED to the first payment trip was 61.1 percent higher in *woredas* where PSNP staff could not use government vehicles.

Table 4.13. Associations between *woreda* characteristics and time spent on PSNP payment activities

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(Log) Number of days between		
	Receipt of first attendance sheet and WOFED submission	Submission to WOFED and first payment trip	First payment trip and last payment trip
Both landline and cell phone service is excellent or good	-0.617*	-0.180	0.194
	(-1.663)	(-0.423)	(0.373)
Electricity supply is excellent or good	-0.562*		
	(-1.737)		
PSNP funds were front-loaded		-1.700***	-1.220**
		(-3.909)	(-2.140)
Bank not local and more than one trip was required to obtain funds		0.101	-0.268
		(0.179)	(-0.473)
PSNP staff could not use government vehicles		0.611*	0.730**
		(1.710)	(1.994)
Number of cashiers working exclusively for PSNP	-0.447*	0.066	0.108
	(-1.875)	(0.195)	(0.296)
PSNP accountant trained in PASS	-0.957***		
	(-2.916)		
Number of years PSNP accountant has worked in *woreda* (log)		-0.016	-0.042
		(-0.0537)	(-0.119)
Travel time to furthermost *kebele* (log)	0.380		-0.071
	(1.343)		(-0.157)
Constant	2.574	2.075***	2.925
	(1.530)	(2.983)	(1.135)
Observations	50	46	46
Adjusted R-squared	0.207	0.182	0.062

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.

Table 4.13 presents a number of interesting results.[10] Good access to communication infrastructure is associated with faster processing of the attendance sheets. Better electricity supply helps too, as does having more staff. The most striking result in column (1), however, is the coefficient on whether the PSNP accountant was trained. Recall from Figure 4.2 that about 70 percent of PSNP accountants were trained on the PASS. Where this has occurred, processing of attendance sheets goes much faster. We explored whether other characteristics (not reported) of *woredas* affected the time spent on this task. Access to working computers and printers did not affect this, but this may be because virtually all *woredas* now have these. Access to manuals did not seem to matter nor did the characteristics (age, sex, education) of the staff working on the PSNP.[11]

What accounts for the length of time it takes from the submission of information to WOFED to the first trip to pay beneficiaries? As described above, the key constraint is whether funds have been transferred from the regional BOFED to the local branch of the Commercial Bank

[10] Two caveats should be born in mind. Table 4.12 shows associations and accordingly caution should be used when interpreting the results. Second, the sample sizes are relatively small.

[11] We considered whether *woredas* that had more experience with cash transfers processed payments more quickly. Using data collected in the *woreda* quantitative survey, we calculated the number of times in 2010 that the *woreda* had made cash payments prior to the payment cycle described here. Neither descriptive statistics nor regression analysis showed a correlation between prior experience with cash and processing times.

of Ethiopia. Where these funds have been front-loaded (i.e., pre-transferred), the amount of time taken to complete this step is dramatically lower (column [2]). The mean time to complete these activities in *woredas* where funds have not been front-loaded is about 20 days, while in *woredas* where front-loading occurs, it is only two days. Table 4.13 indicates that this difference persists even when we control for other *woreda* characteristics.

Lack of access to vehicles appears to be the most important factor when it comes to assessing what influences the amount of time it takes to make all payments. Column (3) shows that where PSNP staff did not have access to government vehicles, and hired private vehicles or walked to payment sites, it took approximately 73 percent longer to complete all transfers. Front-loading of funds was also correlated with faster payments. In these results, and in others not reported, other characteristics, such as the age, sex, and education of PSNP staff, travel times, and other *woreda* resources (such as availability of computers) did not have statistically significant associations with the time taken to complete these activities.

It should be noted that *woreda* staff expressed considerable concern about these delays. In both focus group and key informant interviews, respondents indicated that these delays led to distress sales of assets and borrowing money at high interest rates. In addition, a delay resulted in the procurement of poor construction materials for the public works and this, in turn, led to low quality of public works. In addition, delays in transfer reduce the amount of time available to complete public works and created difficulties in managing these activities. These problems were compounded when disbursement of the capital budget was delayed.

> The budget delay causes inappropriate procurement of materials that lack proper quality. Besides, it is difficult to properly administer the work [AM_S/KI-1].
>
> The budget is supposed to be released in January, but is usually delayed for over a quarter of the year. Even when it is released, by the time we are able to purchase materials with the capital budget, we are not in the intended fiscal year anymore due to the delay; rather, the work is postponed for the subsequent year [TIG_S/KI-1].
>
> If the capital budget is delayed, we will not have time to buy industry products or construct infrastructures since there is a limited time before the end of the budget year. We will not be able to buy tools on time. It prevents us from putting plans into action. The time that could be used for implementation will be shortened [SN_D/KI-1].

4.4. Woreda Differences in the Timeliness of Food Transfers

We had intended to provide an analysis of the timeliness of food transfers similar to that provided above for cash payments. However, it proved difficult to obtain information from enough *woredas* to do so. We suspect that the principal reason for this is that responsibility for food distribution is split across a number of actors in many *woredas* and it is also difficult to obtain a full picture about how this works.[12] For example, we have data from 49 *woredas*

[12] The regional discussion in Tigray was helpful on this issue. They suggested that this difficulty may have arisen in part because we did not include a sufficiently broad set of knowledgeable respondents. They indicated that in some *woredas*,

on who was responsible for arranging transport of food. This was handled by WFSO in 28 *woredas*, by an NGO in 15 *woredas*, by WOFED in one *woreda*, and by others (not specified) in five *woredas*. Consequently, here we provide an abbreviated description of the system through which food transfers are made.

Just as with cash transfers, initially, attendance sheets are sent to the WFSO. Apart from Amhara-HVFB, this information is entered on PASS. Where the *woreda*, either through the WFSO or WOFED, is responsible for arranging the distribution of food transfers, the attendance data are given to WOFED. This does not occur in the Amhara-HVFB *woredas*. There are dedicated storage facilities for PSNP food transfers in just over half the *woredas* that answered this question. In *woredas* where distribution is handled by the government, there are delays in making payments as a result of difficulties in arranging transport—this was reported by 19 out of 29 *woredas*. Transport is less of an issue in *woredas* where distribution is handled by NGOs with only 4 out of 15 reporting that problems in accessing transport contributed to delays in making payments. Twelve out of 45 *woredas* had only one food distribution point, 13 had two, 11 had three, and 9 had five or more.

Table 4.14 lists the median number of days taken to deliver food transfers—from the receipt of the first payment to the final delivery—for the relatively small number of *woredas* for which this outcome could be constructed. As with cash payments, Oromiya lags behind other regions.

Table 4.14. Regional variations in number of days taken to deliver food transfers

	Sample size	Median
Amhara-HVFB	3	11
Tigray	6	17
Amhara	3	23
SNNP	11	30
Oromiya	3	50

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

4.5. Woreda Resources and Early Warning and Response Capacity

The PSNP PIM clearly indicates that the PSNP will incorporate the information from the findings of the Early Warning System while preparing a contingency plan to effectively respond to the imminent risks in a given area. At the regional level, information is collected regularly on weekly, monthly, bi-annual, and annual basis on market prices of cereals and livestock, crop performance (pre- and postharvest crop assessment), school drop-outs, malnutrition rates, rainfall patterns, animal health and diseases, and availability of animal feed and water. The qualitative study carried out in 10 *woredas* showed that 8 have established the system for collecting early warning information. The other two have not started but state that they receive information from *kebeles* in an informal way. However, the early warning and transfer experts in Afherom *woreda* of Tigray region stressed that there is a weak linkage between the *woreda* and *kebele* early warning information flow and management:

managers responsible for food stocks and food distribution storekeepers might be able to assist in constructing these time lines.

> The way the system is organized is good. There is a better flow of information from the *woreda* to the region. But the information flow, particularly from the *kebele* level, is not regularly/consistently responding unless there are emergencies. They are not using the communication channel effectively [TIG_A/W-KI-2].

Most information is collected by development agents using a format developed at the *woreda* level. Community involvement is limited in the information collection process. This was indicated in the response of the informants from Ebinat *woreda*, in Amhara region:

> While collecting information about the distribution of rain, we identify which *kebele* has fully received rains, we send an agriculture supervisor, one supervisor for three to four *kebeles*, with a format. The supervisor fills the format accordingly and then it is sent to the zones. They [zone bureau of DPPA and FSC] need it in number [AM_E/W-KI-2].

Once the information is collected, it is consolidated by the *Woreda* food security and Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency (DPPA)[13] and sent to the zonal offices of the DPPA and FSC on a monthly basis. Regional FSC-DPPA offices, in turn, produce a consolidated early warning information report on a monthly basis and pass it on to the Federal Early Warning and Response Directorate (EWRD) in Disaster Risk Management and Food Security (DRMFS).

There are regional differences in terms of the utilization of the early warning information. In Oromiya, it was indicated that although the early warning team collects timely and context-based information, they are not involved in developing a *woreda* contingency plan. Early warning experts have indicated their dissatisfaction that the regions are not using the information collected accordingly to release and send the resources for the *woredas* when required. “The region was not using our regular reports to justify and allocate resource from the 15 percent contingency resource between 2005 and 2008” [ORO_G/W-KI-2].

In the other regions, the information is used to prepare a contingency plan. The PSNP PIM indicates that the purpose of a contingency plan is to respond in due course to an unexpected deteriorating situation during the PSNP implementation. However, in practice, the contingency planning is not implemented as stated in the PIM across the regions covered in this study. Interviews with the regional and *woreda* level early warning and transfer experts indicated that the contingency plan had not been prepared as it should be and the existing planning approach is mainly based on post-incidence of the shocks. When asked, “How does the region/*woreda* prepare contingency plans to monitor risks and respond to shocks accordingly?,” they responded as follows:

> We do prepare our contingency plan by building on scenarios based on the previous year’s situation of each locality. The plan is meant to minimize future shocks [TIG_R/KI-EW].

[13] Since the last two years, the government’s Early Warning information management and structure have been revised, hence the names of some of the agencies have changed. Currently at the *woreda* level the Early Warning Response and Food Security process owner reports to the Zone and it goes up to the Regional level Early Warning and Response Core process (REWCP). The REWCP consolidates and reports to the Federal Early Warning and Response Directorate in DRMSS. However, it should be noted that during this study, the revised structure has not been fully functioning in most of the *woredas* assessed.

> So far, *woreda* contingency plans are more response oriented. The plan often focuses on addressing the observed risk [ORO_R-KI-2].
>
> We didn't have contingency plans in the last five years. We started to exercise contingency planning in 2010. We used to develop response measures once shocks are observed. The *woreda* early warning technical team will carry out an assessment on the observed shocks and associated risks, estimate population affected, propose measures, and report to the *woreda* FS and DPPA to take response measures [ORO_G/W-KI-2].
>
> So far we did not plan for a contingency budget; it is the food security work process that plans the contingency. They simply ask us relevant information for the plan input. They do not involve us much in the planning process [AM_E/W-KI-2].

One of the topics discussed during these key informant interviews was early warning and response (EWR) capacity. Strikingly, many of the capacity concerns raised in those discussions echo those that emerge from these quantitative data on capacity to make transfers. While the regional bureaus were generally adequately staffed (although concerns were raised about skill levels and training), staff and capacity limitations were widely reported at the *woreda* level and this adversely affected the collection and reporting of early warning data in an accurate and timely manner, the preparation of contingency plans, and the ability of *woreda* officials to respond to shocks.

Poor communication infrastructure and lack of transport were frequently cited as significant constraints to EWR activities. The regional EWR Case Team in Amhara described the condition as follows: "…there is no transportation and logistics to immediately deliver assistances to the required locations. Even it is difficult for yourself to get public transport" [AM/ R-FG-3]. These concerns were echoed at the *woreda* level. A key informant on EWR from Saesi Tsedamba *woreda* in Tigray stated: "Vehicles and motorbikes are nearly nonexistent" [TIG-S/ W-KI-3]. The Ebinat *woreda* Early Warning and Response Case Team stated:

> Challenges for the team are lack of resources: computers with printers, motorbikes. We cannot visit places stricken by shocks immediately within 24 hours. We simply sit down in the office due to lack of transportation. Usually we go to such places with others [NGOs and *woreda* sector offices] waiting for their field visit plans [AM-E/W -KI-3].

These resource constraints are especially problematic in localities where road access is poor and topography rugged. A key informant in Sekota *woreda* explained this bitterly:

> There is a place called Dagbji, where 18,000 PSNP beneficiaries are living scattered in nine *kebeles*. This area is very far from the *woreda* capital and it is not easily accessible. There is no access road leading there. I can take you there to see it if you want. There is no opportunity to access them... [Am-So/ W-FG-1].

Respondents were asked whether there were any significant delays in responding shocks from the federal level. Apart from SNNPR (where it was not possible to interview the EWR team), in the remaining regions officials said that there was a delay in responding to shocks. Across the ten focus groups that we conducted on this topic, eight indicated that the response was not timely, often arriving after communities have deployed negative coping strategies already. Respondents explained that the resources arrive, on average, two-to-three months after the shocks struck. However, the early warning and transfer experts in Shebedino and Tembaro *woredas* indicated that the responses were timely. In part, this might relate to the fact that these two *woredas* are located in a relatively easily accessible distance from the regional capital, Awassa, and particularly, Shebedino *woreda* is just about half an hour's drive from Awassa. This could be factored that the regional early warning team could easily arrive to the sites whenever the shock is reported.

It is worth noting that staff working on EWR issues at the *woreda* level voiced concerns about access to office support. The EWR Case Team of Ebinat *woreda* perceived that this was a consequence of the relatively low priority attached to EWR activities by the *woreda* administration:

> The *woreda* administration does not give emphasis to the team considering it is not developmental work.... We are asked information on daily basis. But we have no facilities to fulfill these requests. Telephone, computers, and motorbikes are the most important materials needed to be fulfilled for this team [AM-E/W-KI-3].

4.6. Contingency Funds

The revised PSNP PIM (June 2010) indicates that the PSNP contingency fund will be used for the following purposes both at the regional and *woreda* levels: (1) to provide support to households that qualify for inclusion in the PSNP but have not been entered in the regular program, either because their need was recognized after the annual retargeting exercise, or because the regular program budget is insufficient to include them; (2) to respond to transitory needs among existing PSNP clients; and (3) to respond to transitory needs among non-PSNP households based on early warning data collected by the *woreda*.

In other words, the contingency fund is used to respond to both chronic and transitory cases of food insecurity among PSNP and non-PSNP households. The responses from both regional and *woreda* level key PSNP implementers confirmed that this basic principle and the purpose of the contingency fund are well understood. When asked, "What is the contingency fund?," the majority of the informants associated its purpose with the occurrence and reduction of risks within the PSNP and the non-PSNP *woredas*. The informants from Oromiya region said: "The contingency fund complements other food security programs (PSNP, HABP) through taking timely actions to reduce the impacts of shocks" [OR_R/KI-1]. Interviews with the SNNPR food security task force revealed that "it is a fund used when shocks occur and affect non-PSNP beneficiaries in a given *woreda* and if there is acute need" [SN_R/KI-1].

Respondents in interviews conducted at the regional level were asked: "How have the contingency funds been used in this region?". In Oromiya, the following response was given:

“The contingency fund is utilized in the form of 5 percent and 15 percent in the region” [OR_R/KI-1]. This response indicates that the principle of the allocation of the contingency fund, rather than the actual practice and use of the fund, has been applied in the region. Only in SNNPR we were told that the contingency fund had been used to extend the months of transfers for the PSNP beneficiaries and to solve problems related to inclusion and exclusion errors.

Similar responses were given when these issues were discussed at the *woreda* level. In SNNPR, the contingency fund was used to support both the PSNP and non-PSNP beneficiaries. Support to PSNP beneficiaries includes extending months of transfers, increasing new caseloads by applying full family targeting, and covering needs during shocks and emergencies. The same support is also provided for the non-PSNP *woredas* in case of emergencies. For instance, in Tembaro *woreda* of the SNNPR, “the contingency fund is used to extend the payment for PSNP beneficiaries and to provide support to non-PSNP households” [SN_T/W-KI-2].

Almost all of the *woredas* covered in this study utilized the 5 percent contingency fund allocated to them during this year for emergencies. Interviews with early warning and transfer experts generated the following responses to the question, “How did this *woreda* use the PSNP 5 percent contingency fund this year?”:

> To compensate for the price increase, to increase the number of months for the PSNP beneficiaries, and to increase a new caseload like households who are chronically food insecure and the non-PSNP beneficiaries [ORO_G/W-KI-2].
>
> To increase the new caseload through providing cash transfers up to 150 households who had already graduated from PSNP and were affected by drought and to provide two months additional transfer for the PSNP public works graduates [ORO_Z/W-KI-2].
>
> To increase the new caseload to those PSNP households whose family members were not fully targeted and to accomplish activities that are already underway [TIG_A/W-KI-2].
>
> Support *kebeles* that do not get the emergency support [AM_E/W-KI-2].
>
> Used to compensate the impact of shocks for both the PSNP and non-PSNP households [AM_SO/W-KI-2].

Apart from two *woredas* (Ebinet and Dembagofa), the remaining *woredas* requested a contingency budget in addition to the 5 percent already allocated to address drought-related shocks. Four *woredas* indicated that they had made a request for the additional contingency fund since the beginning of the program implementation. However, Zeway Dugda *woreda* indicated that it has requested only this year and Tembaro *woreda* had presented the request in each of the last three consecutive years. *Woredas* that received additional contingency fund used them in different ways. The key informant interviews with the respective *woreda* early warning experts produced the following responses:

> The fund was used to support 3,463 drought-affected people who are not benefiting from the PSNP through involving them in public works and the payment was made in cash [ORO_Z/W-KI-2].
>
> We used to use the fund for extending the support periods of some PSNP beneficiary households, such as HIV-affected families, elderly, OVC (Orphans and Vulnerable Children), etc., which are not able to feed themselves for the rest of the six months. In addition, if we have some more funds, then we extend the support period of all PSNP beneficiaries for one to three months [TIG_S/W-KI-2].
>
> Yes, we got a response from the region and used the resources to assist the PSNP beneficiaries whose family members were not targeted [AM_SA/W-KI-2].
>
> We used the 5 percent for PSNP beneficiaries whereas the 10 percent was used for non-PSNP beneficiaries [SN_S/W-KI-2].

Key informant interviews with *woreda* early warning and transfer experts revealed that a number of challenges were faced in using and allocating the contingency funds. These included delays in transfer of funds, limited funds relative to needs, lack of technical support, limited staff capacity to prepare contingency plans, and lack of time to implement planned activities.

4.7. Summary

This chapter has assessed whether concerns about capacity have been addressed and whether this has contributed to more timely transfers to beneficiaries. There are several noteworthy findings:

- *Woreda* level offices are increasingly well-resourced with trained staff. Nearly all now use the PASS system and nearly all have functioning computers. Most, but not all, have manuals that can be referred to. Training has occurred, although this could be more widespread.
- On average, it takes 38.9 days (as measured by the mean) or 32 days (as measured by the median) from the time a *woreda* receives its first attendance sheet to the last payment.
- There is considerable variation in these times across *woredas*. The best performing *woredas* manage to complete all activities associated with making payments in 21 days. By contrast, the worst performers take nearly two months.
- Both the qualitative and quantitative data point to several factors that explain *woreda* level differences in the timeliness of payments. These include lack of training on the PASS, the absence of front-loaded transfers, and lack of transport.
- These factors are perceived to adversely affect beneficiaries as well as the smooth operation of the PSNP.
- The PSNP contingency fund principles and purposes are well understood at both regional and *woreda* levels.

5. Kebele and Household Perspectives on Implementation

5.1. Introduction

The sustainability of any program—the PSNP included—depends in part on whether it is successfully implemented. As with chapter 4, this chapter also focuses on implementation, but here the perspective is largely that of the *kebele* and the household. It considers the following topics. Are local administrative structures such as *Kebele* and Community Food Security Task Forces in existence and functioning as envisaged in the Program Implementation Manual? Are households aware of these Task Forces and do they understand their role in the implementation of the PSNP? How do beneficiaries perceive their experiences with the payment process? Have client cards been distributed? This chapter draws largely on the quantitative community and household surveys. It addresses the following evaluation objective described in the inception report (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Evaluation objectives covered in chapter 5

Evaluation objective	Issue	Data sources	Links to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP			
	Are public works payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	Quant_HH Quant_Comm Focus	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 39
	Are direct support payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	Quant_HH Quant_Comm Focus	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 35
	Transfers are received at a place no more than three hours from home	Quant_HH	PSNP Log frame Output 1.5
Assess trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients			
	Beneficiaries understand how the program works	Quant_HH Focus	PSNP Log frame Output 4.4

Source: Authors' compilation.

5.2. The Kebele and Community Food Security Task Forces

All *kebeles* should have a Food Security Task Force (KFSTF). Tasks undertaken by the KFSTF include:

- Community mobilization activities so as to identify and prioritize community needs;
- Plan prioritized activities with community members;
- Targeting beneficiaries and participants for public works and direct support with input from the community;
- Prepare a *Kebele* Safety Net Plan in consultation with *woreda* sectoral offices;
- Maintaining minutes of KFSTF meetings on Safety Net issues, lists of participants, and progress reports;
- Establishing and training Community Food Security Task Forces; and
- Participating in the monitoring and evaluation of safety net activities (GFDRE 2010).

At the local level, Community Food Security Task Force's (CFSTF) are supposed to be established. Their tasks include:

- Identify potential participants for the PSNP;
- Undertake needs assessments so as to identify those households who can participate in public works and those without sufficient labor or other support who will need direct support;
- Ensure that the proposed list of participants is commented on and endorsed by the general meeting of the village residents;
- Finalize the list of participants and submit it to the KFSTF;
- Prepare a pipeline of projects; and
- Monitor periodically public works projects to ensure that they are undertaken as prioritized.

Tables 5.2 to 5.5 document the existence and activities of the KFSTF and the CFSTFs, drawing on information collected as part of the community questionnaires in 2006, 2008, and 2010.

Kebele FSTFs exist in all surveyed localities. Table 5.2 shows the composition of these KFSTFs. Broadly speaking, on an ongoing basis, these match with what was set out in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM). There appears to be a slight improvement in their composition in Oromiya, where, in 2006, the KFSTFs deviated most from the guidelines set out in the PIM. In nearly all (98 percent) surveyed *kebeles*, there is at least one woman and at least one development agent on the KFSTF.

Table 5.3 describes aspects of record keeping undertaken by these task forces. In addition to asking about whether certain types of records were kept, in 2006, 2008, and 2010, enumerators asked to see these records in order to verify that they did, in fact, exist. (They could not determine whether the records were accurate, only that they existed.) Participant lists and minutes of meetings are well-kept but there appears to be a drop in the number of KFSTFs that keep progress reports. Somewhat surprisingly, the percentage of cases where these records were actually seen by enumerators drops substantially in all regions.

Table 5.2. Composition of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF), by region

Region	Survey year	Percent of KFSTF that contain:			
		Chairperson of *kebele* council	A member of the *kebele* council	An elected representative from elders	An elected representative from youth
Tigray	2006	83	80	75	86
	2008	97	100	94	97
	2010	74	83	81	89
Amhara	2006	97	97	76	88
	2008	75	75	78	78
	2010	94	83	80	86
Amhara - HVFB	2006	-	-	-	-
	2008	100	91	95	98
	2010	90	92	87	87
Oromiya	2006	84	89	84	70
	2008	75	84	81	81
	2010	96	96	96	88
SNNPR	2006	94	89	81	80
	2008	97	95	92	82
	2010	100	91	94	83

		Number of elected representatives from women's groups				Number of development agents			
		0	1	2	> 2	0	1	2	> 2
Tigray	2006	3	31	19	47	8	44	14	34
	2008	0	55	19	25	0	50	11	39
	2010	5	37	17	40	0	54	31	15
Amhara	2006	6	39	6	49	0	58	12	30
	2008	11	14	28	47	8	47	6	39
	2010	0	37	40	23	0	51	29	20
Amhara - HVFB	2006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2008	0	27	9	64	0	41	14	45
	2010	0	22	42	36	0	22	8	70
Oromiya	2006	6	44	39	11	6	64	25	5
	2008	11	51	30	8	11	65	25	5
	2010	0	13	48	39	0	39	31	30
SNNPR	2006	0	50	31	19	0	64	17	19
	2008	8	44	23	26	3	62	15	21
	2010	0	37	34	29	3	46	14	37

Source: Community questionnaire, 2006, 2008, and 2010.

Table 5.3. *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF) record keeping, by region

Region	Survey year	Does the KFSTF keep:			
		Records or minutes of meetings?	Records or minutes of meetings and at least one was seen?	Progress reports of activities?	Progress reports of activities and at least one was seen?
Tigray	2006	92	92	92	92
	2008	92	86	97	94
	2010	83	33	69	35
Amhara	2006	79	76	82	78
	2008	86	78	67	64
	2010	86	42	64	57
Amhara - HVFB	2006	-	-	-	-
	2008	89	86	86	84
	2010	95	77	76	66
Oromiya	2006	78	61	73	68
	2008	68	59	73	62
	2010	79	53	79	63
SNNPR	2006	83	72	86	80
	2008	85	77	85	77
	2010	77	48	54	53

		Keep a list of:		When was the list of participants last updated?			
		Participants?	Participants and at least one was seen?	Not known	Before January	January–March	April–July
Tigray	2006	97	94	3	17	22	58
	2008	97	97	3	14	25	58
	2010	89	52	8	58	19	14
Amhara	2006	100	92	8	14	17	61
	2008	92	86	6	22	29	43
	2010	100	50	15	33	33	18
Amhara - HVFB	2006	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2008	98	98	5	22	30	48
	2010	100	72	0	55	35	10
Oromiya	2006	89	83	18	4	13	65
	2008	89	84	13	17	16	54
	2010	96	70	18	32	36	14
SNNPR	2006	97	97	11	5	18	66
	2008	97	97	5	8	18	69
	2010	100	60	6	56	36	3

Source: Community questionnaire, 2006, 2008, and 2010.

5.3. Households' Interactions with the Community FSTF

Table 5.4 shifts attention to the Community Food Security Task Force. Given its role as the link between the FSP and the community, it is useful to begin by seeing whether respondents were aware of the existence and function of the CFSTF. The sample is disaggregated into three groups: households that had participated in the public works component of the PSNP, households that had received any transfers under the direct support component of the PSNP, and households that had received both work under PSNP and direct support payments. Table 5.4 shows a consistent, but also somewhat surprising, pattern across all regions. Between 2006 and 2008, knowledge of the CFSTF has increased among the program beneficiaries, particularly in Tigray and Amhara. Table 5.4 also shows

that the percentage of program beneficiaries that are aware of the CFSTF and had contact with the CFSTF increased significantly in all regions and among both kinds of beneficiaries from 2006 to 2008. However, this pattern reverses between 2008 and 2010 with awareness of and contact with CFSTFs at best remaining static and in some cases declining. One, admittedly speculative reason for this could be that the frequency with which beneficiary lists are being updated has declined (see Table 5.3), resulting in less contact between CFSTFs and beneficiaries. In general, female-headed households were 5 to 13 percentage points less likely, depending on the region, to have contact with the CFSTFs.

Table 5.4. Household contact with the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF), by region, year, and beneficiary status

	Tigray			Amhara			Amhara-HVFB		
PSNP beneficiary status, received:	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**
	Aware that the CFSTF exists (percent)								
Public Works	76	92	86	70	89	86	-	-	96
Direct Support	62	83	64	45	79	57	-	-	78
Public Works and Direct Support	64	98	88	33	-	80	-	-	93
	Aware that the CFSTF exists and had contact with the CFSTF (percent)								
Public Works	44	75	81	49	83	81	-	-	78
Direct Support	17	57	54	21	69	59	-	-	55
Public Works and Direct Support	34	73	71	17	-	77	-	-	76

	Oromiya			SNNPR		
PSNP beneficiary status, received:	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**
	Aware that CFSTF exists (percent)					
Public Works	79	86	78	88	91	87
Direct Support	54	66	50	84	76	77
Public Works and Direct Support	73	-	80	93	-	85
	Aware that the CFSTF exists and had contact with the CFSTF (percent)					
Public Works	53	80	69	67	83	86
Direct Support	24	62	61	47	69	68
Public Works and Direct Support	46	-	89	80	-	83

Source: Household questionnaire: 2006, 2008, 2010.
Note: Cells are left blank if there were fewer than 10 responses.

Households were also asked to identify the purpose of the CFSTF and Table 5.5 summarizes their responses. Gilligan et al. (2009, Table 3.4a) showed that between 2006 and 2008 there was a significant increase in the proportion of PSNP beneficiaries who could identify specific CFSTF functions. Table 5.5 shows the extent of this awareness using data from the 2010 household survey, disaggregated by beneficiary status and region. When compared to 2008, there is a decline in households' ability to identify CFSTF roles, a finding consistent with the reduced levels of contact seen in Table 5.4. Also note that respondents in Oromiya had the greatest difficulty in identifying the role of the CFSTF and Oromiya is the region where contact with CFSTFs is lowest. Female-headed households, and households headed by individuals with no formal schooling, were less likely to be able to identify these roles.

Table 5.5. Household knowledge of the role of the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF), by region and beneficiary status

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
	Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to mobilize the community for public works				
PSNP beneficiary	71.7	74.4	82.9	59.8	79.3
Non-beneficiary	68.2	46.9	68.4	41.6	63.0
All	70.7	59.5	74.3	49.6	70.6
	Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to identify individuals to participate in public works				
PSNP beneficiary	62.0	54.8	70.9	48.5	65.2
Non-beneficiary	57.3	33.8	64.6	35.7	51.4
All	60.7	43.4	67.2	41.3	57.8
	Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to identify direct support beneficiaries				
PSNP beneficiary	62.3	51.8	67.9	40.7	62.1
Non-beneficiary	56.9	30.5	58.8	29.5	48.6
All	60.8	40.3	62.5	34.4	54.9
	Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to monitor public works activities				
PSNP beneficiary	64.5	76.9	72.2	58.5	71.8
Non-beneficiary	63.6	43.7	63.6	38.6	57.7
All	64.2	58.9	67.1	47.3	64.2

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

5.4. Households' Experiences with the Payment Process

Output 4.4 in the PSNP Log Frame states that beneficiaries should be able to understand how the program works. In both 2008 and 2010, PSNP beneficiaries were asked directly if they felt that they had received all information needed to understand how the program works. In 2008, this was asked as a Yes/No question, while in 2010, respondents could say if they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed. In 2008, between 55 percent (Oromiya) and 80 percent (SNNPR) of respondents answered "yes." If we assume that "strongly agree" and "agree" are equivalent to "yes," then Table 5.6 shows that there have been noticeable improvements in understanding in Amhara (from 65 to 83 percent), Amhara-HVFB (74 to 84 percent), and SNNPR (from 80 to 88 percent). There are slight declines in understanding in Tigray and a considerable percentage of beneficiaries in Oromiya (45 percent in 2008 and 47 percent in 2010) do not feel that they have sufficient information. The Oromiya results are consistent with the findings reported in Table 5.4, showing that contact with the Community FSTFs had declined in that region between 2008 and 2010. Also consistent with lowered rates of contact is the fact that, as shown in Table 5.6b, female-headed households and households where the head had no formal schooling were slightly less likely to strongly agree that they had sufficient information to understand how the program works.

Table 5.6a. Beneficiaries received all information needed to understand how the program works (percent), by region

	2008	2010				
	(Percent saying yes)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Did not state
Tigray	74	22	47	14	7	9
Amhara	65	23	60	12	3	1
Amhara-HVFB	74	38	46	11	3	2
Oromiya	55	18	35	22	15	10
SNNPR	80	47	41	8	3	2

Source: Household questionnaire 2008, 2010.

Table 5.6b. Beneficiaries received all information needed to understand how the program works (percent), by sex and schooling of household head

	2010				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Did not state
Sex of head					
Male	30.4	45.4	12.4	7.1	4.8
Female	26.9	46.4	15.9	4.9	5.9
Education of head					
No schooling	29.3	44.8	14.1	6.5	5.4
Any formal schooling	35.9	44.5	10.1	6.3	3.2

Source: Household questionnaire 2010.

Both public works and direct support beneficiaries were asked about their perceptions regarding payments and the payment process. This included whether they thought they had been paid in full and on time. In 2010, they were asked how many days' notice they were given that they would receive a payment. In both 2008 and 2010, beneficiaries were asked how they had been treated when receiving their payment. Results are reported in Tables 5.7–5.10. As with the results reported in Table 5.6a, in 2008, these were asked as Yes/No questions, while in 2010, respondents could say if they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed.

Table 5.7. Beneficiaries' perceptions regarding being paid in full (percent)

	2008	2010				
	(% saying yes)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Did not state
Tigray	72	19	45	16	12	8
Amhara	74	17	59	16	8	1
Amhara-HVFB	90	42	48	7	3	0
Oromiya	58	14	30	30	17	9
SNNPR	90	43	39	10	6	1

Source: Household questionnaire 2008, 2010.

Table 5.8. Beneficiaries' perceptions regarding the timeliness of payments (percent)

	2008	2010				
	(% saying yes)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Did not state
Tigray	17	8	27	34	22	8
Amhara	40	9	35	38	16	1
Amhara-HVFB	52	32	36	24	8	1
Oromiya	15	5	9	41	37	9
SNNPR	53	27	27	28	16	1

Source: Household questionnaire 2008, 2010.

Table 5.9. Number of days' notice that beneficiaries had that payments would be made (percent)

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
1 day	68	83	72	76	72
2-3 days	21	14	24	16	25
4-5 days	2	1	2	4	2
More than 5 days	8	2	2	4	1

Source: Household questionnaire 2010.

Table 5.10. Beneficiaries' perception that they were treated courteously (percent)[a]

	2008	2010				
	(% saying yes)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Did not state
Tigray	79	19	51	13	7	10
Amhara	92	24	65	6	4	1
Amhara-HVFB	92	43	47	5	3	2
Oromiya	77	23	37	17	13	10
SNNPR	95	43	42	8	4	2

Source: Household questionnaire 2008, 2010.
Note: a/ There was no difference in the proportions of male- and female-headed households who reported being treated courteously.

In Amhara-HVFB, respondents are most likely to perceive, in both 2008 and 2010, that they have received their payments in full. About 82 percent of respondents in SNNPR have this perception in 2010, a decline from the 90 percent recorded in 2008. Just over half of PSNP beneficiaries in Oromiya think that they are receiving their full payments in 2010, a figure unchanged since 2008. (We return to the issue of payments in full in chapter 8.) In Oromiya, considerable concern was also expressed about timeliness of payments. Only 14 percent of beneficiaries agree or strongly agree that they receive payments on a timely basis and 37 percent strongly disagree. While Oromiya is the worst performing region by this measure, beneficiaries clearly perceive that there is considerable scope for improvement in the timeliness of payments.[14] Related to this issue, Table 5.9 indicates that, as a general rule,

[14] Regional level discussions indicated that there may have been some issues specifically relating to the 2010 payment cycle which affected the timeliness of payments. In Oromiya, it was indicated that payments were delayed to those *woredas* that had been tardy in the distribution of client cards. Tigrayan authorities noted that lack of grain availability led to payment delays in some localities.

beneficiaries have no idea when their payments are coming. Between 68 and 83 percent receive only one day's notice that they will be paid.[15]

Timeliness of payment elicited considerable comments during the qualitative fieldwork. Twenty-four out of 30 focus group discussions (FGD) came to consensus that payments were made irregularly and often they did not know from one month to the next when to expect payment.[16] This causes problems for beneficiaries in terms of planning expenditure, loan defaults, and lack of food.

> We got paid 3 months in cash and 3 months in food. There is a delay in time of the payments. For instance, PSNP starts in January every year but payment delays up to March [TIG_A/FG-1].
>
> The payment schedule is monthly, but there is delay in pay times, even up to 3–4 months [TIG_A/FG-3].
>
> We are paid every 2–3 months. The payment time is not predictable and timely information not given. We receive when transfer comes [ORO_G/FG-4].
>
> At the start [of the PSNP] it was regular. Now it is coming every three months; however, it does not come timely. As a result we do not buy assets but rather directly purchase food. In short, we are paid three times [ORO_Z/FG-3].
>
> No clue [when we will receive next payment]. We are not informed when the next payment will be [ORO_Z/FG-3].
>
> We do not know when the payment is coming. We only know the arrival when it is announced. We prefer to be paid monthly. If the payment could have been paid without delay each month, this would have been the basis for our growth [SN_D/FG-3].
>
> We get our payments accidentally, in an unpredictable way [SN_S/FG-1].
>
> We do not know when payments are to be made. We are told suddenly that we are going to get paid. If it were given monthly, we would have been able to do what we planned [SN_S/FG-1].

The few that mentioned that there was some predictability to payments said that payments were usually made every 2–3 months. This is strikingly consistent with the quantitative data reported above. The majority of people who responded to the question about preferred payment arrangement indicated that a monthly payment was best. In about five focus group discussions, respondents said they would like bimonthly payments. Overall, the timing of payment caused less concern than the lack of predictability of payment.

When asked, "Do you know when you will receive your next payment?," the majority of responses indicated that there was a lot of uncertainty when the next payment will arrive. Twenty-four out of 26 focus group discussions that answered this question said that they did

[15] Participants in the regional workshop in Tigray provided a caveat to this finding. They noted that in Tigray, beneficiaries are given an approximate date about a week before payments are made; this date is subsequently confirmed. Where this approach is implemented, our data will understate the amount of notice that beneficiaries receive.

[16] The section on timeliness and frequency of payments was excluded from the "transitioning" focus groups due to the length of the survey instrument for this group.

not know the date. Only two groups indicated that they expected the next payment to be made on a specific date. There was much more confidence in the amount of the payment (food or cash) to be received: “The current level of payments are good; the problem is the delay” [SN_D/FG-1]; “We do not know the time, but regarding how much, we know the usual amount” [SN_S/FG-1]. In fact, most respondents indicated that they knew the payment amount in advance.

In the (frequent) event that payments do not arrive near an expected date, many respondents said that they resorted to borrowing and taking loans as a coping strategy. The sale of assets to finance the time between expected payment and actual receipt was mentioned in seven focus group discussions.

> The delay in payment makes our lives difficult, particularly the households with no reserves, as they go out to borrow from others [TIG_A/FG-1].
>
> Some families who can afford from other sources may not be affected by the delay as such. But in other households, we know that some sell assets such as sheep, goats, or go out for credit and loans to sustain the periods of delay [TIG_A/FG-3].
>
> If we do not get payment on time, we will be forced to take credit to consume food and we will be psychologically forced to be in tension [TIG_S/FG-4].
>
> We are paid once in three months. But this leads to grain price increases due to high money injection into the limited local market. We do not know the time of the next payment, but we know how much we will receive [ORO_Z/FG-4].

When they are paid, beneficiaries are—for the most part—treated courteously by program staff. Table 5.10 shows that only in Oromiya a relatively large percentage of respondents disagree (17 percent) or strongly disagree (13 percent) with the statement, “I was treated courteously by the staff.” However, the results of Tables 5.8 and 5.9 should be viewed with concern, given that timely and predictable payments are listed as an Output (1.1) in the PSNP Log Frame. Table 5.7 suggests that there may be issues associated with receipt of complete entitlements too. This issue appears as Output 1.2 in the PSNP Log Frame.

Table 5.11 provides descriptive statistics on beneficiaries experiences when travelling to the payment site. Outside of SNNPR, beneficiaries typically walk[17] 12 to 16 kilometers to the place where they will be paid. Given that beneficiaries have to cover this same distance when they return home, and given that being paid requires long periods of standing in line, it is not surprising that many beneficiaries must sleep at the payment site. The fact that 84 percent of beneficiaries incur no costs when travelling to receive their payment, and that the average cost in all regions is usually less than one day’s wage, this must be put in context. These costs are low because (outside of SNNPR) beneficiaries are walking 25–32 kilometers and are sleeping in the open. Fortunately, reports of harassment or robbery during the travel to or from the payment site are quite low. This is true for both male- and female-headed households.

[17] Ninety-three percent of beneficiaries walk to the payment site.

Table 5.11. Beneficiaries' experiences with travel to the payment site

Region	Survey year	Distance to payment site	Average cost incurred for travel/overnight stay at payment site	Beneficiaries had to stay overnight at the payment site	Beneficiaries were subject to harassment during the travel to/ from the payment site	Beneficiaries were robbed of food or cash during the travel to/from the payment site
		(kilometers)	(Birr)	(percent)	(percent)	(percent)
Tigray	2008	11.4	2.8	39.5	3.5	3.7
	2010	12.4	7.0	39.6	1.6	1.5
Amhara	2008	12.2	2.5	31.4	1.2	0.4
	2010	14.2	12.4	26.9	2.6	2.0
Amhara – HVFB	2008	18.0	8.1	66.8	3.4	3.6
	2010	16.6	8.5	52.5	2.7	2.9
Oromiya	2008	13.9	3.6	27.8	2.6	1.5
	2010	11.6	15.6	27.6	2.8	1.3
SNNPR	2008	5.5	0.5	6.3	6.7	4.5
	2010	8.4	6.7	12.3	4.1	1.6

Source: Household questionnaire 2008, 2010.

Beneficiaries are supposed to receive their transfers in a place no more than three hours from home (PSNP Log Frame, Output 1.5). Figure 5.1 shows that this goal is largely met in Tigray, Oromiya, and SNNPR. However, a considerable proportion of beneficiaries in Amhara and Amhara-HVFB must travel more than three hours.

Figure 5.1. Travel times to payment sites



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

5.5. Client Cards

An important innovation in the newest phase of the PSNP has been the provision of client cards. These cards serve several functions. They are a means of allowing beneficiaries to keep track of payments they receive while also providing a brief summary of important features of the program. Client cards are supposed to be free.

Table 5.12 shows the proportion of households that reported that they had participated in PSNP public works and had received a client card. As part of the process of verifying this information, enumerators asked respondents to show the card. Approximately 75 percent of the households who reported holding a client card were able to do so.

Table 5.12. Percentage of public works participants who reported holding a client card, by region

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara - HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	Total
Beneficiary has client card	21.8	38.6	26.4	59.6	78.0	43.6

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

There is clearly significant regional variation in the distribution of these cards, with distribution significantly more advanced in SNNPR and Oromiya, and the other regions lagging. Households were also asked how much they were supposed to pay for the cards and how much they had actually paid. Nearly all beneficiaries—95 percent—indicated that they thought the cards should be free. Across the sample, however, only 79 percent indicated that they had received these cards for free—as they were supposed to. But this statistic masks considerable regional variation. Figure 5.2 shows that more than 90 percent of households in Tigray and Oromiya reported that they had not paid anything to receive their cards. Small payments (between 1 and 5 Birr) were reported by about one-fourth of public works participants in Amhara and SNNPR, and a few households paid between 10 and 15 Birr. However, regional level discussions indicated that there may have been some confusion surrounding this question. In some localities, if a beneficiary was not present when photographs for these cards were taken, they were required to provide a photograph at their own expense. It is possible that some of these reported expenses may have been for the photographs and not the cards themselves.

Figure 5.2. Expenses associated with the receipt of client cards, by region (Birr)



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

5.6. Summary

This chapter has assessed the implementation of the PSNP based on information provided at the *kebele* and household level. It has assessed whether local administrative structures have been established and whether these are functioning properly. It describes beneficiaries' perceptions of the payment process and examines the extent to which payment cards have been made available. Key findings are the following:

- *Kebele* FSTFs exist in all surveyed localities. Broadly speaking, these match with what was set out in the Project Implementation Manual. There appears to be a slight improvement in their composition in Oromiya, where, in 2006, the KFSTFs deviated most from the guidelines set out in the PIM. In nearly all (98 percent) surveyed *kebeles*, there is at least one woman and at least one development agent on the KFSTF. Participant lists and minutes of meetings are well-kept, but there appears to be a drop in the number of KFSTFs that keep progress reports.
- In both 2008 and 2010, PSNP beneficiaries were asked directly if they felt that they had received all information needed to understand how the program works. There have been noticeable improvements in self-reported understanding of the program in Amhara (from 65 to 83 percent), Amhara-HVFB (74 to 84 percent), and SNNPR (from 80 to 88 percent). There are slight declines in understanding in Tigray and a considerable percentage of beneficiaries in Oromiya (45 in 2008 and 47 in 2010) who do not feel that they have sufficient information about the PSNP.
- In Oromiya, considerable concern was expressed about timeliness of payments. Only 14 percent of beneficiaries agree or strongly agree that they receive payments on a timely basis and 37 percent strongly disagree. While Oromiya performs poorly by this measure, it is worth noting that this concern is voiced by beneficiaries in all regions.

- Beneficiaries are supposed to receive their transfers in a place no more than three hours from home. This goal is largely met in Tigray, Oromiya, and SNNPR. However, a considerable proportion of beneficiaries in Amhara and Amhara-HVFB must travel more than three hours.
- Across all surveyed beneficiaries, 43.6 percent report having received a client card.

6. Targeting

6.1. Introduction

The PSNP is a targeted program where the targeting methods used embody a mixed set of approaches that include both administrative and community components. This chapter covers the following topics. How is targeting supposed to work in the PSNP? How is this understood and implemented at the regional level? How is this understood and implemented at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels. (As part of this discussion, it examines whether pregnant women are moved from public works to direct support.) How is targeting understood at the household level? Who actually participates in the PSNP? In public works (PW) and direct support (DS)? How consistent is this with the Project Implement Manual (PIM)? Do households actually participate in the PSNP for three consecutive years? Does this contribute to predictability in transfers? In so doing, it covers a number of evaluation objectives as Table 6.1 notes.

Table 6.1. Evaluation objectives covered in chapter 6

Evaluation objective	Issue	Link to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP		
	Are public works payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 39
	Are direct support payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 35
	Pregnant female participants are moved from PW to DS	PSNP Log frame Output 1.4
	Households participate in PSNP for at least three consecutive years	PSNP Log frame Output 1.6
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	TOR, para 42
Assess trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients		
	Beneficiaries understand how the program works	PSNP Log frame Output 4.4
	Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries report that targeting and graduation processes are fair	PSNP Log frame Output 4.5

Source: Auhtors' compilation

6.2. Targeting Principles in the PSNP

Targeting under the PSNP combines both categorical and individual selection using both administrative and community mechanisms. Administrative mechanisms include the provision of a specified number of clients that can be included within a specific administrative area (*woreda*, *kebele*, etc.); guidance on targeting criteria to be used at the community level; and oversight to ensure transparency and accuracy. Oversight ensures upward accountability, through regional oversight of *woredas* and *woreda* oversight of *kebeles*. Accountability relations work downward as well through community targeting, which includes

the identification of clients by community Food Security Task Forces (FSTFs) and verification of the client list in a public meeting, leaving open the possibility for appeals and complaints. The PIM specifies that households who are targeted should fall into the following categories:

- be community members;
- have faced continuous food shortages (three months of food gap or more per year) in the last three years;
- be acutely food-insecure due to a shock resulting in the severe loss of assets; and,
- lack adequate family support and other means of social protection and support (GFDRE 2010, 24).

The PIM specifies supplementary criteria to assist communities in targeting:

- Status of household assets: landholding, quality of land, food stock, labor availability;
- Income from agricultural and nonagricultural activities; and,
- Specific vulnerability, such as female-headed households, households with chronically-ill members, and elderly-headed households looking after orphans.

Targeting rules in the PIM distinguish between households having adequate household labor, which should be registered for public workfare projects as a requirement to receive their transfers, and households with labor constraints that are unable to contribute to public works. The latter receive “direct support” and are not required to work.

According to the PIM (GFDRE 2010), public works participants include men and women over the age of 16 who are able-bodied. Pregnant women after four months and lactating mothers 10 months after the birth of their child are exempt from public works. They should be shifted to direct support if there is no able-bodied labor in their household to compensate for their labor contribution. Where there is household labor available, the work requirement of another able-bodied household member is increased up to the labor cap of 15 days.

The PIM specifies a number of administrative criteria to determine individuals who should receive unconditional transfers, including those who are under the age of 16, the elderly, disabled, and people who are temporarily unable to work, such as those who are sick, pregnant women after four months and lactating mothers up to 10 months. Government and donor officials have worried that direct support beneficiaries have been asked to contribute to public works, although this clearly runs against the PIM. However, in all but one *woreda*, officials indicate that direct support beneficiaries do not contribute to public works. In Gursum, Oromiya state, the Public Works Focal Point explained that it is common for direct support beneficiaries to provide childcare at public works sites and prepare coffee for workers, but that they do not provide physical labor.

The revised PIM (June 2010) introduced a new targeting rule that all members of eligible PSNP households should be listed as clients of the program. This rule is known as “full family targeting” (FFT). The reasoning behind introducing the new rule was to help client households to graduate by providing a transfer for every household member and prevent

dilution of transfers. Along with FFT, the targeting rules for the PSNP incorporate a “labor cap.” This covers households with labor but who have some members who are unable to work. The able-bodied household member(s) are required to work additional days on behalf of those who cannot work in order to help earn their transfer. According to the labor cap rule, the able-bodied household member cannot work more than 20 days in a month. These households are targeted for public works assistance, even though some of the household members may be unable to work.

Lastly, it should be noted that, in principle, the budget for the PSNP should flow from targeting assessments. The PSNP PIM indicates that the available budget is divided between regions according to the estimated number of beneficiaries and the *woredas* (the community as well) have the opportunity to review the budgets through the upward stream budget preparation process.

6.3. Regional Perspectives

Regional officials explained that they follow the official guidance and instructions on targeting. In all regions, a mix of administration and community targeting approaches are used. They affirmed the importance of community involvement in determining household clients. An official on the regional FSTF in Oromiya commented:

> We have learned that it is important to include traditional leaders and elders in determining the targeting criteria because doing so ensures that these match local opinions of who needs support. Involving community leaders in targeting decisions also helps to enhance the transparency of the process [ORO-R-FG-1].

However, they made clear—albeit indirectly—that following the targeting guidelines would not guarantee that all those identified as being eligible would actually receive assistance. In four separate key informant interviews, regional officials were asked how they arrived at the total number of the PSNP beneficiaries in their respective regions. They indicated that the PSNP *woredas* were already identified and the quota was already set by the federal government. Quotations taken from interviews in Oromiya and Tigray illustrate this:

> In principle we are mandated to fix the quota for the *woredas* and zones. However, in practice, the federal government is determining the quota for the *woredas* and zones. The federal government does this based on the available resources. We only channel what is allocated by the federal government to *woredas* and zones [ORO_R/KI-1].

> As of 2006, each *woreda* has a long list of food-insecure cases which were under the food aid programs for many years [on average for 10 years these people were under food aid]. These are the beneficiaries for PSNP and hence planning is based on this data [TIG_R/KI-1].

SNNPR officials, however, indicated that they had adopted a slightly different approach to define the total number of beneficiaries. The excerpt from the discussion with the regional food security revealed this:

> The [PSNP] *woredas* were already identified by the federal office but we had conducted assessments and included some *woredas*. As a result, the number of beneficiaries increased from 760,000 to 900,000 between 2005 and 2007 [SN_R/KI-1].

Consequently, regional officials attributed most exclusion errors not to poor targeting but rather to inadequate budgets. An official of the regional FSTF in Oromiya stated:

> A significant number of chronically food-insecure households were left outside PSNP due to the limited quota [from the federal allocations to regions] [ORO_R-FG-1].

Regional officials also noted a tension that exists between wider coverage of the program that would allow inclusion of more households and the principle of full family targeting. They also recognized that full family targeting was a means of ensuring that the PSNP was more likely to be successful:

> Consumption smoothening and the protection of a household's assets is undermined when all family members are not targeted in an attempt to reach more households [ORO_R-FG-1].

> [Without full family targeting] there will be dilution. You cannot achieve what you want to. If there are households that receive payment for five members while they have seven members, they will share the payment. As a result, the food gap for these households is extended and they may be pushed to sell their assets to make up for this. If they do not have land or other assets, they won't have physical strength. Their children won't go to school [SN_R-FG-1].

6.4. Woreda Perspectives

Woreda officials indicated that primary responsibility for targeting lies with communities. *Woreda* officials confirmed that they provide orientation and training to *kebele* FSTFs on how to carry out community level targeting, including familiarizing *kebele* officials with the targeting criteria that are in the PIM. They also review and approve beneficiary lists submitted by *kebele* FSTFs.

Key informant interviews and focus group discussions held at the *woreda* level probed attitudes and knowledge of specific targeting practices. In some localities, it was noted that in initial targeting exercises carried out in 2005, there were cases where "model farmers" were prioritized because they were thought to perform better and more likely to achieve graduation. In Ebinet *woreda*, Amhara state, an official on the *Woreda* Food Security Task Force explained that better-off farmers were targeted until 2006—when new targeting guidelines were issued—whereas the poor were targeted for resettlement. It is unclear how widespread this problem was. Still, the little evidence uncovered in our interviews suggests that inclusion errors were not a serious problem. In Gursum *woreda*, Oromiya state, officials noted that 400 better-off households were initially targeted before retargeting was carried out. An official on the *woreda* FSTF in Sekota, Amhara state, estimated that fewer than 5 percent of all beneficiaries registered in the initial targeting exercise were better-off. After

new targeting guidelines were issued, the “poorest of the poor” were emphasized in retargeting carried out during 2007.

All *woreda* focus groups reported that the PSNP targets “the poor.” While some groups specified more precise criteria of who might be targeted, such as the landless and disabled, most groups offered no more precise distinctions of who might be considered to be “poor.” Although better-off community members are, in general, not regarded as being entitled to PSNP support, there was recognition that households regarded as better-off were included on beneficiary lists in some areas. In Demba Gofa *woreda*, SNNPR state, when asked if there were any exclusion or inclusion errors, an official on the FSTF responded:

> Since *kebele* leaders facilitate targeting, they do not include some poorer individuals, so that their own relatives can be covered [S_D/W-FG-1].

When asked whether better-off individuals had been included, another official on the same *woreda* FSTF stressed:

> There were some areas in which the *kebele* chairman was included although he was not poor. Everyone thinks that they deserve it. They [community members] do not know about the program [targeting criteria] [S_D/W-FG-1].

Public works officials in six of ten *woredas* stated that the disabled, chronically ill, and elderly were exempt from public works requirements. *Woreda* level officials in five areas stated that children were exempt. However, there was some confusion evident about the age under which children should not work. Officials in three *woredas* stated that children under 18 are exempt, whereas a public works official in one *woreda* said children under 15 are exempt. We encountered one anecdote about children working on public works sites. A public works official in Shebedino *woreda*, SNNPR state, revealed that some children do work in spite of entreaties by *woreda* officials that they should not work:

> There are occasions where *kebele* officials allow the elderly to participate in public works when we have told them not to do so. We have told them not to allow children to work, as well. However, when the father is not able to work, public works households will send their children to work out of fear that they will be punished if they do not show up and fulfill their household’s labor contribution. Such types of problems do exist [SN_S/W-FG-PW].

A public works official in Sayint *woreda*, Amhara state, stated that although children under 15 are exempt, orphaned children are required to work. No explanation was given and the assessment came over with no other evidence to substantiate this claim.

Pregnant women and lactating mothers are categories exempt from undertaking public works according to all *woreda* level public works officials that were interviewed. However, there is some variation in the timing of when pregnant women are permitted to stop attending public works as well as when new mothers are expected to return. In three *woredas*, public works officials stated that pregnant women over three months are exempt. In three other *woredas*, officials stated that women over six months are exempt. In one *woreda*, a public works official stated that women are exempt once they visibly show signs of being pregnant.

As with the discussions held at regional level, *woreda* respondents were asked about quotas. In nine out of ten *woredas*, officials of the *woreda* FSTFs acknowledged that they receive a quota from the regional level. In turn, *woreda* FSFTs determine a quota for each *kebele*. A range of criteria is used to determine quotas including population size, agroecological conditions (rainfall levels and farming potential), average size of landholdings, levels of malnutrition, and the estimated size of the chronically food-insecure population. There is a tendency at the *woreda* level to target all *kebeles*, although officials in some *woredas* suggested they exclude a limited number of *kebeles* that are regarded as higher potential farming areas with smaller chronically food-insecure populations. A FSTF official in Shebedino *woreda* explained that they excluded *kebeles* that were comparatively better-off as a way of working with a smaller quota:

> There are *kebeles* that are more prone to shocks. There are a total of 19 PSNP *kebeles* (out of 32 rural *kebeles* and 2 urban *kebeles*). Our attention is focused on dwellers in lowland *kebeles (kola)* rather than highland areas (*weynadega*), since these areas are lagging behind [SN_S/ W-FG-1].

In light of these quotas, officials on *woreda* FSTFs were asked how they covered the needs of chronically food-insecure households who met the PSNP eligibility criteria but were not targeted. Responses varied. In Oromiya state, officials in Gursum and Ziway Dugda *woredas* explained that they used the contingency fund to cover households that were not covered. In Gursum, officials were able to provide transfers for three months to chronically food-insecure households that were excluded from PSNP targeting. The contingency budget (allocated by the region) was also used to cover excluded households that were eligible in Sayint *woreda*, Amhara state, and Saesi Tseda Emba *woreda* in Tigray. Another approach was to base targeting decisions on local criteria, which tended to be more specific than the criteria in the PIM. For example, in Dimtu Rareti *kebele* in Ziway Dugda *woreda*, a development agent noted that a household is excluded if they own a pair of oxen, regardless of other indicators of their poverty and food security. In Saesi Tseda Emba *woreda*, a FSTF official explained:

> We prioritize households according to their level of poverty and income as the main tool to differentiate between eligible and non-eligible households. But in our effort to reach the poorest of the poor, we cannot help it if some households who actually deserve to be included in PSNP are left out. This is just because of the limited quota. Eligible households are left out due to limited resources; it is a tradeoff [TIG_S/W-FG-1].

Some interviews at the *woreda* level explored whether the concept of full family targeting was ignored in order to increase the number of beneficiary households. Given the newness of this, officials were asked to describe how they understand full family targeting and if the rule was being followed. FSTFs in all *woredas* were knowledgeable of FSTF. All *kebele* FSTFs that were asked affirmed they had heard of full family targeting. A FSTF official in Gursum *woreda*, Oromiya state, explained:

> Full family targeting requires that we include all the members of targeted households, although this means that a limited number of households are covered by the program. It leads to the exclusion of eligible households. Targeting a greater number of households means that more households are

> supported. But it leads to partial family targeting and this compromises the consumption smoothening objective of the PSNP [ORO_G/W-FG-1].

A FSTF official in Saesi Tseda Emba *woreda*, Tigray state, noted:

> We know about full family targeting and have practiced it since last year. In the previous round of the PSNP, the tendency was to reach more households than reach all the members within a household. By trying to reach many households, we stretch the program and help as many people as possible to survive hard times. But this holds back the main purpose of program. It delays households from graduating. Some might not graduate. On the other hand, full family targeting will quicken graduation, even though many poorer households that are eligible for support are left out [TIG_S/W-FG-1].

Although many officials support the principle of full family targeting, there are tensions. In one *woreda* (Gursum, in Oromiya state), FSTF officials acknowledged that they target fewer members of client households, even though this runs against the principle of full family targeting. A FSTF official in Ahferom *woreda*, Tigray state, recounted:

> In some places (*kebeles*), even the selection committees swear to each other not to disclose the confidentiality of breaking rules of full family targeting, because they prefer to reach as many households as possible in the name of sharing what they have with the community [TIG_A/W-FG-1].

Officials in Gursum *woreda* worried that full family targeting would promote dependency by encouraging larger families. One FSTF official stressed:

> We have not pushed *kebele* officials to adhere to full family targeting because we want to discourage people from increasing the size of their families. Children between the ages of 1 and 5 were not included into the program as a result [ORO_G/ W-FG-1].

Lastly, public works officials in nine of ten *woredas* confirmed that they enforce a labor cap (there was one unclear response by officials in Tembaro *woreda*, SNNPR state). However, the labor cap in all areas is 20 days/month/laborer, higher than the 15 days specified in the PIM. In Tigray, officials explained that there is a different labor cap for men (20 days) and women (15 days).

6.5. Kebele Perspectives

Key informant and focus group discussions indicated that the provision of a quota extends all the way down to the lowest administrative level, the *kebele*. FSTF officials and development agents in all *kebeles* visited confirmed that the *kebele* quota is divided among sub-*kebeles*, following a similar process of assessing population size, livelihoods, and wealth in different areas. Community FSTFs prepare a list of beneficiaries based on the quota they receive and development agents train community level officials on targeting procedures. All focus groups confirmed that community members participate in targeting by verifying and agreeing on the list of clients. In nearly all *kebeles*, members of the community FSTF, which are elected by

the community, determined the initial list of beneficiaries. A public meeting is called and the list is read and subsequently adjusted according to the feedback and views of community members. There were few indications that the process at this level was exclusive, with the exception of the women's group in Wal *kebele* of Sekota *woreda*, Amhara state, who insisted that "low class" women stayed away from the community targeting meeting. The beneficiary list is submitted to the *kebele* FSTF for review and approval. Any questions and concerns are referred back to the community FSTF, although few instances of this happening in practice were mentioned by *kebele* officials. *Kebele* FSTF officials gather beneficiary lists from all sub-*kebeles* and submit these to the *woreda* FSTF.

Respondents in four focus groups indicated that kinship, including affinity to community and *kebele* leaders, influenced targeting outcomes. When asked if better-off community members were targeted, a development agent in Dimtu Rareti *kebele* in Ziway Dugda *woreda*, Oromiya state, noted:

> *Aba gare* (the community headman) has the upper hand in the targeting process and this has at times undermined the transparency of targeting because of favoritism and the inclusion of individuals that are not eligible [ORO_Z/K-KI-2].

A development agent in Furra *kebele* of Shebedino *woreda*, SNNPR state, maintained that *kebele* leaders included their wives on beneficiary lists. When questioned if the better-off had been targeted, an official on the *kebele* FSTF in Soyame *kebele* of Tembaro *woreda*, SNNPR state, remarked:

> [You ask] why did you include those who should not have been targeted? Well, when you work with the community you cannot be 100 percent without sin! [S_T/K-KI-1].

Thus, although it is widely recognized at the community level that the poorest should be targeted, there are reported instances of favoritism and nepotism by elites at the community level. Further, in some areas, there were exclusion errors because of absenteeism at targeting meetings and because community members were not fully informed about the wealth status of their neighbors. When asked if better-off community members had been included on beneficiary lists, a development agent in Soyame *kebele* explained:

> Yes, they have. There were problems with targeting and some were excluded who should have been listed. Targeting was done without a proper wealth ranking exercise being carried out. Wealth ranking was done later (after the initial targeting), but many were not covered because of the community vote. The community voted on those to be included but they did not have reliable data on which to base their decisions. Others were excluded because they could not make it to the targeting meeting for reasons such as being ill [S_T/K-KI-2].

In Adizata *kebele* of Ahferom *woreda*, Tigray state, a development agent similarly indicated that exclusion errors occurred due to problems with wealth indicators used by communities to select beneficiaries:

> Only simple proxy indicators of wealth were considered and this meant that some who would be eligible were excluded. Also, in-migrants were excluded, regardless of their food gap [TIG_A/K-KI-2].

To what extent do these exclusion errors reflect quotas that are too small to meet the needs of all those households who meet criteria for inclusion? In six of ten *kebeles* visited as part of the qualitative study, officials stated explicitly that an insufficient quota contributed to exclusion errors. For the public works component of the PSNP, this claim matches closely with information found in the community quantitative survey. This component of the quantitative fieldwork included a set of questions on the adequacy of resources given to *kebeles* to meet the needs of both public works and direct support. Results are reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.

Table 6.2. Kebele perceptions of adequacy of resources for public works participants

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
Sufficient	33.3	25.6	35.0	7.1	38.9
	(12)	(10)	(14)	(2)	(14)
Insufficient	66.7	66.7	65.0	78.6	58.3
	(24)	(26)	(26)	(22)	(21)
Did not state	0.0	7.7	0.0	14.3	2.8
	(0)	(3)	(0)	(4)	(1)

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: Figures given are percentages, with the number of *kebeles* reporting appearing in parentheses below.

Table 6.3. Kebele perceptions of adequacy of financial resources to meet direct support needs

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
Sufficient	5.6	15.4	15.0	7.1	11.1
	(2)	(6)	(6)	(2)	(4)
Insufficient	94.4	76.9	85.0	78.6	86.1
	(34)	(30)	(34)	(22)	(31)
Did not state	0.0	7.7	0.0	14.3	2.8
	(0)	(3)	(0)	(4)	(1)

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: Figures given are percentages, with the number of *kebeles* reporting appearing in parentheses below.

Across all regions, a minimum of 58 percent of *kebeles* perceived that resources for public works were insufficient. For direct support, the percentage was much higher with 76.9 to 94.4 percent of *kebeles* across all regions reporting that the financial resources needed to meet requirements for households eligible were insufficient.

One response to insufficient resources is to ask for more funds. Out of 119 *kebeles* that reported that they had insufficient resources to employ all those eligible for public works, 79 stated that they asked the *woreda* for additional resources. In the remaining 30 *kebeles*, 24

did not, while 6 did not provide a response to this question. Out of 151 *kebeles* that reported that they had insufficient resources to employ all those eligible for public works, 94 stated that they asked the *woreda* for additional resources, 25 did not, and 32 did not say. Yet such appeals were rarely successful—fewer than 5 percent of *kebeles* reported that they received additional funds following these requests.

The vast majority of *kebeles* also asked for advice as to how they should allocate their resources, given that these were insufficient to meet all needs. Responses by *woredas* (as recounted by *kebeles*) are given in Table 6.4.

Lastly, the issue of the labor cap was discussed during the qualitative fieldwork. The cap is followed by most *kebele* FSTF officials that were interviewed. Officials in one *kebele*, Adizata *kebele* in Ahferom *woreda* (Tigray state), stated that they do not follow a labor cap:

> The guideline says that public works participants can work a maximum of 15 days per month per person but we do not follow this guideline. We always order everybody to work as per their family size. We do not have a labor cap. Rather, it is the work that determines the limit to which households are expected to contribute their labor [TIG_A/K-FG-1].

Table 6.4. Advice given to *kebeles* for addressing resource shortfalls

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
	Advice given to *kebeles* for coping with insufficient resources to employ all those eligible for public works				
Restrict the number of households that could receive employment	66.7	64.3	64.7	45.5	60.0
Reduce the number of days of employment allocated to beneficiaries so that more households could receive employment	6.7	25.0	23.5	31.8	16.7
Rotate households access to employment across different years	16.7	3.6	11.8	18.2	10.0
No advice received	10.0	7.1	0.0	4.6	13.3
	Advice given to *kebeles* for coping with insufficient resources to meet demands for direct support				
Restrict the number of households that could receive direct support	51.8	61.1	54.6	35.0	48.2
Reduce the payments made to direct support beneficiaries so that more households could receive payments	22.2	16.7	12.1	10.0	11.1
Allow some households to receive public works employment and direct support payments	18.5	11.1	18.2	35.0	14.8
Have these households do public works employment instead of receiving direct support	3.7	5.6	15.2	15.0	25.9
No advice received	3.7	5.6	0.0	5.0	0.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

6.6. Household Perspectives

In all three survey rounds, the same households have been asked to describe the criteria used to select public works respondents in their locality. Results are tabulated in Table 6.5.

Across all regions, Table 6.5 presents a consistent, yet somewhat unsettling pattern. As previously discussed in Gilligan et al. (2009), between 2006 and 2008 respondents increasingly described program criteria in terms of poverty and were able to do so in increasingly specific ways. However, between 2008 and 2010, this trend reverses with fewer respondents describing poverty-related criteria. Instead, access to the program is increasingly described as random or is determined by a quota system. On a more positive note, there are fewer reports that access to public works is determined by being a friend or family member of project staff or the village leadership. Also, fewer households identify the public works component of the PSNP as being a response to drought.

Table 6.5. Percentage of households reporting that the following criteria were used to select public works participants in their locality, by region and year

	Tigray			Amhara			Amhara-HVFB	
	2006	2008	2010	2006	2008	2010	2008	2010
Poverty								
People who are seen to be poor	42.4	62.1	24.1	55.7	75.9	22.7	86.2	25.8
People with small or no landholding	32.7	44.5	24.9	33.4	55.1	23.1	81.4	27.0
People with few or no cattle/oxen	9.6	22.1	13.3	10.6	30.2	11.2	51.2	16.2
Connections								
Religious or ethnic groups	0.3	1.3	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.0	4.1	0.0
Family friends of project staff or village leadership	3.2	3.0	1.5	5.0	2.8	1.5	8.7	2.9
Other								
Randomly	2.3	1.5	19.0	1.8	3.0	17.8	6.1	20.4
Quota for each *kebele*	11.7	17.5	26.5	11.3	7.3	20.7	24.4	21.5
People badly affected by drought	14.1	19.1	6.5	14.7	22.0	4.9	35.2	8.7

	Oromiya			SNNPR		
	2006	2008	2010	2006	2008	2010
Poverty						
People who are seen to be poor	45.3	67.3	21.4	68.0	72.4	26.5
People with small or no landholding	42.0	40.6	20.3	44.4	54.5	29.6
People with few or no cattle/oxen	20.4	15.4	8.7	18.0	25.3	10.6
Connections						
Religious or ethnic groups	0.5	0.3	0.0	1.2	2.6	1.5
Family friends of project staff or village leadership	8.4	14.3	3.3	4.5	2.1	1.9
Other						
Randomly	2.7	2.5	9.3	1.2	8.0	18.0
Quota for each *kebele*	10.6	5.4	18.7	2.5	10.8	22.4
People badly affected by drought	28.2	13.7	9.6	16.6	26.3	8.2

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Perceptions of the criteria applied to allocate direct support are given in Table 6.6. These results mirror those found for identification of access to public works—namely a reduction in the percentage of households that could provide specific criteria and an increase in those who perceive that access is either random or governed by a quota.

In the focus group discussions, there is an overall understanding that the "poor" or the "poorest of the poor" are targeted under the PSNP. Consistent with Table 5.5, there was a tendency among the groups that were interviewed to view the "poor" as an undifferentiated

category. There was little understanding of the program criteria for determining which population groups should be targeted. This could be interpreted as ignorance of the targeting criteria. A different explanation is that respondents are reluctant to over-specify who should benefit, because needs are so extensive and undercoverage is a problem. This, in turn, relates to the preference of most communities for broader targeting, including more households rather than larger transfers for a smaller segment of the population. Instead, focus groups offered their own targeting criteria of who should benefit from the program. Three of four focus groups in Shebedino *woreda* in SNNPR stated that the "landless" are deserving of PSNP support. Elsewhere, landlessness was not mentioned consistently. Disability or the inability to work was the next most common criterion, mentioned by focus groups in all regions. Surprisingly, female-headed households do not appear to be a significant category that is targeted for PSNP support, although, in practice, many female-headed households were covered in targeting exercises carried out to date. Only two groups (both in Shebedino *woreda*) offered this as a criterion.

Table 6.6. Percentage of households reporting that the following criteria were used to select direct support participants in their locality, by region and year

	Tigray			Amhara			Amhara-HVFB	
	2006	2008	2010	2006	2008	2010	2008	2010
Demographic								
Old people	70.8	84.0	23.4	64.3	73.5	23.0	92.4	24.5
Disabled	55.9	75.1	23.4	54.6	72.6	19.1	88.9	23.9
Connections								
Religious or ethnic groups	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Family friends of project staff or village leadership	1.5	1.0	0.9	1.9	1.6	1.4	4.8	1.8
Other								
Randomly	0.3	4.2	19.5	1.7	0.9	15.8	3.6	18.7
Quota for each *kebele*	4.9	7.3	23.7	1.2	0.5	22.1	16.8	22.8

	Oromiya			SNNPR		
	2006	2008	2010	2006	2008	2010
Demographics						
Old people	65.7	69.5	21.9	65.5	67.7	25.2
Disabled	59.5	59.1	20.8	69.4	74.0	21.1
Connections						
Religious or ethnic groups	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.3	2.3	0.8
Family friends of project staff or village leadership	3.0	8.5	3.1	1.1	0.9	1.4
Other						
Randomly	2.0	1.2	14.6	0.4	5.7	18.5
Quota for each *kebele*	3.1	1.4	15.2	0.3	6.6	19.4

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Although nearly all groups do not recall specific targeting criteria for the PSNP, nearly all expressed a basic understanding of the criteria for targeting direct support. In general, this is understood as those who are unable to work, whether because of disability, sickness, or old age. The poor who can work are regarded as those who should participate in public works. Only 3 out of 40 focus groups expressed ignorance of the criteria for receiving direct support. Further, there was broad agreement with the rules for targeting direct support. The main

point of disagreement rather concerned exclusion errors, given the breadth of the population that requires support and the limited coverage of the program.

Yet, in spite of problems with targeting, 24 of 40 focus groups that were interviewed maintained that targeting had been carried out correctly. Ten groups suggested there were problems with targeting, although in some groups members disagreed with at least some claiming that targeting had been done correctly. A further six groups gave no response. Overall, ten groups referred to a limited quota size as having contributed to the exclusion of some chronically food-insecure households.

Furthermore, there is a general understanding that the community should also be involved in agreeing on the list of direct support beneficiaries, even though none of the focus groups provided any detailed description of the precise selection process. The process for selecting those put forward to the community for agreement is slightly more varied. Some focus groups reported that it is the community who identifies the initial list of proposed direct support beneficiaries. In Tembaro and Shebedino *woredas* of SNNPR state, all focus groups explained that the community identifies the neediest beneficiaries at a community meeting. However, in Demba Gofa *woreda*, the third area of SNNPR covered by the assessment, and in *woredas* in all other regions, focus groups reported a slightly different process in which a *kebele* leadership committee first proposed a list of beneficiaries to the community, which then debated the list at a public meeting. Only one focus group explicitly named the community FSTF as having an acknowledged role in helping select direct support beneficiaries, although it can be assumed that what many groups referred to as "*kebele* leadership committees" were, in actual fact, community FSTFs. One group, a women's group in Ziway Dugda *woreda* of Oromiya state, expressed explicit dissatisfaction with the selection process, noting that it was male-dominated and that women did not take part in decisionmaking. A women's group in Berite *woreda*, also in Oromiya, also complained:

> "They [*kebele* officials] registered the better-off people. I complained and the village (Ganda) leader said, 'they have the right to cancel your name.' Nepotism is high. They accused me of insulting the *kebele* 'Arada' leader. The Arada people work for their kin… They do replace names of people they want to benefit. The better-off people are registered" [ORO_G/FG-3].

Community focus group discussions touched on the issue of the labor cap. These revealed that there is an understanding of the principle of the labor cap, although there are differences in awareness of the precise cap. In Tigray, all but one focus group correctly recalled the labor cap of 20 days for men and 15 days for women that is followed in the region. In Oromiya, four focus groups stated that the labor cap is 12 days per month; a men's focus group in Beritie *kebele* (Gursum *woreda*) explained that the labor cap is 2 days/week between January and March in the dry season and 1 day/week during the rains between April and June; and a women's group in Beritie stated that women are required to work 3–4 days/month. In Amhara state, six of nine groups stated that each individual is required to work 5 days/month; one women's group explained that the cap is 2 days/week increasing to the entire week when there is a lot of work; one group did not know; and one group did not respond. Various views were expressed by community focus groups in SNNPR state revealing a lack of understanding. Six groups in total responded out of a possible of nine groups. Of these, two groups stated that the labor cap was 16 days/month, although

members of one of these groups maintained that some households work up to 40 days/month. The responses of the other four groups that replied were not clear.

At the community level, there is widespread knowledge of the full family targeting rule. However, views are mixed on whether the principle is being adhered to. In three of the four regions, some focus group participants maintained that not all members of targeted households were registered. According to a men's focus group in Tembaro *woreda*, SNNPR state, "all household members were not registered. They said there is a quota shortage. So the full family size was not taken into consideration, either for large or small families" [SN_D/FG-4]. Participants of a women's group in Gursum *woreda*, Oromiya state, attributed partial family targeting to a limited quota size as well. Participants of a men's focus group in Gursum explained that the full family targeting rule is followed for small- and medium-size households but that some members of larger households are not targeted. According to a men's group in Ziway Dugda *woreda*, Oromiya state, 10 percent of household members, on average, are not targeted. However, in all regions, when focus group members were asked to report their household sizes and the number of members that were registered, a majority indicated that all members were registered. In most cases in which households reported that some members were not registered, further probing determined that these were newborns, which are not covered under PSNP targeting rules if they were born after a targeting exercise was carried out.

Views were also solicited from community focus groups on how polygamous households are registered, who collects payment for registered polygamous households, and who makes decisions in polygamous households on the use of transfers. Not all groups responded. However, respondents in groups in three regions explained that a husband in a polygamous household registers with his first ('official" or "legal") wife. Second and lower ranking wives—if they meet the selection criteria—are registered as female heads of households. Yet, respondents acknowledged many instances in which second and lower ranking wives were not registered, usually because of a "quota," meaning that a polygamous household could only register one wife. There were varied responses to who collects the payment—sometimes it is the first wife who is registered, for others it is the husband, and for still others it is the husband and wife together. Unsurprisingly, because the elder wife is typically registered with the husband in polygamous households, this does create tension around how the transfer is shared. The quotes below indicate the tensions within polygamous households around sharing the transfer:

> In most cases, even if there is discussion on the use of PSNP payment between a husband and wife, it is the man that has the final say. We say we are equal but our tradition and culture favors the man. The bad side of our culture has not yet been fully removed. We [women] say we have equal rights with men, but he is the one who decides. He knows what is good and what is bad [AM_SA/FG-3].

> There are families where there is fair sharing but also there are situations in which the sharing is unfair, in which case the family ends up in dispute [ORO_Z/FG-3].

If the women are in harmony, the payment is shared. If not, there is no sharing. However, the husband can receive the share of one person payment (his share) and give it to the other wife [SN_T/FG-3].

The registered wife collects the money and is the one that decides its use. In a household where there is harmony, a decision on how to use the transfer is made, based on consultation involving the husband and the two wives. However, such harmony is very rare [SN_T/FG-3].

If the wife receives, she brings the payment and gives to the husband. The husband shares to both households, if he has two wives. If one wife wants to use alone, it is not accepted and there will not be peace [SN_S/FG-4].

Buying clothing, food, sheep, etc., is decided by consultation of the wife and husband. In polygamous households, the husband consults with both wives. He calls both wives and then consults. The sharing depends on size of children in the respective households. There has to be peace [SN_S/FG-4].

6.7. Selection into Public Works

Table 6.7 looks at the extent to which access to public works remains constant over time. The top panel looks at constancy of access between 2008 and 2010, while the bottom panel looks at 2006 to 2008. In the top panel, a relatively large fraction of households who ever received public works between 2008 and 2010 (between 13 and 28 percent, depending on the region), only do so in 2008. A similar percentage received these transfers in 2009 and 2010 and a much larger percentage, between 50 and 72 percent, received payments for public works in all three years. This is suggestive of a move toward stabilizing the lists of public works beneficiaries so as to increase the number of households who receive payments for three consecutive years. (It also explains why households may have had less contact with the community FSTFs.) This contrasts with results for the years 2006–2008 shown in the bottom panel. There is evidence in those data of considerably more movement in and out of public works from one year to the next. The greater constancy observed in 2009 and 2010 is consistent with the argument that access to public works has become more predictable.

Table 6.7. Consistency of household participation in the public works component of the PSNP, by region

Region	Number of households ever receiving public works	Only in 2008	Only in 2009	Only in 2010	In 2008 and 2009	In 2008 and 2010	In 2009 and 2010	In 2008 and 2009 and 2010
Tigray	538	14.5	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.9	23.2	60.6
Amhara	292	18.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	10.9	69.2
Amhara-HVFB	399	17.3	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.8	12.3	67.2
Oromiya	326	28.2	0.0	0.3	0.9	1.5	19.0	50.0
SNNPR	389	13.6	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	14.1	71.5

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: Sample restricted to households receiving public works payments in the first five months of at least one year, 2008, 2009, or 2010.

Table 6.7. continued

Region	Number of households ever receiving public works	Only in 2006	Only in 2007	Only in 2008	In 2006 and 2007	In 2006 and 2008	In 2007 and 2008	In 2006 and 2007 and 2008
Tigray	522	14.8	2.3	5.2	2.1	9.8	25.5	40.4
Amhara	429	17.9	5.1	2.8	7.0	5.1	27.3	34.7
Amhara-HVFB	-		-	-	-	-	-	-
Oromiya	457	24.3	3.7	2.4	5.9	4.8	13.4	45.5
SNNPR	441	16.8	0.5	0.0	2.3	0.5	11.6	68.5

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: Sample restricted to households receiving direct support payments in the first five months of at least one year, 2006, 2007, or 2008.

Has the move to greater constancy in participation across years affected the targeting of public works employment? Because there are a number of factors that affect selection, cross-tabulating individual characteristics against selection will not necessarily give a clear sense of changes that may have emerged over time. Nor will tables give a sense as to whether certain characteristics have, in terms of targeting, become more or less important over time or whether they matter more or less across different regions.

For these reasons, we address this issue using regression analysis. The dependent variable equals one if the household was employed in PSNP public works, zero otherwise. Probit regressions are appropriate when the outcome is dichotomous and so we use them here. We assess whether the selection into public works is affected by three broad sets of household categories: household demographic categories, wealth, and "connections." We take into account where households reside so as to control for regional-specific factors that affect selection. The coefficients that are estimated by the probit have been transformed into marginal effects to make them easier to interpret. For example, the coefficient -0.001 found in column (1) associated for the age of head means that every additional year of age of the household head reduces the likelihood that the household was paid for public works employment by 0.1 percentage points (0.001 x 100). Dummy variables, such as whether the household head is female, are interpreted as "switching the variable" from 0 to 1. The coefficient for female head in column (1) means that a female-headed household is 5.5 percentage points less likely to participate in the public works component of the PSNP than an otherwise identical male-headed household.[18]

The most striking result in Table 6.8 is the constancy of the parameters across years. Access to public works declines with the age of the household head. Households with high dependency ratios, or with individuals over 65, are less likely to be employed in public works; conversely, increasing the number of adults aged 15–59 increases the likelihood of employment. Consistent with a number of comments made in focus groups, ownership of oxen reduces the likelihood of receiving payment for PSNP public works. Finally, while our crude indicators of household connections (based on parents' status within the *kebele*) do not show any consistent correlations, being born in the *kebele* increases the likelihood of public works participation by 5.3 percentage points. This, too, is consistent with remarks

[18] For the full sample results, the calculation of standard errors takes into account the clustered nature of the sample. Calculating heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors does not appreciably change these findings. For the region-specific results, there are too few clusters to control for clustering and so we report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.

made during focus groups that in-migrants are excluded from participation in the PSNP. The negative and statistically significant coefficients for the three regional variables mean that after taking into account other household characteristics, relative to a household in Tigray, a household in these regions is less likely to be included in the public works component of the PSNP.

Table 6.8. Correlates of receipt of public works (PW), by year

Variables	(1) Access to PW 2006	(2) Access to PW 2008	(3) Access to PW 2010
Age of head	-0.001	-0.004***	-0.004***
	(-0.752)	(-3.477)	(-3.489)
Female head	-0.055*	-0.069***	-0.040
	(-1.871)	(-2.591)	(-1.418)
Males, 65+	-0.083*	-0.060	-0.034
	(-1.863)	(-1.318)	(-0.731)
Females, 65+	-0.048	-0.080**	-0.087**
	(-1.170)	(-2.217)	(-2.037)
Dependency ratio	-0.014***	-0.006	-0.012
	(-2.853)	(-0.865)	(-1.588)
Males, 15–59	0.022*	0.034*	0.017
	(1.835)	(1.914)	(1.093)
Females, 15–59	0.045***	0.029	0.046**
	(2.862)	(1.416)	(2.258)
Grades completed, head	-0.000	-0.003	-0.003
	(-0.144)	(-1.598)	(-1.375)
Oxen owned	-0.072***	-0.067***	-0.060***
	(-5.373)	(-5.093)	(-4.151)
Head born in this *kebele*	0.046	0.053**	0.053*
	(1.565)	(2.079)	(1.826)
Father of head an important person in *kebele*	-0.011	-0.041*	-0.035
	(-0.479)	(-1.714)	(-1.286)
Mother of head an important person in *kebele*	0.035	0.063*	0.031
	(1.025)	(1.882)	(0.940)
If parent of head holds official position in *kebele*	0.010	-0.033	0.064
	(0.320)	(-0.944)	(1.098)
Amhara	-0.101	-0.155**	-0.233***
	(-1.362)	(-2.270)	(-3.782)
Oromiya	-0.014	-0.192***	-0.315***
	(-0.249)	(-2.861)	(-5.153)
SNNPR	-0.066	-0.192***	-0.246***
	(-1.096)	(-2.995)	(-4.193)
Observations	3,398	3,398	3,101

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: Coefficients are expressed in terms of their marginal effects. Robust (clustered) Z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.

One potentially confounding factor in the interpretation of Table 6.8 is the following. Over time, suppose in one region, a particular characteristic became more associated with public works participation, while in another region, the association between this characteristic and participation weakened. Since these would tend to cancel each other out, our aggregated results would mask these changes. Accordingly, as a robust check, we estimate the correlates of receipt of public works by year and region. These are presented in Table 6.9.

Looking across these coefficients, we see no meaningful evidence of this cancelling out hypothesis.

Table 6.9. Correlates of receipt of public works (PW), by year and region

Variables	(1) Access to PW Tigray 2006	(2) Access to PW Tigray 2010	(3) Access to PW Amhara 2006	(4) Access to PW Amhara 2010	(5) Access to PW Oromiya 2006	(6) Access to PW Oromiya 2010	(7) Access to PW SNNPR 2006	(8) Access to PW SNNPR 2010
Age of head	-0.005**	-0.007***	-0.001	-0.004	0.001	-0.003	0.000	-0.005**
	(-2.382)	(-3.348)	(-0.392)	(-1.633)	(0.476)	(-1.434)	(0.111)	(-2.187)
Female head	0.029	-0.073	-0.070*	0.048	-0.119*	-0.150***	-0.103*	-0.053
	(0.442)	(-1.083)	(-1.843)	(1.276)	(-1.852)	(-3.021)	(-1.758)	(-1.156)
Males, 65+	-0.019	-0.103	0.014	0.041	-0.118	-0.097	-0.281***	-0.076
	(-0.202)	(-1.443)	(0.179)	(0.466)	(-1.516)	(-1.071)	(-3.144)	(-0.629)
Females, 65+	0.039	-0.091	0.011	-0.104	-0.057	0.082	-0.184***	-0.163**
	(0.422)	(-1.056)	(0.179)	(-1.512)	(-0.704)	(1.427)	(-2.607)	(-2.050)
Dependency ratio	-0.008	0.010	-0.018***	-0.027***	-0.006	0.001	-0.006	0.008
	(-0.829)	(1.093)	(-2.743)	(-3.108)	(-0.605)	(0.0680)	(-0.513)	(0.462)
Males, 15–59	0.059**	0.063**	0.026	0.053*	0.014	0.030	0.013	0.014
	(2.278)	(2.058)	(1.005)	(1.675)	(0.614)	(1.392)	(0.599)	(0.509)
Females, 15–59	0.101***	0.139***	0.074***	0.066**	0.046	0.057*	0.014	-0.001
	(2.624)	(3.747)	(2.601)	(2.287)	(1.135)	(1.690)	(0.718)	(-0.0397)
Grades completed, head	0.003	0.001	0.004	-0.004	-0.009**	-0.009***	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.773)	(0.312)	(1.219)	(-1.045)	(-2.243)	(-2.653)	(-1.379)	(-1.101)
Oxen owned	-0.064***	-0.065**	-0.117***	-0.128***	-0.016	-0.025	-0.102***	-0.099***
	(-2.792)	(-2.085)	(-5.608)	(-7.330)	(-0.554)	(-1.036)	(-3.468)	(-2.927)
Head born in this *kebele*	0.039	-0.021	0.005	0.088	0.084	0.059	0.020	-0.001
	(0.775)	(-0.385)	(0.0893)	(1.314)	(1.249)	(0.977)	(0.345)	(-0.0106)
Father of head an important person in *kebele*	0.006	-0.024	-0.032	0.024	-0.008	-0.002	0.014	0.029
	(0.171)	(-0.445)	(-0.611)	(0.619)	(-0.218)	(-0.0300)	(0.211)	(0.419)
Mother of head an important person in *kebele*	0.073	0.057	0.179***	0.004	0.013	0.009	-0.085	-0.044
	(1.095)	(0.666)	(4.066)	(0.0719)	(0.198)	(0.146)	(-1.206)	(-0.663)
If parent of head holds official position in *kebele*	0.049	-0.049	-0.090	-0.011	-0.018	-0.061	0.063	0.034
	(0.857)	(-0.588)	(-1.498)	(-0.153)	(-0.307)	(-0.661)	(1.238)	(0.939)
Observations	844	849	831	849	824	845	899	911

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: Coefficients are expressed in terms of their marginal effects. Robust Z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.

6.8. Selection into Direct Support

We now examine the evolution of access to direct support over time. We begin with Figure 6.1. This shows the percentage of households in our sample that received direct support in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. In Tigray, the percentage of households receiving direct support jumped markedly between 2005 and 2006 from 13 to 20 percent. Since 2007, this figure has hovered between 20 and 22 percent. Access is much higher in Tigray than in any other region. In 2010, it ranged from 8 to 10 percent in the other regions, a percentage that has changed little over time.

Figure 6.1. Percentage of households receiving direct support, by region and year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 6.10 looks at the extent to which access to direct support remains constant over time. The top panel looks at constancy of access between 2008 and 2010, while the bottom panel looks at 2006 to 2008. In the top panel, a relatively large fraction of households who ever received direct support between 2008 and 2010 only do so in 2008 (between 25 and 39 percent, depending on the region). A similar percentage received these transfers in 2009 and 2010 and somewhere between 26 and 45 percent received direct support in all three years. This is suggestive of a process in which the list of direct support beneficiaries was revised in 2009—with the result that some, but not all, households were dropped and others added—but not revised in 2010 (which is why the percentage of households getting direct support in both those years is also relatively high). This contrasts with results for the years 2006–2008 shown in the bottom panel. There is evidence in those data of considerably more movement in and out of direct support from one year to the next. The greater constancy observed in 2009 and 2010 is consistent with a claim that along this dimension access to direct support has become more predictable.

In an earlier analysis of the targeting of direct support, Gilligan et al. (2009) found that households receiving direct support payments had heads that are considerably older, had fewer members, and had fewer able-bodied workers. They were also poorer as measured by livestock and landholdings. To assess whether targeting of direct support has improved, remained the same, or worsened, we estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable equals one if the household received direct support, zero otherwise. Results are reported in Table 6.11.

Table 6.10. Consistency of household participation in the direct support component of the PSNP, by region

Region	Number of households ever receiving direct support	Only in 2008	Only in 2009	Only in 2010	In 2008 and 2009	In 2008 and 2010	In 2009 and 2010	In 2008 and 2009 and 2010
Tigray	241	29.8	0.0	0.0	0.8	2.5	27.8	39.0
Amhara	130	37.2	0.0	0.8	0.0	5.4	20.2	36.4
Amhara-HVFB	184	30.9	1.6	0.5	0.0	1.6	23.9	41.3
Oromiya	99	38.8	0.0	3.0	0.0	1.0	30.6	26.5
SNNPR	89	25.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.2	44.9

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: Sample restricted to households receiving direct support payments in the first five months of at least one year, 2008, 2009, or 2010.

Region	Number of households ever receiving direct support	Only in 2006	Only in 2007	Only in 2008	In 2006 and 2007	In 2006 and 2008	In 2007 and 2008	In 2006 and 2007 and 2008
Tigray	224	8.0	2.2	11.6	0.5	2.7	39.7	35.3
Amhara	125	4.0	5.6	8.8	0.0	0.0	52.0	29.6
Amhara-HVFB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oromiya	181	4.4	6.6	47.5	2.8	1.7	20.4	16.6
SNNPR	124	0.8	0.0	37.1	3.2	0.0	24.2	34.7

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: Sample restricted to households receiving direct support payments in the first five months of at least one year, 2006, 2007, or 2008.

In Table 6.11, the number associated with each variable denotes its marginal effect on the probability that a household receives direct support. For example, the number "0.069" for female head in the column marked "Access to DS 2006" means that holding all other characteristics constant, a household headed by a female was 6.9 percentage points more likely to receive direct support. In 2006, demographic characteristics dominated the likelihood that a household received direct support. Households with older heads, older men, and fewer younger men were also more likely to receive these payments. Characteristics related to poverty played a much smaller role in determining selection, suggesting that infirmity (as proxied by age) and absence of labor power are the factors driving selection. Household "connections" as proxied by family status within the *kebele* appear to have no impact on receipt of direct support.

The magnitudes of these effects are meaningfully large. As with our discussion of public works, consider two households. Household A has a female head aged 70; household B has a male head aged 40. In all other respects, they are identical. The results reported in Table 6.11, column (1) (for 2006) indicate that the probability of receipt of direct support by Household A is 12.9 percentage points higher than by Household B. Doing the same exercise with column (3) (for 2010), we find that the probability that Household A receives direct support rises by 23.5 percentage points. Assuming that advanced age is correlated, in these settings, with reduced work capacity, these results indicate that the targeting principles laid out in the Project Implementation Manual for direct support continue to be met.

Table 6.11. Correlates of receipt of direct support (DS), by year

Variables	(1) Access to DS 2006	(2) Access to DS 2008	(3) Access to DS 2010
Age of head	0.002***	0.003***	0.004***
	(3.934)	(7.180)	(7.716)
Female head	0.069***	0.092***	0.115***
	(4.732)	(6.797)	(7.314)
Males, 65+	0.064***	0.057***	0.020
	(2.808)	(2.781)	(0.944)
Females, 65+	0.074***	0.002	-0.004
	(3.742)	(0.113)	(-0.247)
Dependency ratio	0.004	-0.000	0.005**
	(1.528)	(-0.121)	(2.031)
Males, 15–59	-0.019***	-0.034***	-0.013
	(-2.668)	(-4.376)	(-1.640)
Females, 15–59	0.003	-0.017**	-0.018***
	(0.330)	(-2.099)	(-2.613)
Grades completed, head	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	(-0.898)	(1.117)	(0.468)
Oxen owned	-0.029***	-0.023***	-0.012**
	(-3.937)	(-3.557)	(-2.205)
Head born in this *kebele*	0.007	-0.024	0.007
	(0.408)	(-1.574)	(0.527)
Father of head an important person in *kebele*	0.003	0.015	-0.006
	(0.284)	(1.175)	(-0.521)
Mother of head an important person in *kebele*	0.006	-0.010	0.003
	(0.448)	(-0.842)	(0.210)
If parent of head holds official position in *kebele*	-0.016	-0.014	0.003
	(-0.798)	(-0.623)	(0.142)
Amhara	-0.063***	-0.071***	-0.070***
	(-2.670)	(-3.003)	(-4.366)
Oromiya	0.027	-0.071***	-0.070***
	(0.803)	(-3.628)	(-4.165)
SNNPR	0.003	-0.070***	-0.050***
	(0.133)	(-4.438)	(-3.163)
Observations	3,669	3,264	3,120

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: Coefficients are expressed in terms of their marginal effects. Robust (clustered) Z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent.

Lastly, in Table 6.12, we assess whether these changes are observed across all regions. To do so, we estimate the probit separately by region and examine how the coefficients change, or do not change, over time. Consistent with what we observed in Table 6.11, over time being a female head has an increasingly large effect on the likelihood of being selected for direct support. This is especially so in Tigray, where, holding other factors constant, a female-headed household had a 10.4 percentage point higher likelihood of receiving direct support in 2006 and a 24.1 percentage point higher likelihood of receiving direct support in 2010.

Table 6.12. Correlates of receipt of direct support (DS), by region and year

Variables	(1) Access to DS Tigray 2006	(2) Access to DS Tigray 2010	(3) Access to DS Amhara 2006	(4) Access to DS Amhara 2010	(5) Access to DS Oromiya 2006	(6) Access to DS Oromiya 2010	(7) Access to DS SNNPR 2006	(8) Access to DS SNNPR 2010
Age of head	0.003***	0.008***	0.000	0.002**	0.004***	0.003***	0.001	0.003***
	(3.091)	(4.666)	(0.231)	(2.215)	(4.088)	(4.403)	(1.010)	(3.949)
Female head	0.104***	0.241***	0.034*	0.089***	0.031	0.077***	0.082**	0.044*
	(5.572)	(4.340)	(1.815)	(3.595)	(0.842)	(3.804)	(2.085)	(1.789)
Males, 65+	0.128**	0.099	0.025	0.005	-0.028	0.003	0.166***	-0.017
	(2.283)	(1.270)	(1.051)	(0.161)	(-0.585)	(0.114)	(3.958)	(-0.531)
Females, 65+	0.038	-0.009	0.072***	0.036	0.105*	-0.029	0.077*	-0.004
	(1.330)	(-0.174)	(2.764)	(1.274)	(1.730)	(-1.152)	(1.858)	(-0.0955)
Dependency ratio	-0.006	0.007	0.007**	0.015***	0.005	0.002	0.005	-0.004
	(-0.947)	(1.243)	(2.122)	(3.398)	(0.846)	(0.505)	(0.727)	(-0.777)
Males, 15–59	-0.031**	-0.017	-0.006	0.001	-0.034	-0.008	-0.017	-0.028**
	(-2.271)	(-0.727)	(-0.657)	(0.0426)	(-1.598)	(-0.613)	(-1.370)	(-2.376)
Females, 15–59	-0.046**	-0.061***	0.015	0.011	0.031*	-0.022	0.008	-0.011
	(-2.413)	(-3.835)	(1.553)	(0.456)	(1.951)	(-1.607)	(0.790)	(-1.455)
Grades completed, head	-0.003	0.000	-0.002*	0.000	0.003	0.002	-0.001	-0.002
	(-1.302)	(0.0477)	(-1.665)	(0.0676)	(1.247)	(1.220)	(-0.584)	(-0.977)
Oxen owned	-0.017	-0.015	-0.023**	-0.014	-0.032**	-0.001	-0.034**	-0.018
	(-1.121)	(-0.929)	(-2.466)	(-1.451)	(-2.068)	(-0.145)	(-2.106)	(-1.468)
Head born in this *kebele*	-0.028	0.033	0.024*	0.037	0.074**	0.005	-0.068*	-0.029
	(-0.909)	(0.909)	(1.666)	(1.598)	(2.557)	(0.242)	(-1.907)	(-1.267)
Father of head an important person in *kebele*	-0.014	-0.037**	-0.009	-0.052***	-0.005	-0.015	0.039*	0.054***
	(-0.516)	(-2.167)	(-0.567)	(-2.936)	(-0.243)	(-0.652)	(1.667)	(4.301)
Mother of head an important person in *kebele*	0.046	0.057*	0.016	0.053*	-0.004	0.014	-0.015	-0.059***
	(1.469)	(1.880)	(1.353)	(1.679)	(-0.104)	(0.545)	(-0.684)	(-4.849)
If parent of head holds official position in *kebele*	0.093**	0.109			-0.048	-0.023	-0.042	0.002
	(2.068)	(1.075)			(-0.874)	(-0.782)	(-1.460)	(0.0704)
Observations	894	775	845	667	937	824	944	821

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

6.9. Switching from Public Works to Direct Support and vice versa

Outside of Tigray, there is virtually no evidence of households being shifted from public works to direct support or vice versa. Fewer than 5 percent of public works households were switched to direct support, and fewer than 5 percent of direct support households were switched to public works in Amhara, Amhara-HVFB, Oromiya, and SNNPR. In Tigray, approximately 12 percent of households were switched from public works to direct support after 2008, while about 33 percent of direct support households were switched to public works. Female-headed households, smaller households, and households with older heads were more likely to be switched from public works to direct support, while larger households were more likely to be switched from direct support to public works. However, focus group discussions with women indicated that, when pregnant, they are switched out of public works and into direct support.

6.10. Summary

- The provision of an administrative quota begins at the federal level and extends all the way down to the sub-*kebele* level. Regional and *woreda* officials broadly follow the targeting criteria outlined in the PIM to determine administrative quotas, determining allocations on the basis of previous relief caseloads, agroecological conditions, malnutrition levels, the average size of landholdings, and the estimated population of chronically food-insecure households in particular administrative areas. The upstream budget review process—starting at the *kebeles* and moving upward to the *woredas*, the regions, and the federal level—to decide the total number of the PSNP beneficiaries has not been practiced.
- Most exclusion errors are due to inadequate administrative quotas. Full family targeting is practiced in most areas, even though officials acknowledge that it implies that fewer households are targeted. *Kebele* officials frequently request additional funds but invariably these requests are denied.
- Officials have used the contingency budget and stricter, locally-specific targeting criteria to manage the limited administrative quota compared with the larger population of chronically food insecure that require support.
- The targeting criteria appear to be widely understood. However, there has been a fall in the percentage of respondents who can identify specific criteria for access to the PSNP and there is a rise in the percentage who perceives these are a consequence of a quota system or a random allocation. Despite this, a majority of focus groups agreed with the targeting process as well as the selection criteria used to determine public works and direct support beneficiaries.
- Access to public works and direct support has become more consistent over time. Between 50 and 72 percent of current public works participants received payments for public works in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Between 26 and 45 percent of current recipient of direct support received direct support in 2008, 2009, and 2010.
- There has been little change in the application of targeting criteria as seen through estimates of the correlates of access to public works or direct support.
- Outside of Tigray, there is virtually no evidence of households being shifted from public works to direct support or vice versa. However, focus group discussions with women indicated that, when pregnant, they are switched out of public works and into direct support.

7. The Implementation of Public Works Projects

7.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with the implementation of public works projects under the PSNP. It explores whether there have been administrative improvements in the coordination of public works activities planning and implementation. It assesses the extent to which those activities that are chosen have incorporated feedback from communities and whether these activities are linked to livelihoods. It summarizes perceptions regarding implementation problems and the extent to which gender considerations have been incorporated into the implementation of public works activities. While it includes perceptions of the usefulness of public works, it does not provide a technical assessment of their quality.[19] In so doing, it covers a number of evaluation objectives as Table 7.1 notes.

Table 7.1. Evaluation objectives covered in chapter 7

Evaluation objective	Issue	Link to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP		
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	TOR, para 42
Assess trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients		
	Beneficiaries understand how the program works	PSNP Log frame Output 4.4

Source: Authors' compilation.

7.2. Coordinating the Implementation of Public Works

An objective of the current phase of the PSNP is to improve coordination and technical support to public works activities. To this end, Regional Public Works Focal Units (RPWFU) have been established in all regions. They are responsible for coordinating the implementation of public works activities under the Natural Resource Management (NRM) Work Process of the Bureau of Agriculture and Regional Development (BoARD) at the regional level. They are also responsible for providing technical supports to *woredas* in the planning and implementation of public works. Regional Public Works Technical Committees also provide some technical support. In focus group and key informant interviews, some concerns were expressed that there were insufficient resources to support these coordination activities. Limitations included shortages of vehicles, limited operational budget, insufficient number of staff compared to *woredas* required to be covered, and limited experience.

There are variations in the establishment of *Woreda* Public Works Focal Units (WPWFU) across regions. In Amhara and SNNPR, WPWFUs have been established and have started to provide technical support to the implementation of public works at the grassroots level.

[19] Such an assessment is beyond the Terms of Reference for this study. A number of other instruments assess the quality of public works sub-projects, such as the Public Works Reviews and Public Works Impact Evaluation.

The *woreda* public works focal unit coordinator of Denba Goffa *woreda* of SNNPR explained their situation as follows:

> There is a public work focal unit at *woreda* level. The head of natural resource management case team is the coordinator of the focal unit. Crop, livestock, food security, and natural resource management experts are assigned to monitor the whole activities of public works starting from the planning stage [SN-D/W-FGD-WPWFU].

The existence of WPWFU with different experts in Amhara and SNNPR *woredas* is perceived to provide more coordinated technical support during the implementation of public works. A respondent from a WPWFU in Ebinate *woreda* explained:

> There was only a focal person responsible for public works, but now there are a group of experts and they are jointly planning, monitoring, and evaluating the implementation of public works [AM-E/W-FGD-WPWFU].

That said, concerns were also expressed about coordination with sectoral government offices and technical assistance they provide. The Sokota *woreda* Public Works Focal Unit indicated, “There is not much coordinated technical support from sectoral offices” [AM_SO/W-KII-WPWFU].

7.3. Planning Public Works

Interviews with actors involved at different administrative levels provided a variety of contrasting views on how public works are planned. In most areas, officials at the *kebele* level and below prioritize projects for public works. Five *woreda* Public Works Focal Points that were interviewed suggested a certain degree of community involvement in helping to plan public works and set priorities. They indicated that they provide an initial list of indicative projects, with development agents and community FSTF officials modifying these on the basis of local priorities and circumstances. In all three *woredas* visited in Amhara, the Public Works Focal Point indicated that a *woreda* level Natural Resource Technical Committee (“Watershed Committee”) determines public works plans and sends these to *kebeles*. However, *kebele* officials in the three *woredas* offered a contrasting view, indicating that development agents and community members decide priorities and plans for public works.

In all but two *kebeles*, members of *kebele* FSTFs and development agents explained that public works planning is conducted at the community level. In Gurade *kebele* in Demba Gofa *woreda*, SNNPR state, a development agent explained that the *woreda* sends a list of indicative activities and that the community has no decisive role in changing this. In Beritie *kebele*, Gursum *woreda*, Oromiya state, a development agent explained that public works plans were determined by the *kebele* FSTF but that these did not deviate greatly from plans sent by the *woreda*:

> The *kebele* FSTF develops a detailed implementation plan based on the indicative plan sent from the *woreda*. The *kebele* FSTF makes minor adjustments to this. It can increase the volume of public works but cannot reduce the number of proposed works. Also, it can substitute one activity with a similar and locally relevant activity, such as constructing a soil bund rather

than a stone bund. However, the *kebele* FSTF does not have the mandate to make major modifications to the plan sent from the *woreda*. Public works planning is not participatory, because the main activities and the amount of work to be done is fixed by *woreda* officials [ORO_G/K-KI-2].

These varying responses are suggestive of the possibility that there is just a good deal of substantial variation in community participation in the selection of public works projects across regions and over time. Evidence consistent with this comes from the household surveys where respondents were asked if they had been involved in the selection of public works that had been completed during 2010. Results are shown in Table 7.2. This shows that, over time, there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of households indicating some role in project selection. However, as Table 7.3 shows, significant differences exist in the percentages of male- and female-headed households participating in decisionmaking, with male-headed households more likely to do so in all regions.

Table 7.2. Percentage of households participating in selection of public works, by region and year

Year	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
2006	8	10		11	9
2008	20	31		22	31
2010	34	30	35	28	28

Source: Household questionnaire, 2006, 2008, 2010.

Table 7.3. Percentage of households participating in selection of public works, by region and sex of head, 2010

Sex of head	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
Male	40	31	38	32	29
Female	20	25	24	18	26

Source: Household questionnaire, 2010.

Two other aspects of the planning of public works are worth noting. First, there appears to be little effort to explicitly include women in decisionmaking. In three of ten *woredas*, women are represented on watershed committees. Some *woreda* officials justified this by stating that there were other ways that women could contribute to decisionmaking, such as through their representation on *kebele* FSTFs or by attending meetings at the community level to discuss public works plans.

Second, one of the principles of public works specified in the PIM is that they are to be integrated with *woreda* development plans. In all *woredas* that were visited, public works officials confirmed that public works are planned in this way. As well as being consistent with *woreda* development plans, public works are also to be implemented in accordance with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) guidelines on community-based participatory watershed development (CBPWD). The overall objective of CBPWD is "to improve the livelihood of communities and households in rural Ethiopia through comprehensive and integrated natural resource development" (GFDRE 2010, 40). Many of the indicative public works activities in the PIM reflect the CBPWD approach, such as the

establishment of area enclosures and woodlots, the construction of hillside terraces, shallow wells and ponds, and stream diversion.

7.4. Linking Public Works and Local Livelihoods

Regional and *woreda* officials were asked to describe how public works had supported people's livelihoods. The most frequent response given was the construction of conservation works such as hillside terraces, tree planting, and rock dams. Terraces, in particular, were thought to have prevented further soil erosion and limited crop damage due to flooding. Other ways in which public works supported people's livelihoods was by the establishment of enclosures for growing high value fodder and constructing roads to improve market access (indicated by three out of nine officials that were asked). At the *kebele* level, all development agents that responded (seven in total) said that soil and water conservation activities had helped improving livelihoods. A development agent in Furra *kebele* in Shebedino *woreda* (SNNPR state) summarized the impacts of public works on people's livelihoods as the following:

> The roads that were built helped members of this community to take their produce to the market easily. Soil and water conservation activities have helped to improve the productivity of farm plots. Planting trees has brought about positive ecological changes, which are observable in improved productivity of coffee farms. Not only do the trees provide shade for the coffee, but the wood is cut for fuelwood and as construction material [SN_S/K-KI-2].

Woreda level public works officials in Shebedino explained:

> Public works have helped to build community assets. For example, terraces have helped to recover land that previously was thought to be useless. Trees and grasses have been planted to produce animal feed; as well as stabilizing land that is susceptible to erosion; these have a direct economic benefit for the community, because there is more fodder available for cattle. The other activity that has helped is road construction. Before, it was difficult for vehicles to reach rural areas and to transport farm produce to bigger markets. Roads have opened up outlying areas and vehicles can move much more easily than before. Connections to markets have increased [SN_S/W-FG-PW].

A development agent in Adizata *kebele* in Ahferom *woreda* (Tigray state) offered a similar assessment:

> Water for irrigation is more readily available for growing vegetables and fruits. Now you can get banana, orange, and lemon in this area, which you could not before. These also provide a source of income. Communal grazing areas have been established as well through public works and this has increased access to livestock fodder and, hence, increased household incomes. The construction of schools and clinics has also helped supporting livelihoods. The construction of roads has made it easier to transport farm produce and increase incomes [TIG_A/K-KI-2].

Officials were also asked to give examples of particular public works activities that had been successful. Five of ten *woreda* public works officials who replied mentioned watershed improvements such as water harvesting structures and terraces. However, there were some dissenting views as to whether public works have helped to improve people's livelihoods, even though these were the exception to the general outlook, which was positive. Members of the Public Works Technical Committee in Ebinet *woreda* in Amhara state explained:

> Public works are supporting people's livelihoods in terms of protecting assets. But if you take a long-term perspective and having a look at an impact beyond the life of the program, then public works are having less impact, because they do not create assets. Public works in this *woreda* consisted mainly of constructing hillside terraces and micro-basins, but an integrated approach was not used, so these will not support livelihoods in the long run. So we cannot say confidently that public works are supporting livelihoods in this *woreda* [AM_E/W-FG-PW].

A development agent in Berite *kebele* in Gursum *woreda* (Oromiya state) recounted numerous problems with public works:

> Few public works were completed in this *kebele* because we have received limited support from the *woreda,* such as few seedlings, although tree planting was one of the main activities. The *kebele* is over 40 km from the *woreda* center and the road is bad, particularly during the wet season. Watershed activities have been localized and the quality of the work carried out is poor. Hence, there has been no reduction in natural resource degradation. Part of the problem is that public works sites are far away. People complain about the distance they must travel to reach the sites. Some of the seedlings that were planted were not cared for and dried up. Soil and water conservation structures were also subsequently ruined [ORO_G/K-KI-2].

As part of the household survey, respondents were asked if they perceived that they had benefitted from these public works. As Table 7.4 shows, households have consistently perceived that they have benefitted from road construction and maintenance. In 2010, between 56 and 80 percent of households felt that the construction of water-harvesting infrastructure had been helpful and, generally, this percentage had risen since 2006. By contrast, soil and water conservation (SWC) activities and natural resource management (NRM) are not as frequently perceived as being beneficial and the percentage of households reporting that these were helpful had generally declined since 2008. Broadly speaking, these views are consistent with those of regional and *woreda* officials. Across all activities, female-headed households are slightly less likely to report that they benefitted from these (Table 7.5). Separately, we assessed whether perception of benefits differed by wealth status. To do this, we disaggregated the sample into quartiles based on livestock holdings. Across most forms of public works activities, there are few differences in perceptions. However, the wealthiest quartile was more likely to indicate that they benefitted from soil and water conservation activities on private land and other natural resource management activities (52 and 49 percent, respectively) than the poorest quartile (44 and 39 percent, respectively).

Table 7.4. Household perceptions of whether they benefitted from public works

Region	Survey year	Percentage of households indicating that their household benefited from construction or maintenance of					
		Roads	Water harvesting infrastructure	SWC, communal land	SWC, private land	Other NRM activities	Wells
Tigray	2006	53	33	38	51	21	58
	2008	72	55	54	68	52	46
	2010	69	58	59	44	56	45
Amhara	2006	57	29	36	67	16	48
	2008	83	39	68	59	69	80
	2010	78	56	50	42	40	75
Amhara – HVFB	2010	85	62	58	61	49	69
Oromiya	2006	76	63	39	28	13	62
	2008	90	78	53	60	52	66
	2010	79	80	49	24	30	96
SNNPR	2006	70	36	35	22	8	-
	2008	84	42	54	37	53	91
	2010	85	66	63	46	46	77

Source: Household questionnaire, 2006, 2008, 2010.
Notes: SWC = soil and water conservation. NRM = natural resource management. Cells are left blank if there were fewer than 10 responses.

Table 7.5. Household perceptions of whether they benefitted from public works, by sex of head, 2010

Sex of head	Percentage of households indicating that their household benefited from construction or maintenance of					
	Roads	Water harvesting infrastructure	SWC, communal land	SWC, private land	Other NRM activities	Wells
Male	83	65	57	47	44	64
Female	77	59	54	44	41	60

Source: Household questionnaire, 2010.
Notes: SWC = soil and water conservation. NRM = natural resource management.

One reason why wealthier households would be more likely to say that they benefitted from soil and water conservation activities on private land is that these activities were actually undertaken on their own land. Figure 7.1 shows that in all regions, wealthier households were more likely to report that a public works activity was undertaken on their land than were poorer households. By contrast, there was no difference between male- and female-headed households (not shown).

Figure 7.1. Percentage of households reporting that public works were undertaken on their land, by wealth category and region, 2010



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

7.5. Implementation Problems

Regional and *woreda* public works officials recounted many implementation difficulties that contributed to these problems. Limited capacity was the most common complaint. Capacity issues that were mentioned included a lack of training and technical knowledge, few staff to monitor works being carried out, limited access to vehicles for *woreda* officials to visit public works sites, and a shortage of funds, making it difficult to procure equipment for technically complex works, such as GPS for watershed planning. The Public Works Focal Point in Tembaro *woreda*, SNNPR state, stated:

> Roads that have been constructed have poor technical qualities. This is because of a lack of monitoring by experts who are knowledgeable about road construction. Sometimes we take experts from rural road construction office with us to the construction sites. But since it is not possible to take them to all places where roads have been constructed, there is still a problem in the quality of the roads that have been constructed [SN_T/W-FG-PW].

Three of five *woreda* public works officials that responded to questions on implementation difficulties indicated delays in transferring the capital and transfers budgets. The Public Works Focal Point in Sayint *woreda*, Amhara state, explained how budget delays had adverse consequences for public works that had been planned in 2010:

> The timing of public works was extended this year because we did not receive funds until May. Because of this, we could not pay public works participants directly after they had completed their work. The delay led to unwanted things. For example, it was difficult for us to process bids and employ

> contractors or to procure materials, given that the fiscal year ends in June, just one month after we received the funds. By the time we received the budget, the rains had set in. The timing was bad for the public works we had planned, such as installing water pumps. The quality of some public works was compromised; costs increased. Some public works that were planned had to be cancelled and carried over to the next fiscal year [AM_SA/W-FG-PW].

Another problem referred to by an official in the Oromiya Regional Public Works Office is the tendency of development agents to work with more successful farmers rather than the poorest:

> The development agents working at the community level lack the required capacity to mobilize the community for public works. This is because they tend to work with the model farmers that adopt technologies and show progress rather than the poorest of the poor who need diverse support for which the development agent may not have the knowledge, attitude, or skills to provide [ORO_R/R-KI-PW].

The same official also raised the possibility that a dependency attitude had set in among clients of the program, thereby limiting its achievements:

> The most important factor affecting the performance of public works is the dilemma of whether the PSNP is an entitlement or a tool for development. The development concern of PSNP has been overridden by the entitlement concern of PSNP and this has significantly impacted on the performance of public works. Donors more often than not are pushing for the PSNP to be treated as an entitlement. They say people have to receive the transfer and that public works should not be considered as a condition for being paid. In most cases the community knows this and as a result people are not motivated to be involved in public works [ORO_R/R-KI-PW].

This tension between the twin objectives of the public works component of the PSNP emerges from other sources. As part of the quantitative survey conducted at the *kebele* level, respondents were asked, “Which is more important for public works programs, transferring income to the poorest households or building productive community assets?” and “Is hiring skilled labor to assist with public works projects sometimes justified, even if it means that less people can be hired or that other lower skilled people must work fewer days?” Table 7.6 shows responses by regions.

Table 7.6. *Kebele* level perceptions of the comparative importance of income transfers to the poor and the construction of public works as priorities for the PSNP

	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HYFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	All
	Which is more important for public works programs, transferring income to the poorest households or building productive community assets?					
Only transferring income to the poor is important	2.9	8.8	10.8	0.0	6.3	6.3
Transferring income to the poor is more important than building productive assets	41.2	38.2	27.0	17.4	12.5	28.1
Transferring income to the poor and building productive assets are equally important	17.7	20.6	29.7	60.9	46.9	33.1
Building productive assets is more important than transferring income to the poor	38.2	26.5	29.7	21.7	25.0	28.8
Only building productive assets is important	0.0	5.9	2.7	0.0	9.4	3.8
	Is hiring skilled labor to assist with public works projects sometimes justified even if it means that less people can be hired or that other lower skilled people must work fewer days?					
Agree	85.7	94.3	94.7	86.4	93.3	91.3
Disagree	14.3	5.7	5.3	13.6	6.7	8.7

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

7.6. Gender Considerations

The revised PIM (June 2010) incorporates principles to ensure that implementation of public works is gender sensitive. For example, priority is to be given to projects that will reduce women's work burden. Work is to be organized in a way that considers women's domestic responsibilities. Therefore, women may be asked to work fewer hours each day and less days overall than men, as well as be permitted to arrive late and leave early to look after their responsibilities for cooking and caring for children at home. Also, women are also to be assigned tasks that are less physically demanding or alternatively to participate in nutritional classes or other activities that are thought to be particularly beneficial to them and their children.

Men's and women's focus groups were asked to provide examples of "men's work" and "women's work" on public works to determine if women were assigned tasks that were less physically demanding. Ten out of 20 groups responded. Groups in three *kebeles* reported different tasks for women and men. For example, members of a women's group in Adizata *kebele* in Afherom *woreda* (Tigray state) stated that men will do the digging, such as for a pond, while women remove the soil. The same example was given by a men's group in Furra *kebele* in Shebedino *woreda* (SNNPR state). Members of the men's group in Adizata explained that men will break stone and women will transport the stone to the public works site. Another example provided by members of a men's group in Beritie *kebele* in Gursum *woreda* (Oromiya state) is that men do digging and excavation, while women prepare and serve tea and perform other lighter tasks. Community focus groups were also asked if men and women do the same types of activities on public works. Seven women's focus groups

(of seven who responded) stated that women and men do the same activities; six men's groups (of seven who responded) said that both sexes do the same activities. A respondent in a women's group in Wal in Amhara complained, "We go for work together with the men and we come back home together. It is our foremen that are pressurizing us to do hard labor like men, not the government. We shoulder and transport stones from one place to another and dig the ground just like men" [AM_SO/FG-3]. A respondent in a men's group in Wal in Amhara state explained, "As far as public works are concerned, women are given the same type of work as men. She is required to work like men. We feel that this puts a lot of pressure on women. The work is even very hard for us, let alone for women. In light of this, they are oppressed" [AM_SO/FG-4].

Thus, although women in some areas do lighter tasks, in general, women and men do the same work on public works projects.

Woreda officials were asked whether public works interfere with women's other responsibilities around the home. Public works officials in six of ten *woredas* responded. Of these, four acknowledged that public works do interfere with women's domestic work; however, officials in two of these *woredas* said the evidence was "anecdotal" and that no formal assessment had taken place. Still, a member of the *Woreda* FSTF in Sokota in Amhara state exhorted, "It goes without saying [that public works interfere with women's other domestic work]. Public works are continuous. This situation needs attention. It has created an additional workload for women" [AM_SO/W-FG-1]. *Kebele* FSTF members were not asked directly whether public works interfere with women's domestic work, but responses to other questions concerning who participates in public works gave some indication that public works in some areas are overburdening women, as the following quotes illustrate:

> Yes, public works interfere with women's domestic and childcare responsibilities. But we did not take this issue into account or develop any supportive actions. You know, if a housewife works with her husband until 6 pm in the evening at a public works site, then she also will need to finish her domestic activities till 9 pm. This is really a burden which needs further attention [TIG_A/K-KI-1].

> Yes, public works affect women.... Women do not get any rest. They are engaged again in domestic work when they return home from doing public works. A member of the KFSTF added that women are mentioning that the public works is becoming harder and harder for them [AM_SO/K-KI-1].

> Women are usually engaged in lighter activities than men. But the number of hours they are working is the same as men. A woman leaves behind many other household activities to work on public works [SN_S/K-KI-1].

Nine of ten women's focus groups that were asked report that public works interfere with women's domestic tasks. By comparison, four men's groups (out of eight that responded) stated that public works interfered with their other work activities. However, of these, three stated that public works interfere with their agricultural work in the harvesting period in December and January. Yet, as *woreda* and *kebele* officials alike state that public works are

timed around the lean agricultural activity period, we can assume that the problem is minimized.

The following statements from women's groups give a sense of the pressures existing for women who must fulfill their labor contribution to public works alongside their work at home:

> Yes, we face problems. When we face serious problems we go to the foreman to get permission to be absent, such as in the event of a funeral or to care for someone sick at home. We are permitted up to two days off if we need to travel far for a funeral. If it is more than two days then there will be deduction in our salary. There is no one who will help us for free. Those that help you on public works want to be paid for what they have worked. So if I miss work at a public works site, then I must expect to pay 10 Birr to whoever steps in. There is no one from home who can help. There are those who say that if you have a problem, then give me my 10 Birr, otherwise there are no relatives who give support for free [SN_S/FG-3].
>
> We feel that women's time share in public works should have been half that of men to help us accomplish our additional responsibilities at home. We'd even suggest that public works should include projects that help female heads of households to repair their homes and complete other difficult tasks [TIG_S/FG-3].
>
> The burden of balancing public works and domestic chores fall the hardest on us—female heads of households [ORO_Z/FG-3].
>
> Those not having a helping hand in the family are faced with the problem. Especially, those women who do not have an elder girl at home to help out face the greatest challenge of contributing to public works and working at home [ORO_G/FG-3].
>
> Yes, it interferes with our domestic responsibilities. But since it is development, we decrease the time we spend on domestic tasks and concentrate on the public works [AM_E/FG-3].
>
> There are women who have children that feed on the breast. In such cases, when there are no elder children at home to take care of the younger ones, we are forced to leave them behind with neighbors. If there is a milking cow, we face a shortage of time to fetch it grass. There is also no time to prepare food for school children [SN_T/FG-3].
>
> Public works interfere with our domestic work. The workload in the house awaits her when she is back home. If she does not work the public works, she will not get payment, and if she does not accomplish her domestic work at home, the family cannot survive, therefore she is affected by the public works [AM_SO/FG-3].
>
> There is no one in the village or household to assist us. Both the public works and the domestic work are managed by us women alone. The children are in the school. The cattle are kept in the shade while we are away for public works. There is nobody to take care of them [AM_SA/FG-3].

Woreda and *kebele* officials alike were asked what measures had been taken to help women cope with the additional burden of contributing to public works, such as being permitted to arrive late and leave early and being provided with childcare at public works sites. Public works officials in eight of ten *woredas* report that no steps have been taken to make it easier for women to participate in public works. The exceptions were Ziway Dugda (Oromiya) and Shebedino (SNNPR) *woredas*, where officials affirmed that women can arrive late and leave early from public works sites. Members of four KFSTFs (out of eight that responded) report that there are no special measures in place to help women. KFSTF members in Shengodefer and Serawudi *kebeles* (Ebinet and Sayint *woredas*, respectively, in Amhara state) and in Beritie *kebele* (Gursum *woreda*, Oromiya state) stated that measures exist to help women contribute to public works. In both Shengodefer and Serawudi, other household members are expected to cover the contribution of women who arrive late or leave early. In Beritie, direct support recipients provide childcare at some public works sites, according to *woreda* public works officials.

An interesting insight was provided by members of the FSTF in Saesi Tsemba *woreda* in Tigray state:

> As per the guideline [in the PIM], women are allowed to start work late and leave early to support them in doing their household chores. However, this has raised a very serious issue. Although women are not penalized for coming late and leaving early, other community members, and men, in particular, have complained that this is not proper. They have questioned the practice, saying 'why not reduce the work norm for the women, as is the case in the non-PSNP community free labor?' [TIG_S/W-FG-1].

The women's affairs member of the same FSTF added:

> The principle of allowing women to arrive late or leave early is not widely known for fear that women might claim this as a right and, hence, deter them from participating in the community's work. Even some complain that women time the birth of their children to coincide with public works so that they can receive free support [TIG_S/W-FG-1].

7.7. Summary

This chapter has explored aspects of the implementation of public works projects under the PSNP. There are several noteworthy results.

- There appears to be considerable variation in the extent of community involvement in the selection of public works projects. There are clearly cases where these have been decided upon by the *woreda* and consultation with *kebeles* and communities seems notional. But there are other instances where development agents and community members have had a significant say in deciding priorities and plans for public works.
- Public works projects are generally perceived to assist in supporting livelihoods. Work on roads is seen as particularly positively. Views on other activities, such as water conservation and natural resource management, are more mixed.

- A number of implementation problems associated with lack of technical skills, difficulties in supervision, and delays in receipt of funds were noted. The tension between the use of public works as a means of transferring funds to poor households and as a means of strengthening community assets was also highlighted.
- Participation in public works activities puts considerable strain on women. There appears to be little willingness to address this.

8. Payments for Public Works and Direct Support

8.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with payments for public works employment and direct support. We provide information describing public works participation by gender, age, and region. We then review the levels of transfers, the frequency with which they are made, and the extent to which these reflect beneficiaries' entitlements as outlined in the Project Implement Manual (PIM). We examine transfer levels given to direct support beneficiaries. We also present findings on household preferences for modality of payment (food and cash) and whether these preferences are season or location dependent. Table 8.1 notes how this work links to the evaluation objectives set out in the PSNP Log Frame.

Table 8.1. Evaluation objectives covered in chapter 8

Evaluation objective	Issue	Links to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP		
	Are public works payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 39
	Are direct support payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 35

Source: Authors' compilation.

8.2. Public Works Employment

Figure 8.1 displays the mean number of days worked, per household, by region, and year, conditional on having worked at least one day in that year. It is important to note that, because of the timing of the 2006, 2008, and 2010 surveys, these data pertain to the first five months of each year, the months of *Tir*, *Yekatit*, *Megabit*, *Miaza*, and *Ginbot* in the Ethiopian calendar (approximately January 9–June 9). Public works are also planned for the month that follows *Ginbot*, but because this is not captured here, Figure 8.1 understates the amount of employment that individuals receive under the PSNP. In Tigray and SNNPR, beneficiary households averaged 25 days of work per month. In Amhara and Amhara-HVFB, they averaged about 20 days per month. While the level of employment has increased in Oromiya relative to its performance in 2006, the number of days worked remains considerably lower than that found elsewhere.

Figure 8.1. Number of days worked per beneficiary household, *Tir–Ginbot*, by survey year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

In the 2008 and 2010 surveys, we also asked about employment over the previous year (2007 and 2009, respectively). This allows us to assess whether, for example, employment levels in Oromiya are low or, instead, whether employment occurs slightly later in the calendar year. Figure 8.2 reports these data for two subperiods, *Tir–Sene* (roughly mid-January to mid-July) and *Hamile–Tahese* (mid-July to mid-January). Until 2008, he program design called for employment to be concentrated in the period *Tir* to *Sene* so what we should see is little employment in the subsequent period, *Hamile* to *Tahisas*; from 2009 onwards, public works can be carried out at any time during the year. Across the full sample, the average household employed in public works received 129 days of employment in 2009. Three-quarters of this work occurs in the first six months of the year. There are, however, some differences by region. Tigray, Amhara, Amhara-HVFB, and SNNPR largely conform to this pattern. For example, the average public works household in SNNPR received 134 days employment in 2009 of which 103 days occurred between *Tir* and *Sene*. By contrast, employment levels are lower in Oromiya. There, beneficiary households received, on average, 104 days employment and a larger fraction of this, 40 percent, occurred in the second half of the year.

Figure 8.2. Mean days worked per beneficiary household, 2007 and 2009, by region and six-month period



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.2 examines the distribution of employment by sex between *Tir* and *Ginbot*, 2010. In Tigray, employment is fairly evenly split between men and women. Around 40 percent of public works in Amhara and Amhara-HVFB is undertaken by women. Women's participation in public works is lowest in SNNPR and Oromiya.

Table 8.2. Distribution of employment by sex and region, *Tir–Ginbot*, 2010

		Region				
		Tigray	**Amhara**	**Amhara-HVFB**	**Oromiya**	**SNNPR**
Men	Number who worked	309	285	277	262	323
	Mean days worked	69.7	51.0	59.0	41.4	66.0
Women	Number who worked	293	221	233	122	204
	Mean days worked	63.9	43.8	49.1	36.9	55.0
All	Percent workers female	48.4	42.2	45.4	31.7	38.6
	Percent labor days by women	46.4	38.6	40.9	29.2	34.4

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Lastly, we examine the age distribution of public works participants. At various times, there have been concerns expressed in terms of either children or the elderly undertaking these activities. Figure 8.3 shows that the reported number of children (individuals aged 15 or less) as a percentage of the total number of participants is small (not shown, but available on request). In fact, the quantitative data show that there are only 10 children in the more than

2,500 individuals who undertook public works employment in the first five months of 2010.[20] Individuals aged 20–29, 30–39, and 40–49 make up nearly 70 percent of the workforce engaged in public works and only 1.2 percent is 69 or older.

Figure 8.3. Age distribution of individuals employed on public works projects, by sex, 2010



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: Figures are in percentages.

8.3. Payments for Public Works: Levels

The 2006, 2008, and 2010 surveys collected information on how much, and when, beneficiaries were paid for their work in both cash and kind.[21] The community questionnaire collected data on prices of the goods provided in kind and these data are the main source used to value the in-kind transfers. Note that all figures are nominal. They do not account for inflation, which at times has been substantial.

Figure 8.4 shows the mean payments received by beneficiary households in the first five months of 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 for the full sample and also by region. In three locations, Tigray, Amhara-HVFB, and SNNPR, there are impressive increases in the amount

[20] We were concerned that, if parents understate the age of their children, these data would understate the extent of child labor. If this were true, we might expect to see age heaping around the age cutoff, 15 years. However, examination of the age distribution of the sample shows only slightly higher percentage of individuals aged 15 than those aged 14 or 16.

[21] It is important to note that these are self-reported data. It would be immensely helpful to validate these self-reports against administrative payroll data. This was discussed during the regional workshops in August 2011 and with federal FSCD staff. However, as of mid-October 2011 (when the final versions of this report was prepared), these administrative data have not been made available to us.

of money paid to respondents over this period, particularly between 2006 and 2009. For example, this rises from 251 to 865 Birr per household in Tigray and from 281 to 985 Birr per household in SNNPR. The value of transfers in Amhara-HVFB in the first five months of 2009 exceeded 1,000 Birr; it was the first time this has occurred in the six years the PSNP has operated. In these localities, however, payments fell in 2010. While payments in Oromiya increased between 2008 and 2009, they remained below Tigray and SNNPR. In Amhara, there has been little increase in mean payments over the first five months between 2007 and 2009, and the mean level of payments in 2010, 332 Birr, was the lowest level recorded since 2006.

Figure 8.4. Mean payments to households with public works participants between *Tir* and *Ginbot*, by region and year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

One possible explanation is that, just as employment is delayed in some regions, so, too, is payment. For the year 2009, we can explore this possibility by examining payments made month-by-month. This is reported in Table 8.3 and summarized, in six monthly intervals, in Figure 8.5. Table 8.3 shows that payments, for at least some beneficiaries, continue after *Sene*, the last month when employment is supposed to occur. That some payments are made in *Hamile* is not especially noteworthy; it is likely that in some *woredas*, the distances involved mean that work undertaken in one month is paid in the following month. But Table 8.3 shows that while payments do continue after *Hamile*, they slow to a trickle everywhere by *Meskerem*.

Table 8.3. Mean payments (Birr) to households with public works participants, by month and region, 2009

Region	*Tir*	*Yekatit*	*Megabit*	*Miaza*	*Ginbot*	*Sene*	*Hamile*	*Nehase*	*Meskerem*	*Tikmit*	*Hidar*	*Tahisis*	Total
Tigray	113	138	197	180	212	204	109	104	26	14	14	14	1,329
Amhara	46	65	125	102	97	132	109	53	47	6	12	9	807
Amhara-HVFB	92	138	263	209	253	161	199	60	6	11	16	9	1,419
Oromiya	122	72	106	122	141	102	89	99	56	25	21	16	974
SNNPR	185	175	222	193	199	192	97	78	55	33	37	44	1,512

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.5. Mean payments (Birr) to households with public works participants, 2009, by region and six-month period



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Tables 8.4 and 8.5 disaggregate these monthly payments by food and cash for 2009 and 2010. Table 8.4 indicates that the predominant form of transfer in SNNPR was cash, while food transfers comprised a much larger fraction of total transfers in Tigray and Amhara-HVFB. Cash accounted for just over half the value of all payments in Amhara, while food accounted for approximately 60 percent of transfers in Oromiya. Food transfers in the first three months of 2009 in Amhara are so small—53 Birr per household to be essentially nonexistent. The largest food transfer, in value terms, in Amhara occurs in Meskerem, several months after transfers are supposed to be completed.

Table 8.4a. Mean cash payments (Birr) to households with public works participants, by month and region, 2009

Region	*Tir*	*Yekatit*	*Megabit*	*Miaza*	*Ginbot*	*Sene*	*Hamile*	*Nehase*	*Meskerem*	*Tikmit*	*Hidar*	*Tahisis*	Total
Tigray	40	41	64	20	38	26	22	27	11	15	37	32	303
Amhara	51	60	99	70	60	61	25	10	25	19	41	20	433
Amhara-HVFB	1	10	24	53	36	40	28	9	6	2	34	12	197
Oromiya	43	39	46	57	54	62	28	36	40	24	31	34	369
SNNPR	162	151	192	150	153	129	74	41	80	65	101	105	1,155

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.4b. Mean food payments (Birr) to households with public works participants, by month and region, 2009

Region	*Tir*	*Yekatit*	*Megabit*	*Miaza*	*Ginbot*	*Sene*	*Hamile*	*Nehase*	*Meskerem*	*Tikmit*	*Hidar*	*Tahisis*	Total
Tigray	81	105	166	125	198	173	86	85	59	37	31	16	1,026
Amhara	1	12	40	38	41	75	88	45	135	3	2	11	368
Amhara-HVFB	104	145	276	186	224	126	176	53	24	55	51	32	1,220
Oromiya	91	40	70	77	120	64	82	85	95	36	20	4	604
SNNPR	25	26	33	46	52	70	28	40	76	29	3	20	358

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.5 shows payments by month for 2010. Table 8.6 shows payments disaggregated by cash and food. There is a sharp distinction between payments in Tigray, Amhara-HVFB, and SNNPR, and Amhara and Oromiya. SNNPR managed to deliver, on average, relatively large and (apart from *Ginbot*, which coincided with the 2010 election) equal amounts of cash on a monthly basis. Tigray and Amhara-HVFB were able to transfer, on a consistent basis, meaningful amounts of food. By contrast, food transfers in Amhara and Oromiya were low in 2010 and cash transfers were considerably smaller than in SNNPR.

Table 8.5. Mean payments (Birr) to households with public works participants, by month and region, 2010

Region	*Tir*	*Yekatit*	*Megabit*	*Miaza*	*Ginbot*	Total
Tigray	98	131	116	142	127	614
Amhara	48	66	64	65	89	332
Amhara-HVFB	76	133	190	151	223	772
Oromiya	40	62	64	46	80	292
SNNPR	161	161	200	118	86	725

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.6a. Mean cash payments (Birr) to households with public works participants, by month and region, 2010

Region	*Tir*	*Yekatit*	*Megabit*	*Miaza*	*Ginbot*	Total
Tigray	28	10	19	35	39	132
Amhara	47	42	28	47	87	250
Amhara-HVFB	4	11	18	23	60	117
Oromiya	34	35	47	42	71	228
SNNPR	153	153	183	81	62	633

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.6b. Mean food payments (Birr) to households with public works participants, by month and region, 2010

Region	*Tir*	*Yekatit*	*Megabit*	*Miaza*	*Ginbot*	Total
Tigray	70	121	97	107	88	482
Amhara	1	23	37	18	2	82
Amhara-HVFB	71	121	172	128	163	655
Oromiya	6	27	17	4	8	63
SNNPR	8	7	17	37	24	93

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

A limitation of Table 8.6 is that, by averaging across all beneficiary households, it does not distinguish between payment regimes where many beneficiaries get small-ish payments regularly from one where periodically beneficiaries receive large-ish payments. Given the especially low values for food transfers (see above), in Table 8.7 we look at the number of PSNP public works beneficiaries receiving a food payment in the first five months of 2010. This confirms that there were virtually no food transfers occurring in Amhara in the first five months of 2010.

Table 8.7. Number of food payments to households with public works participants, by month and region, 2010

Region		*Tir*	*Yekatit*	*Megabit*	*Miaza*	*Ginbot*
Tigray	Number households receiving food payment	100	147	129	110	130
	Number households not receiving food payment	279	232	250	269	249
Amhara	Number households receiving food payment	1	15	22	16	2
	Number households not receiving food payment	252	238	231	237	251
Amhara-HVFB	Number households receiving food payment	61	107	137	150	166
	Number households not receiving food payment	288	242	212	199	183
Oromiya	Number households receiving food payment	31	27	15	4	30
	Number households not receiving food payment	192	196	208	219	193
SNNPR	Number households receiving food payment	27	21	25	66	50
	Number households not receiving food payment	318	324	320	279	295

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

8.4. Payments Levels Relative to Entitlements

While the preceding tables give a good sense as to how much beneficiaries get paid, it does not tell us if they are receiving their full entitlement. Assessing this is tricky for several reasons: (1) payments may come more than one month after the work has been done. For example, our data will not capture payments made after *Ginbot* 2010; (2) if there are errors in respondents' recollections of how much they work—for example, overstatements of the number of days worked or understatements of payments will increase the proportion of beneficiaries that appear to be underpaid; (3) in order to construct estimates of total payments, we need to value payments made in-kind. This can also lead to errors in the determination of whether beneficiaries have received their full entitlement.

Mindful of these caveats, we do the following. We focus on 2009 for which we have a full year of payment data. We assume that every three kilograms of grains received as a payment for public works is worth 10 Birr and construct a "normalized cash value" of these grain payments. We add all cash payments to this "normalized cash value" to create a "normalized total payment" in 2009. We then calculate the level of payment, in Birr, that a beneficiary household should have received, given full family targeting. Under full family targeting, each member is entitled to five work days per month for six months. At a wage rate of 10 Birr per day, this yields a payment of 300 Birr per household member. This means that a three-person household should receive 900 Birr, a four-person household should receive 1,200 Birr, and so on. We compare these expected levels of payment against mean notional total payments by region for households ranging in size from three to nine persons.[22] Results are shown in Figure 8.6.[23]

There are a number of striking findings. First, SNNPR appears to come closest to meeting the transfer levels envisaged under full family targeting. Second, there are large gaps between transfer levels under full family targeting and these notional total payments in all other regions. These gaps vary by region, with the result that identically-sized households receive markedly different levels of transfers, depending on where they live. Using the methodology described in the previous paragraph, a five-person household (about average household size in these regions) received 573 Birr if they lived in Oromiya, 785 Birr in Amhara, 800 Birr in Amhara-HVFB, 972 Birr in Tigray, and 1,333 Birr in SNNPR—a 133-percent difference between the lowest (Oromiya) and highest (SNNPR) paying regions. Third, in Tigray and Amhara-HVFB, there appears to be an attempt to follow the spirit of full family targeting as these transfer levels rise with family size. This is less apparent in Oromiya. In Amhara, all households appear to receive about the same amount, regardless of household size.

Figure 8.7 complements these results, showing the percentage of entitlement received by household size and region. Within each level of size, it is ordered SNNPR, Tigray, Amhara-HVFB, Oromiya, and Amhara so as to illustrate not only the magnitude of the shortfalls, but also the regional differences in these. For small- to medium-sized households, SNNPR meets or comes very close to meeting entitlements under full family targeting, while larger

[22] There are insufficient observations to do this for households with fewer than three people or more than nine. Also, there were not enough observations of nine-person public works beneficiary households in Amhara to calculate a mean notional total payment.

[23] When reviewing these findings, participants in the Tigray workshop noted that, "If people do not work, they do not get paid." So, for example, if a household meets only 80 percent of their work requirement, they receive only 80 percent of their payment. This is done to prevent free riding.

households receive 70 to 80 percent. By contrast, nearly all small households in Oromiya and Amhara receive less than 50 percent of entitlement, and larger households receive as little as one-third of their entitlement.

Figure 8.6a. Comparison of normalized total payment (public works) to full family targeting entitlement, by household size, Tigray, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.6b. Comparison of normalized total payment (public works) to full family targeting entitlement, by household size, Amhara, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.6c. Comparison of normalized total payment (public works) to full family targeting entitlement, by household size, Amhara-HVFB, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.6d. Comparison of normalized total payment (public works) to full family targeting entitlement, by household size, Oromiya, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.6e. Comparison of normalized total payment (public works) to full family targeting entitlement, by household size, SNNPR, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.7. Normalized public works payments as a percentage of entitlement under full family targeting, by household size and region, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Are these results plausible? To assess, we take our household level data and aggregate them up to *woreda* level means. We present these in Table 8.8, ordering the data from the *woreda*, where it appears that households received the smallest percentage of their entitlement, to the *woreda* where payments, as a percentage of entitlements, were highest. We also include the *woreda* mean value of normalized payments and the number of payments—disaggregated by number of food and cash payments—for 2009.

Table 8.8. Entitlements and number of payments (public works), by woreda, 2009

		2009 *Woreda* mean:				
Region	***Woreda***	**Percent entitlement received**	**Normalized payments received (Birr)**	**Total number of payments**	**Number of cash payments**	**Number of food payments**
Oromiya	Zeway Dugda	13.0	254	2.80	2.80	0.00
Amhara	Angolela Tera	14.9	236	2.25	2.25	0.00
Oromiya	Gelana	18.5	313	1.71	0.00	1.71
Amhara	Ebenat	19.1	251	2.33	1.60	0.73
Oromiya	Goro	21.3	332	5.41	5.35	0.06
Oromiya	Anchar	23.1	390	1.75	0.88	0.88
Oromiya	Seweyna	25.2	510	3.38	1.54	1.83
SNNPR	Alaba	28.2	459	2.96	2.38	0.58
Oromiya	Boset	29.5	497	4.91	4.91	0.00
Oromiya	Boke	29.9	359	3.71	3.43	0.29
Amhara	Artuma fursi	32.1	491	3.00	2.25	0.75
Oromiya	Mema Angetu	34.5	588	4.75	4.25	0.00
Amhara	Kelala	35.2	386	5.00	4.56	0.44
Amhara	Ambasel	35.7	536	4.84	4.26	0.58
Amhara	West Belesa	36.3	462	3.91	2.91	1.00

Region	*Woreda*	2009 *Woreda* mean:				
		Percent entitlement received	Normalized payments received (Birr)	Total number of payments	Number of cash payments	Number of food payments
Tigray	Naedei Adet	37.0	613	2.67	1.29	1.38
Tigray	Atsegede Tsimbela	38.3	511	3.86	3.43	0.57
Amhara	Janamora	39.1	568	2.83	2.08	1.33
Oromiya	Fentale	42.0	797	3.06	0.71	2.18
Oromiya	Yabello	43.9	771	2.43	0.00	2.43
Oromiya	Gola Oda	44.2	950	5.31	4.38	0.94
Amhara	Beyeda	46.7	765	4.50	2.38	2.13
Oromiya	Gursum	47.5	915	5.81	3.81	1.96
Oromiya	Daro Lebu	48.5	678	2.83	2.50	0.33
Tigray	Kolla Temben	48.9	912	5.29	2.86	2.38
Amhara-HVFB	Dehana	49.3	611	3.07	0.00	3.00
SNNPR	Soro	49.4	764	4.36	4.36	0.00
Tigray	Atsbi Wenberta	50.3	759	5.39	1.09	4.28
Amhara-HVFB	Tach Gayint	52.7	725	3.24	2.45	2.40
Oromiya	Babile	53.9	1,220	3.20	1.80	1.40
Tigray	Saesi Tsaedamba	56.2	927	4.90	0.95	3.83
Amhara-HVFB	Habru	56.8	574	3.75	2.50	2.50
Amhara	Dawa Chefa	56.9	744	4.43	4.10	0.33
Amhara-HVFB	Wadla	57.3	917	3.72	1.76	2.28
Oromiya	Fedis	57.6	914	4.10	1.20	2.90
SNNPR	Amaro	59.0	939	6.00	3.50	2.25
Amhara	Were Ilu	59.2	616	5.73	4.55	1.18
Tigray	Ahiferom	61.2	939	3.05	1.36	1.56
Amhara-HVFB	Kobo	61.4	812	4.06	1.87	2.19
Tigray	Tanqua Abergele	63.7	1,101	7.53	1.86	5.58
Amhara-HVFB	Gubalafto	63.8	1,070	5.00	0.86	4.09
Amhara	Legambo	65.4	967	4.39	3.87	0.52
Amhara	Sayint	65.5	1,022	3.06	0.76	2.29
Amhara-HVFB	Lay Gayint	65.8	806	3.02	1.81	1.72
Oromiya	Guba Koricha	68.0	1,297	5.40	2.87	2.60
Tigray	Enderta	69.4	1010	4.67	1.61	3.03
Amhara-HVFB	Sokota	69.6	876	3.47	0.00	3.38
Oromiya	Mieso	70.3	1,147	5.95	3.26	2.74
SNNPR	Burji	71.0	1,378	5.35	3.65	1.70
SNNPR	Badewacho	73.1	1,277	6.05	4.38	1.67
Amhara-HVFB	Habru	74.4	950	5.94	3.06	2.97
SNNPR	Damot Gale	75.3	1,154	5.65	3.65	2.00
Amhara-HVFB	Bugna	75.4	820	5.69	1.62	4.15
Tigray	Gulomehada	76.3	1,269	6.40	3.08	3.38
SNNPR	Zala	77.5	1,125	6.00	6.00	0.00
Tigray	Ofla	77.9	1,386	6.16	3.45	2.68
Amhara-HVFB	Zukela	80.4	1,406	4.77	0.00	4.77
Amhara	Kalu	81.5	1,085	3.71	3.24	1.00

Region	*Woreda*	2009 *Woreda* mean:				
		Percent entitlement received	Normalized payments received (Birr)	Total number of payments	Number of cash payments	Number of food payments
Amhara-HVFB	Simada	81.6	1,324	3.52	0.57	2.96
Tigray	Alamata	82.1	1,395	6.13	1.82	4.18
Amhara	Debresina	82.4	1,021	4.50	2.80	1.50
Amhara	Gidan	82.6	1,034	6.31	3.00	3.31
SNNPR	Aleta Wendo	87.8	1,458	5.05	4.82	0.23
Tigray	Wukro	88.0	1,575	5.69	0.00	5.63
Amhara	Tena	91.1	1,233	6.15	5.54	0.62
Amhara	Habru	91.3	1,059	5.45	2.70	3.40
SNNPR	Omo Sheleko	92.3	1,218	5.54	2.69	2.85
SNNPR	Boloso sore	95.6	1,458	7.00	4.65	2.26
SNNPR	Shebedino	97.1	1,957	5.54	5.54	0.00
SNNPR	Kemba	97.2	1,629	7.61	4.94	2.67
SNNPR	Bonkie	98.6	1,940	6.00	6.00	0.00
SNNPR	Gofa zuria	100.8	1,552	6.33	4.22	2.06
SNNPR	Kindo Koisha	114.2	1,611	7.94	5.35	2.59
Oromiya	Jarso	125.8	2,222	8.59	4.59	3.71
SNNPR	Damote Weyede	137.6	1,875	10.50	10.50	0.00
SNNPR	Konso	151.4	2,291	10.59	8.07	2.46

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.8 shows that there is considerable variation in the percentage of entitlements received, from a low of 13 percent (Zeway Dugda *woreda* in Oromiya) to a high of 151 percent (Konso *woreda* in SNNPR). While the poorest performing *woredas* tend to be in Oromiya and Amhara, and the best performing *woredas* in SNNPR, this is not universally true. Alaba *woreda*, in SNNPR, performs poorly by this measure, while the third best performing *woreda* is Jarso in Oromiya. This variation suggests that it is unlikely that these results are driven by systematic measurement errors across regions. In Figure 8.8, we present a scattergram of the data on percentage of entitlements received (the vertical axis) and the number of payments received in 2009 (the horizontal axis). This figure is consistent with what emerges from a causal "eye-balling" of the data in Table 8.7, namely that in *woredas* where payments were more frequent, beneficiaries were more likely to receive a greater share of their entitlement.

Figure 8.8. Scattergram, *woreda* mean percentage entitlement received, by woreda mean number of payments, public works, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.9 presents data on some other dimensions of implementation performance at the *woreda* level: days worked in 2009 and 2010, number of payments made in 2010, and household size. To simplify the analysis of these relative to entitlements, we calculate Spearman correlation coefficients. A Spearman correlation coefficient is a correlation measure based on ranks. It ranges in value from -1 to +1. A positive coefficient means that the best performing *woredas* by one measure (here, entitlements) are also the best performing *woredas* by some other measure. A negative coefficient means that the best performing *woredas* by one measure (here, entitlements) are the worst performing *woredas* by some other measure. These are presented in Table 8.10 for all *woredas* and also by region.

Table 8.9. Entitlements, days worked in 2009 and 2010, number of payments, 2010, and household size, by woreda

Region	*Woreda*	Percent entitlement received, 2009	Days worked, January-July 2009	Days worked, January-June 2010	Total number of payments, January-June 2010	Household size, 2010
Oromiya	Zeway Dugda	13.0	115	86	1.07	6.40
Amhara	Angolela Tera	14.9	78	49	1.00	5.56
Oromiya	Gelana	18.5	41	31	1.47	6.35
Amhara	Ebenat	19.1	56	64	0.93	5.27
Oromiya	Goro	21.3	48	34	3.18	5.94
Oromiya	Anchar	23.1	64	63	1.00	6.06
Oromiya	Seweyna	25.2	90	72	0.71	7.04
SNNPR	Alaba	28.2	70	81	2.65	5.65
Oromiya	Boset	29.5	49	43	2.86	5.59
Oromiya	Boke	29.9	61	37	1.00	4.43
Amhara	Artuma fursi	32.1	87	71	1.18	5.43
Oromiya	Mema Angetu	34.5	23	0	0.00	6.75
Amhara	Kelala	35.2	96	71	1.44	4.78
Amhara	Ambasel	35.7	110	92	3.79	5.16
Amhara	West Belesa	36.3	111	100	1.04	4.65
Tigray	Naedei Adet	37.0	122	86	0.81	6.00
Tigray	Atsegede Tsimbela	38.3	71	26	1.00	4.86
Amhara	Janamora	39.1	73	60	1.42	4.58
Oromiya	Fentale	42.0	42	21	0.53	6.35
Oromiya	Yabello	43.9	82	65	1.00	5.79
Oromiya	Gola Oda	44.2	15	36	1.19	7.25
Amhara	Beyeda	46.7	91	75	0.00	5.44
Oromiya	Gursum	47.5	21	18	0.38	6.58
Oromiya	Daro Lebu	48.5	130	83	0.17	6.33
Tigray	Kolla Temben	48.9	123	43	0.95	6.52
Amhara-HVFB	Dehana	49.3	116	93	1.93	4.80
SNNPR	Soro	49.4	56	49	2.86	6.45
Tigray	Atsbi Wenberta	50.3	113	101	2.00	5.43
Amhara-HVFB	Tach Gayint	52.7	117	101	2.27	5.02
Oromiya	Babile	53.9	50	40	1.60	6.60
Tigray	Saesi Tsaedamba	56.2	114	75	1.59	5.56
Amhara	Dawa chefa	56.9	114	76	1.81	4.86
Amhara-HVFB	Wadla	57.3	98	80	2.04	5.16
Oromiya	Fedis	57.6	73	61	1.00	6.00
SNNPR	Amaro	59.0	90	66	2.75	5.25
Amhara	Were Ilu	59.2	108	66	2.45	4.00
Tigray	Ahiferom	61.2	142	86	1.13	5.74
Amhara-HVFB	Kobo	61.4	96	74	2.29	4.74
Tigray	Tanqua Abergele	63.7	100	76	3.19	6.09
Amhara-HVFB	Gubalafto	63.8	121	97	3.40	5.60
Amhara	Legambo	65.4	127	107	0.78	4.74

Region	*Woreda*	Percent entitlement received, 2009	Days worked, January-July 2009	Days worked, January-June 2010	Total number of payments, January-June 2010	Household size, 2010
Amhara	Sayint	65.5	80	65	1.65	5.24
Amhara-HVFB	Lay Gayint	65.8	115	78	0.96	4.79
Oromiya	Guba Koricha	68.0	133	76	1.00	6.53
Tigray	Enderta	69.4	130	103	2.73	5.42
Amhara-HVFB	Sokota	69.6	55	44	2.22	4.38
Oromiya	Mieso	70.3	82	66	1.84	5.74
SNNPR	Burji	71.0	164	137	2.48	6.78
SNNPR	Badewacho	73.1	138	118	3.33	6.14
Amhara-HVFB	Habru	74.4	142	117	1.40	4.40
SNNPR	Damot Gale	75.3	98	78	3.39	5.39
Amhara-HVFB	Bugna	75.4	85	69	4.08	3.85
Tigray	Gulomehada	76.3	127	105	1.42	5.63
SNNPR	Zala	77.5	113	90	3.38	5.06
Tigray	Ofla	77.9	102	45	1.29	5.92
Amhara-HVFB	Zukela	80.4	123	101	3.68	6.09
Amhara	Kalu	81.5	143	119	1.24	4.88
Amhara-HVFB	Simada	81.6	89	54	1.04	5.43
Tigray	Alamata	82.1	110	81	2.62	5.62
Amhara	Debresina	82.4	123	101	1.40	4.40
Amhara	Gidan	82.6	103	86	3.31	4.56
SNNPR	Aleta Wendo	87.8	125	103	2.68	5.95
Tigray	Wukro	88.0	142	119	3.35	5.98
Amhara	Tena	91.1	92	79	4.38	4.62
Amhara	Habru	91.3	73	47	1.85	4.05
SNNPR	Omo Sheleko	92.3	132	110	2.85	5.62
SNNPR	Boloso sore	95.6	106	90	3.55	5.19
SNNPR	Shebedino	97.1	97	82	3.67	6.92
SNNPR	Kemba	97.2	118	100	4.22	5.22
SNNPR	Bonkie	98.6	158	141	4.56	6.72
SNNPR	Gofa zuria	100.8	87	65	2.72	5.50
SNNPR	Kindo Koisha	114.2	77	63	3.59	5.53
Oromiya	Jarso	125.8	56	32	1.12	6.29
SNNPR	Damote Weyede	137.6	103	91	4.60	5.10
SNNPR	Konso	151.4	126	100	3.02	5.29

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.10 confirms the evidence shown in Figure 8.8—*woredas* that made more payments were more likely to provide beneficiaries with levels of transfers that reflected their entitlements. In SNNPR, where most transfers took the form of cash, the mean number of cash payments made in 2009 was more strongly correlated with the mean percentage of entitlements received than with the mean number of food payments. In the other regions, the ability to make food payments was much more strongly correlated with meeting entitlements.

We wondered if the ability of *woredas* to provide work was correlated with payments. Tables 8.9 and 8.10 suggest that some correlations exist but these are relatively smaller than those found for payment frequency and, at the regional level, less precisely measured. We note, however, that *woredas* that provided larger transfers as a percentage of entitlements in 2009 tended to make more payments in the first five months of 2010 in Tigray, Amhara, and SNNPR. This suggests that, at least over 2009 and 2010, *woredas* that performed well in terms of payments in one year tended to do so in the other year and vice versa. We also wondered if some of these *woreda* differences were a result of differences in mean household sizes across *woredas*. Table 8.9 suggests that there is some variation in size by location; however, Table 8.10 suggests that these variations are not, generally, correlated with household size. The one exception is Amhara. Figure 8.6b showed that in Amhara, there appears to have been no differentiation of payments by household size and so it is not surprising that within Amhara, *woreda*s with larger households do less well in terms of providing payments that reflect entitlements.

Table 8.10. Spearman correlation coefficients between entitlements and other measures of PSNP implementation (public works)

	All	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
Number of payments, 2009	0.68***	0.65**	0.62***	0.43	0.55**	0.78***
Number of cash payments, 2009	0.29**	0.01	0.27	-0.27	0.12	0.72***
Number of food payments, 2009	0.40***	0.62**	0.58**	0.44	0.70***	0.22
Days worked, Jan–Jul 2009	0.41***	0.20	0.30	-0.15	0.16	0.16
Days worked, Jan–Jun 2010	0.42***	0.46	0.29	-0.31	0.04	0.13
Number of payments, Jan–Jun 2010	0.55***	0.71**	0.48**	0.11	-0.09	0.58**
Household size	-0.13	0.04	-0.65**	0.14	0.01	-0.29

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: * Significant at the 10 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; *** Significant at the 1 percent level.

If payments are not being made on the basis of entitlements, how are they being made? Tables 8.11 and 8.12 provide some insights. Table 8.11 cross-tabulates the number of months worked by the number of payments received in 2009. Cells to the right and above the diagonal line represent cases where the number of payments exceeded the number of months worked. Cells with the diagonal line are cases where the number of payments equaled the number of months worked and cells below and to the left of the diagonal line are cases where frequency of payment was less than frequency of work. To interpret Table 8.11, it is helpful to work through several examples. In 2010, in SNNPR (Table 8.11e), 347 households reported that they did public works under the PSNP for which they were paid. About 45 percent reported that they worked for six months (the row total for number of months worked is 157 and 157/347 = 0.45). A small number of households worked fewer than four months[24]. 88 out of those 157 households were paid on six different occasions (88 is the number in the cell where number of months worked and number of payments both equal 6).

[24] The number of households reporting that they worked 12 months, 64, seems high. It is possible that at least some of these cases arise where respondents claim, "I worked every month."

The usefulness of Table 8.11 is the following. A simple explanation for low payments as a fraction of entitlements and low frequency of payments being made in some regions is that, for whatever reason, the number of months households reported working was lower in some regions than in others. But Table 8.11 indicates that this is not a plausible explanation. In Amhara, only 11 out of 301 households report that they worked in four, or fewer, months in 2009. But roughly half of PSNP public works beneficiaries in Amhara report that they were paid on fewer than five occasions. While we observe a similar pattern in Amhara-HVFB, a comparison of Figures 8.6b and 8.6c tells us that transfer levels in Amhara-HVFB are higher than in Amhara. (Note that Figure 8.6 is based on normalized transfer levels, so the difference between Amhara-HVFB and Amhara is not because of differences in grain prices or because of the additional pulses and lentils provided in Amhara-HVFB.) Put in another way, while the distribution of months worked and the frequency of payments look similar in Amhara and Amhara-HVFB, in Amhara-HVFB the payments that are made are larger. This is also consistent with the finding in Table 8.10 that food payments frequency is more weakly correlated with percent entitlements received in Amhara-HVFB than in Amhara.

In Oromiya, there is a slightly higher number of households reporting working fewer than six months. While the number of households reporting working 12 months is high, the more salient number is the sum of households receiving six or more payments, only 72 out of 265 public works beneficiaries.

Table 8.11a. Number of months worked and number of payments, 2009, Tigray

Number of months worked	Number of payments												Row total
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
3	1	0	4	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
4	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
5	0	2	1	1	2	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	14
6	1	3	14	4	13	50	5	3	0	0	0	0	93
7	0	0	6	2	10	17	12	5	1	0	0	0	53
8	0	2	6	6	5	9	7	29	0	0	0	0	64
9	0	2	6	1	3	10	3	5	0	0	0	0	30
10	0	0	13	6	3	7	8	1	0	1	0	0	39
11	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	8
12	2	2	21	17	7	21	17	10	0	0	0	4	101
Column total	7	15	75	41	43	124	54	56	1	1	0	0	421

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.11b. Number of months worked and number of payments, 2009, Amhara

Number of months worked	Number of payments												Row total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
3	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
4	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
5	1	3	7	10	3	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	29
6	1	10	32	20	12	43	1	3	1	0	0	0	123
7	3	14	14	4	3	21	9	0	0	0	0	0	68
8	1	14	15	5	2	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	44
9	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
10	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
11	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
12	0	3	4	1	0	9	1	1	0	1	0	0	20
Column total	10	49	75	43	20	85	12	5	1	1	0	0	301

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.11c. Number of months worked and number of payments, 2009, Amhara-HVFB

Number of months worked	Number of payments												Row total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
3	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
4	0	0	4	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
5	0	0	14	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	23
6	0	6	54	46	2	26	1	6	1	1	0	0	143
7	0	5	21	16	8	4	0	4	0	1	0	0	59
8	0	3	21	12	7	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	46
9	1	1	7	3	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	20
10	0	1	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
11	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
12	1	6	5	4	2	1	1	7	1	0	0	0	28
Column total	3	22	135	89	30	37	3	19	3	3	0	0	344

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.11d. Number of months worked and number of payments, 2009, Oromiya

Number of months worked	Number of payments												Row total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
2	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	4
3	0	2	2	1	7	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	16
4	2	1	1	5	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	15
5	2	1	1	2	8	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	19
6	0	2	3	1	16	13	0	1	0	0	0	0	36
7	0	2	0	2	2	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	10
8	0	7	3	6	2	2	3	6	0	0	0	0	29
9	0	6	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	12
10	2	0	0	4	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	9
11	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
12	9	29	24	13	7	11	3	3	1	1	1	6	108
Column total	17	51	38	38	49	34	12	14	2	2	2	6	265

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.11e. Number of months worked and number of payments, 2009, SNNPR

Number of months worked	Number of payments												Row total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
5	0	0	3	1	1	12	0	1	0	0	0	0	18
6	0	0	18	17	20	88	3	10	0	1	0	0	157
7	0	1	4	4	2	17	4	3	1	0	0	0	36
8	0	0	0	1	1	5	1	12	3	0	0	0	23
9	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	4	5	0	0	0	16
10	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	3
11	0	0	0	0	1	16	1	2	0	0	0	0	20
12	0	1	0	0	4	7	1	13	1	2	1	34	64
Column total	5	2	29	24	36	146	10	45	10	4	1	35	347

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Finally, we calculate an "implied wage" for 2009. That is, we take the total normalized payments for 2009 (so as to strip out the impact of variations in grain prices and the provision of legumes and oils in Amhara-HVFB) and divide it by the total number of days worked in 2009. This quotient is referred to as "Implied Wage (1)" in Table 8.12. To correct for possible overreporting of days worked, or cases where respondents confuse unpaid community labor with PSNP public works, we construct a second measure where—

arbitrarily—we restrict the number of days a household could report working to a maximum of 180. This quotient is referred to as “Implied Wage (2)” in Table 8.12

Table 8.12. Distribution of implied wages (Birr), by region and assumptions of labor supplied

Region		Distribution of implied wages				
		10th percentile	25th percentile	Median	75th percentile	90th percentile
Tigray	Implied Wage (1)	2.54	4.02	6.67	10.00	11.67
	Implied Wage (2)	3.33	4.81	8.33	10.00	13.33
Amhara	Implied Wage (1)	2.13	3.25	5.44	10.00	12.50
	Implied Wage (2)	2.22	3.37	5.93	10.00	12.50
Amhara-HVFB	Implied Wage (1)	2.96	4.29	6.38	10.00	17.50
	Implied Wage (2)	3.46	4.67	6.86	10.30	17.50
Oromiya	Implied Wage (1)	1.74	3.73	6.94	12.00	25.42
	Implied Wage (2)	2.22	4.10	7.39	12.11	26.67
SNNPR	Implied Wage (1)	4.00	6.02	10.00	15.28	22.22
	Implied Wage (2)	4.33	7.69	10.98	16.67	23.25

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

The combined effect of full family targeting (FFT) and the labor cap means that the implied wage can exceed 10 Birr. Given this, the implied wages greater than 10 Birr/day, seen at the 75th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of implied wages, suggests that the labor cap is, in fact, being implemented to some extent. Even after adjusting for possible overreporting of days worked, the median implied wage in Amhara is only 5.93. This suggests that, at least for 2009, that not only were beneficiary households not receiving their full entitlement of payments, they were not even receiving the equivalent of 10 Birr per day. But as with the analysis presented above, it is again instructive to disaggregate to the *woreda* level. Being careful to note that in some *woredas*, sample sizes get very small, Table 8.13 shows the distribution of implied wages—with the arbitrary correction for overreporting of days worked. Table 8.13 shows that just as there is variation across regions, there are also variations within regions. Even in Amhara, there are *woredas* such as Habru and Tena that are paying most PSNP public works participants an implied wage close to the 10 Birr per day that households should receive. But there are many *woredas* in Amhara, and elsewhere, that did not even meet this payment level.

Finally, in chapter 4, we showed that 82 percent of public works beneficiaries in SNNPR “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that they received their payments in full. This percentage is consistent with the good performance of SNNPR highlighted in all tables in this section. Similarly, only 44 percent of beneficiaries in Oromiya agreed with this statement and this is consistent with the relatively low percentages reported in Figure 8.7. But, puzzlingly, 89 percent of beneficiaries in Amhara “strongly agree” or “agree” with this statement, even though payments are well below entitlements.

Table 8.13. Distribution of implied wages (Birr), by region and woreda under conservative assumptions of labor supplied

Region and *woreda*	10th percentile	25th percentile	Median	75th percentile	90th percentile	Sample size
Tigray						
Atsegede Tsimbel	2.12	2.63	7.51	12.46	26.47	7
Ahiferom	2.78	4.00	6.67	7.50	9.56	39
Naedei Adet	1.67	2.71	4.07	4.56	7.78	21
Kolla Temben	3.06	4.91	8.83	10.00	10.00	21
Tanqua Abergele	3.33	8.15	10.00	11.43	13.33	43
Gulomehada	5.00	7.32	10.00	10.00	12.00	48
Saesi Tsaedamba	3.59	4.48	6.02	8.33	10.56	41
Wukro	5.56	8.33	10.00	13.33	17.76	49
Atsbi Wenberta	3.33	3.61	4.57	8.68	11.54	44
Enderta	2.64	4.17	6.29	8.23	11.48	32
Alamata	3.06	7.78	10.00	13.33	18.75	39
Ofla	5.58	7.67	10.00	11.17	22.22	38
Total	3.33	4.81	8.33	10.00	13.33	422
Amhara						
Beyeda	5.42	5.42	6.89	8.57	8.57	32
Janamora	2.30	2.92	5.52	15.07	20.00	10
West Belesa	2.50	2.96	3.54	5.00	6.62	23
Ebenat	3.33	3.37	3.89	4.67	7.86	15
Gidan	6.86	8.27	10.11	11.39	13.61	16
Habru	9.00	10.00	11.81	14.17	20.83	20
Tena	7.29	8.00	9.11	10.00	20.56	10
Ambasel	2.13	3.13	4.21	6.25	6.80	18
Kalu	4.33	5.75	9.63	10.30	11.00	16
Legambo	2.29	3.06	8.33	10.00	16.00	23
Sayint	4.76	7.69	10.53	16.67	37.04	15
Debresina	1.11	5.00	7.73	13.06	38.85	9
Kelala	0.83	2.10	3.00	5.47	7.50	8
Were Ilu	1.85	2.08	5.10	9.00	10.00	11
Angolela Tera	1.30	1.39	3.00	5.65	7.00	14
Dawa chefa	2.71	3.61	3.61	7.50	8.83	21
Artuma fursi	1.43	2.38	4.26	9.74	19.97	27
Total	2.38	3.61	6.25	10.00	12.86	292
Amhara-HVFB						
Simada	3.41	4.00	8.25	10.91	19.56	15
Tach Gayint	3.33	4.31	5.57	7.92	9.96	62
Lay Gayint	2.92	3.89	5.69	8.52	12.00	46
Habru	4.18	4.23	4.95	8.16	10.69	4
Wadla	2.24	4.06	7.75	14.66	20.49	24
Bugna	7.04	7.22	7.78	8.33	12.52	26
Habru	4.17	5.08	6.81	10.76	15.00	35
Gubalafto	3.70	4.63	6.15	8.94	13.33	34
Kobo	4.22	5.42	5.96	9.48	13.23	30
Sokota	5.00	6.22	20.00	28.44	41.67	30
Zukela	8.33	10.00	11.83	15.00	25.47	22
Dehana	3.50	3.96	4.67	4.67	5.00	15
Total	3.50	4.67	6.91	10.33	17.50	343

Region and *woreda*	10th percentile	25th percentile	Median	75th percentile	90th percentile	Sample size
Oromiya						
Fentale	4.31	10.00	15.63	20.41	29.03	17
Boset	6.58	7.81	8.62	9.26	9.80	21
Zeway Dugda	0.56	0.74	1.48	3.36	5.56	12
Mieso	5.00	6.94	7.89	13.89	25.00	19
Guba Koricha	4.67	5.83	8.44	12.00	17.71	15
Anchar	1.63	2.22	2.94	4.12	5.19	14
Daro Lebu	1.92	2.50	4.44	7.50	7.96	5
Boke	1.96	1.99	5.56	9.46	10.54	7
Jarso	14.56	22.08	25.00	29.69	36.92	17
Gursum	7.30	10.78	24.06	55.00	72.41	20
Babile	1.94	5.66	18.85	38.67	49.01	4
Fedis	2.47	3.06	5.64	8.00	8.33	19
Gola Oda	3.70	4.17	16.30	65.97	100.00	14
mema Angetu	4.07	4.07	12.22	50.00	50.00	3
Goro	4.17	5.00	10.00	10.00	12.00	16
Seweyna	2.22	2.78	4.82	7.92	10.42	24
Yabello	4.17	4.44	6.32	8.33	10.53	14
Gelana	3.47	3.47	3.47	4.86	5.30	17
Total	2.42	4.27	7.80	12.58	26.67	258
SNNPR						
Badewacho	4.05	5.00	7.69	10.00	11.90	21
Soro	1.79	2.08	16.67	25.00	25.00	21
Omo Sheleko	4.86	5.00	6.94	7.78	10.00	13
Shebedino	11.11	14.79	18.75	20.64	30.56	24
Aleta Wendo	10.00	10.00	10.00	13.33	16.67	22
Boloso sore	6.59	8.70	9.70	13.33	15.24	31
Damot Gale	5.83	6.08	13.35	16.67	20.83	23
Damote Weyede	4.44	7.50	11.04	13.33	18.05	10
Kindo Koisha	11.43	13.33	16.79	20.00	23.33	17
Kemba	5.43	9.26	10.00	13.64	18.52	18
Bonkie	10.00	10.00	12.00	13.60	23.33	18
Gofa zuria	8.58	12.86	15.97	23.30	40.83	18
Zala	4.17	7.50	10.00	11.67	20.00	16
Amaro	5.75	7.43	9.76	13.54	16.67	4
Burji	5.95	6.94	11.11	17.01	20.83	23
Konso	7.33	9.67	12.59	16.67	26.67	41
Alaba	2.41	2.67	3.85	6.41	9.62	26
Total	4.44	7.73	11.04	16.67	23.25	346

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

8.5. Payments for Direct Support

We now examine direct support payments, starting with the trend in the mean level of these payments between 2006 and 2010. We define a direct support beneficiary in 2006 as someone who received at least one direct support payment in the first five months (*Tir* to *Ginbot*) of 2006, a 2007 beneficiary as someone who received at least one direct support payment in the first five months (*Tir* to *Ginbot*) of 2007, and so on. The amounts shown in Figure 8.9 are the sum of cash payments received plus the value of food transfers. They are

nominal amounts, that is, they do not take inflation into account, which was substantial over this period.

Figure 8.9 shows that mean direct support payments are, in all years, highest in SNNPR, followed by Amhara-HVFB and Tigray. In these localities, there are increases in nominal payments between 2006 (2007 for Amhara-HVFB) and 2009, followed by a reduction in 2010. In Amhara, mean payments have fallen in every year since 2007. While payments rose between 2006 and 2009 in Oromiya, there is little difference in mean payments in 2010 and 2007.

Figure 8.9. Mean payments to direct support beneficiary households, by region and year



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.14 shows the extent to which payments were received in cash and in-kind during the first five months of 2009 and 2010. As with payments for public works, cash payments predominate in SNNPR, while in-kind transfers are more important in Tigray and Amhara-HVFB. There were virtually no food transfers made to direct support beneficiaries in Amhara in 2010.

In addition to the level of payments, we are also interested in their frequency—how often do beneficiaries receive their payments. Tables 8.15 and 8.16 report the number of times a direct support household received payments in the first five months of 2009 and 2010. There are distinct regional patterns. In SNNPR, nearly 80 percent of beneficiaries received at least four payments in the first five months of 2009, as did 43 percent of beneficiaries in Tigray. By

contrast, less than 16 percent did so in Oromiya. A similar regional pattern is observed in 2010 but with lowered frequency of payments found everywhere.

Table 8.14. Mean in-kind and cash direct support payments 2009 and 2010, by region

	Tir–Ginbot 2009		*Tir–Ginbot* 2010	
	Value of in-kind payments	Cash	Value of in-kind payments	Cash
Tigray	388	66	256	55
Amhara	73	159	20	133
Amhara-HVFB	490	54	303	68
Tigray	233	139	74	211
SNNPR	139	483	51	469

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.15. Frequency of direct support payments (percent), *Tir–Ginbot* 2009, by region

	Region				
Number of payments	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
1	22.4	33.3	12.2	31.9	3.3
2	21.9	25.3	33.3	24.6	5.5
3	10.4	13.1	26.0	27.5	13.2
4	13.1	7.1	2.4	8.7	16.5
5	32.2	21.2	26.0	7.2	61.5

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 8.16. Frequency of direct support payments (percent), *Tir–Ginbot* 2010, by region

	Region				
Number of payments	Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR
1	32.3	34.5	21.9	60.3	4.6
2	23.7	39.1	32.1	20.6	15.9
3	27.3	16.1	18.3	14.3	28.4
4	9.1	5.7	8.0	3.2	22.7
5	7.6	4.6	19.7	1.6	28.4

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

It is possible that Figure 8.9 as well as Tables 8.15 and 8.16 understate the amount of transfers being made because they only cover the first five months of 2009 and 2010. For this reason, we report, in Table 8.17, the median level of transfers per month for all 12 months of 2009 along with the number of households receiving direct support.

Table 8.17 indicates that direct support payments do continue into *Sene*, and to a lesser extent into *Hamile* and *Nehase*. It also shows that the number of beneficiaries falls in the second half of the year. For example, there are 392 households receiving direct support in *Megabit* but only 114 in *Meskerem*. Table 8.17 shows that the regions that did not provide significant levels of payments in the first five months of 2009 did not compensate with either higher payments or more extensive coverage in the second half of the year.

Table 8.17. Median value (Birr) of direct support transfers, by month and region, 2009

	Region				
Month	**Tigray**	**Amhara**	**Amhara-HVFB**	**Oromiya**	**SNNPR**
Tir	91	50	113	60	150
	(78)	(30)	(47)	(35)	(74)
Yekatit	95	50	106	100	150
	(98)	(42)	(70)	(13)	(73)
Megabit	100	55	112	73	150
	(130)	(66)	(74)	(38)	(84)
Miaza	75	97	83	100	150
	(148)	(61)	(88)	(34)	(78)
Ginbot	95	75	119	67	150
	(115)	(56)	(86)	(42)	(80)
Sene	98	75	68	86	150
	(134)	(77)	(88)	(40)	(74)
Hamile	75	112	54	95	150
	(94)	(48)	(51)	(28)	(44)
Nehase	100	117	109	90	150
	(86)	(25)	(35)	(36)	(38)
Meskerem	36	59	169	90	100
	(54)	(17)	(6)	(15)	(22)
Tikmit	50	43	0	103	100
	(28)	(10)	(0)	(8)	(14)
Hidar	50	54	50	50	100
	(19)	(11)	(13)	(13)	(18)
Tahisis	52	50	121	60	100
	(15)	(9)	(10)	(9)	(14)

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: Number of beneficiaries in parentheses.

Table 8.17 also indicates that in 2009, the number of direct support beneficiaries is highest in Tigray. We explore this further in Table 8.18, which looks at payment size, the number of payments, and the number of households receiving direct support between *Tir* and *Ginbot* 2010. (Note that we present both the mean and median so as to see whether outliers in the data affect the pattern we observe.) What is striking here is that while median payments are nearly two-times higher in SNNPR compared to Tigray, Tigray has slightly more than twice the number of beneficiaries. Both payment levels and the number of beneficiaries are lowest in Amhara and Oromiya.

In light of this information, Figure 8.10 is instructive. It shows the share of all payments made to direct support beneficiaries in Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR between *Tir* and *Ginbot* 2010. The samples for these four regions are approximately similar[25] and so if each region was allocating the same level of direct support payments, the pie chart would show each region accounting for a quarter of the overall budget. Instead, we see that approximately 44 percent of total direct support payments made in this sample are disbursed in Tigray and 33 percent in SNNPR. Amhara and Oromiya collectively account for only 23 percent of direct support spending.

[25] In fact, the sample sizes in Amhara and Oromiya are slightly larger. We exclude Amhara-HVFB from this figure because it is drawn from a much larger sample.

Table 8.18. Direct support payment data for *Tir–Ginbot*, by region, 2010

Region		Mean (Birr)	Median (Birr)	Number of beneficiaries
Tigray	Payment size	124.9	82.2	198
	Number of payments	2.4	2.0	198
Amhara	Payment size	79.9	50.0	87
	Number of payments	2.1	2.0	87
Amhara-HVFB	Payment size	130.6	75.7	137
	Number of payments	2.7	2.0	137
Oromiya	Payment size	199.6	69.8	63
	Number of payments	1.7	1.0	63
SNNPR	Payment size	152.5	150.0	88
	Number of payments	3.5	4.0	88

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.10. Distribution of direct support payments across regions, between *Tir* and *Ginbot* 2010



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Lastly, we assessed how direct support payments varied by household size. Interpreting these data is a little tricky as a result of the small numbers of beneficiaries in Amhara and Oromiya—an atypically high or low level of payment reported by one household can skew mean values. We partially remedy this in Table 8.19 by reporting transfer levels in terms of median values. These show that in SNNPR direct support payments rise with household size. In all other regions, direct support payments are effectively the same irrespective of how many people reside in the household.

Table 8.19. Median direct support payments, by household size and region, 2009

	Household size					
Region	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Tigray	405	410	602	392	617	585
Amhara	388	212	336	525	408	338
Amhara-HVFB	277	540	592	543	400	168
Oromiya	112	765	319	463	379	330
SNNPR	483	755	900	1,178	1,200	1,472

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

We complement Table 8.19 by assessing the extent to which direct support payments are consistent with Full Family Targeting in 2009. This is shown in Figure 8.11 which shows the distribution of payments in terms of the percentage of entitlement that is actually received. Only in SNNPR we do see that more than 50 percent of direct support beneficiaries receive their full entitlement. Tigray has the highest number of beneficiaries but payment levels (as a percentage of entitlements under FFT) are lower than they are in SNNPR. Amhara and Oromiya come out especially badly—not only are their relatively few direct support beneficiaries, direct support households typically get only a small fraction of their entitlement.

Figure 8.11. Distribution of direct support payments as a percent of entitlement under full family targeting, 2009



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Taken collectively, these data present a mixed picture on the level of direct support transfers. On the positive side, there has been a marked increase in the nominal values of these transfers after 2006 in Tigray and SNNPR. These regions have adopted somewhat

different approaches. In Tigray, there are more beneficiaries but with lower transfer levels, while in SNNPR, there are fewer beneficiaries receiving higher levels of transfers. By contrast, there are fewer recipients of direct support in Amhara and Oromiya and these recipients receive smaller transfers.

8.6. Preferences for Cash and Food

An initial goal of the PSNP was "to shift the financing of the program from food aid to cash" (GFDRE 2004, 1). This was more than a signal of the government's intent to phase out nonemergency food aid; it also recognized the developmental potential of cash transfers. It was hoped that through the provision of cash transfers, the PSNP would enable smallholders to increase consumption and investment levels while stimulating the development of rural markets.

In the 2006, 2008, and 2010 quantitative surveys, respondents were asked if they would prefer their payments entirely in cash, 75 percent cash and 25 percent food, an even split between cash and food, 25 percent cash and 75 percent food, or entirely in food. These responses for both public works and direct support recipients are summarized by region in Figures 8.12a–8.12e.

Figure 8.12a. Preferences for food and cash, 2006–2010, Tigray



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.12b. Preferences for food and cash, 2006–2010, Amhara



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.12c. Preferences for food and cash, 2006–2010, Amhara-HVFB



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.12d. Preferences for food and cash, 2006–2010, Oromiya



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Figure 8.12e. Preferences for food and cash, 2006–2010, SNNPR



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Across all regions, there are several common features. First, beneficiary preferences shift toward food and away from cash between 2006 and 2008, a consequence of rapidly rising food prices in the first six months of 2008. Second, in all regions apart from Tigray, this is reversed between 2008 and 2010, although this increased preference for cash is more pronounced among public works beneficiaries. Third, in all locations and in all years, direct support beneficiaries are more likely to express preferences for food than public works beneficiaries. Outside of SNNPR, less than 25 percent of direct support recipients would prefer that more than half of their payments would be made in cash. Fourth, regional differences have persisted over time with PSNP beneficiaries in Tigray always having the strongest preference for food and SNNPR beneficiaries the strongest preference for cash.

Preferences for cash and food were explored in 40 focus group discussions.[26] When asked about their preference for payment type, 17 of 38 groups (2 did not respond) reached consensus that they would prefer to be paid only in food. A further 15 said they wanted to receive a mix of food and cash and only 5 groups indicated that they would like cash only.

In focus groups that indicated a preference for food, most justified this due to the lack of availability of food in the local markets and poor growing conditions. Furthermore, many said that prices increased significantly when they receive cash.

> We want food. The reason we said food is that although we may take the cash, the great part of it is used to buy food. Moreover, once the cash goes into the pocket of men, they do not get happy to give out for grain buying [SNNPR_S/FG3].
>
> If the payment is in cash, we could not be able to buy food from the market easily, because there is no sufficient supply of food items like grains in the marketplace [AM_S/FG1].
>
> If you want to buy food, it is very expensive. When money is given, the traders talk to each other and raise the price [AM_S/FG4].
>
> We prefer food payment. Our community knows which payment is important and we can get money by working in different areas but cannot get easily grains in our area [TIG_SA/FG1].
>
> When we are paid in cash the market price of food items increases, but when paid in kind the market prices are fair [TIG_SA/FG2].

Most of the respondents who revealed a preference for a mixed transfer explained that they use the food for their household's own consumption and the money for other needs, such as education and clothes—in other words, reasons related to the differential uses of cash and food. A direct support group in SNNPR agreed that when

> We are paid in food; we do not face a problem of having to eat with other families and people in the community. The cash is needed to cover expenses of fertilizer and improved seeds, tax, to buy and create assets, and to cover expenses of clothing [SNNPR_T/FG1].

[26] Across these focus groups, 22 received their payments as a mix of food and cash, 14 received cash only, and 4 received only food.

The Transitioning group in the same *kebele* indicated that

> We prefer both...if we say we can buy grain using the money, the grain prices get expensive. Thus there are times that we prefer grain. The reason we say cash is to cover school expenses, tax, to buy fertilizer and others we need money. Thus, we prefer to continue with a mixture—as it is now [SNNPR_T/FG2].

Of the few households with a preference for cash only, this was attributed to the flexibility of cash to enable them to use it for a variety of things (Table 8.20), as well as investing in growing their own food.

> We prefer cash payment. All of us prefer cash. This is because of two reasons. First, if we bring the grain home, it is not enough for a month and second, if it is sold it does not fetch as much as the value of cash payment [SNNPR_D/FG3].

> Cash, because it can be used to pay back the lent money. Nowadays, food such as maize can be bought for 300ETB/100kg and wheat for 600ETB/100kg. So the cash can be flexibly used [ORO_Z/FG1].

Table 8.20. Use of cash transfer mentioned, by focus groups, in order of priority usage

Use	Total	First	Second	Third
Food	27	19	6	2
Schooling	16	2	6	8
Livestock	14	3	5	6
Seeds/fertilizer	13	6	4	3
Clothes	8	0	3	5
Other	9	2	5	2

Source: FSP qualitative evaluation, 2010.

Focus group participants were asked the hypothetical question, “If you could receive 15 kg of grain a month or 50 Birr, what would you chose?” Of the 37 focus groups that provided responses, 19 agreed that they would prefer 15 kg of grain, 5 said they would prefer 50 Birr, and 3 said that they would prefer to switch payment across seasons—specifically, post-March there is a preference for grain and pre-March a preference for cash. When probed, the reasons for the strong preference for food-only payment can be clustered into three categories: (1) the unequal current value of food and cash (“We told you that 15 kg is more than 50 Birr and hence we prefer it” [TIG_SA/FG1].); (2) general market/price uncertainty and therefore a preference for a certain value of food (“Market uncertainty makes it difficult to answer. Today’s price is not the same as yesterdays” [SNNPR_S/FG2].); and (3) deliberate price hiking at the time of payment (“We prefer food transfers, even if the cash payment is increased, because the moment merchants know the payment is in cash, the price increases. Thus we are forced to purchase food items before the payment days. The merchants exchange information with the mobile telephone and play with the food prices” [TIG_SA/FG3]. “We still prefer to be paid in food, because the cash does not guarantee that

we get food items in the market. The merchants also increase prices/play a kind of game when they know that we are paid in cash" [TIG_SA/FG2].).

Respondents preferring food-only were asked whether they would still prefer food if the cash amount was increased seasonally. All of these respondents still preferred food. The main reasons given for this were the lack of food available on the market and increasing food costs. Many respondents were not convinced that an increase would ever be sufficient enough to cover the continual rise in prices. "No, if the cash increases, we [still] cannot buy the amount that we need" [AM_SA/FG4]. "We prefer food payments, because we use it for household consumption; if it is money, the money cannot buy enough food from the market" [AM_S/FG3]. One women's focus group discussed the possible misuse of cash in the hands of men. This led them to agree that, "Still we prefer food. When the pay is cash, men usually go to collect it, but also misuse the cash before reaching home" [ORO_G/FG3].

The dominant theme within these focus group discussions is the differential value of the cash and food payments. To explore this further, we exploit data collected in the market price survey that was fielded at the same time as the quantitative household survey. Table 8.21 shows locality (EA) median prices for the six most frequently consumed grains in rural Ethiopia as of June 2010.

Table 8.21. Locality median price per kg, by crop, June 2010

Food	Median price per kg	Number of observations
White teff	7.60	100
Black/mixed teff	7.12	23
Barley	4.61	128
Wheat	6.11	35
Maize	3.88	137
Sorghum	4.30	112

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

The 10 Birr cash payment should be sufficient to purchase 3 kg of maize. This is based on an assumed price of 3.33 Birr/kg. As Table 8.16 shows, only maize prices are close to this assumed price. Mindful of this, we calculate the mean preference for the mix of food and cash payments at the locality (EA) level and categorize these as "Mostly cash," "Even split," and "Mostly food."[27] We cross-tabulate these with mean EA maize prices grouped into the following tertiles: 1.33–3.35 Birr/kg; 3.35–4.48 Birr/kg; and 4.48–16.00 Birr/kg. Results are show in Figure 8.12.

Figure 8.13 shows that when maize prices are below 3.35 Birr/kg, a majority of beneficiaries would prefer mostly cash payments or an even split of food and cash. However, once prices rise above 3.35 Birr/kg, fewer than 15 percent want mostly cash payments and more than half want mostly food payments. These results are consistent with what we observe in the qualitative data.

[27] To construct these categories, we calculated the mean EA values based on individual responses. These equaled one where all beneficiaries indicate a preference for cash, three where, on average, there is a preference for an equal split between food and cash, and five where all beneficiaries indicate a preference for food. "Mostly cash" were EAs where the mean value ranged from 1.0 to 2.50. "Even split" EAs were those where the mean value ranged from 2.51 to 3.50 and "Mostly food" EAs were those where the mean value ranged from 3.51 to 5.00.

Figure 8.13. Locality preferences for food and cash, by maize prices



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Respondents were asked whether there are certain times of the year that they would prefer to have payments in food or cash. The general consensus on this was that people require food during the rainy season and cash during the dry season. These vary across the survey sites, possibly due to different varying regional climatic conditions. Only in one region, Amhara, did all groups indicate that they preferred food all year round.

> R1. When our crops are not ready to harvest—that is when we prefer food.
> R2. During December and January or before the month of May, they prefer cash, because the cash is used to cover expenses to send children to school (non-beneficiary made this comments) [AM_E/FG-1].

> R1: We prefer cash from January to March, because it helps us buy farm inputs for the following planting season. Also, we have food from our own harvest during these months.
> R2: We prefer food transfer during planting season (from April-June), because the food improves farm labor performance [ORO_G/FG-4].

8.7. Summary

These data on days worked, payments for public works employment, and direct support transfers are strongly suggestive of a "two-tiered" PSNP.

- In SNNPR and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Tigray and Amhara-HVFB, there are clearly efforts being made to ensure work is available, that beneficiaries are paid for this work, and that these payments reflect the amount of work undertaken. In 2009, significant

levels of transfers were made to public works beneficiaries in these regions and to ensure that payments bear some relationship to entitlements.

- In Tigray and SNNPR, there are clearly serious attempts to provide direct support transfers, though the regions differ in how they implement this. In Tigray, there are more beneficiaries, but with low-ish levels of transfers; in SNNPR, the converse appears to be the case.
- By contrast, this dimension of program implementation lags in Amhara and Oromiya. Total public works payment levels are lower as are the proportion of beneficiaries receiving their entitlement.
- Self-reported payments data indicate that Full Family Targeting has not been implemented in Amhara.
- These self-reports show that direct support payments in Oromiya are considerably below what is envisaged in the PIM.
- There exists a very strong preference for food payment, given uncertainly about prices, lack of food availability on the market, deliberate price hiking by traders, and non-equivalent value of food basket and current cash payment. Beneficiaries were more likely to prefer cash when grain prices were below 3.5 Birr/kg.
- Nearly all those who responded to a preferred payment arrangement were monthly. But it seems the main problem is predictability of payment. Many respondents indicated that they would prefer a seasonally-specific payment modality: food during the rainy season and cash during the dry season. The months seem to vary, possibly due to different varying regional climatic conditions.

9. Appeals and Complaints

9.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the qualitative findings of the appeals and complaints management of the PSNP in the highland areas of Ethiopia. It describes the reasons for appeals, who people appeal to, how these are presented, whether the appeals process is easy and transparent, and how long the appeals and complaint cases take to be resolved. It also includes a discussion of the views and perception of the *Woreda* and *Kebele* Food Security Task Force on visits by the Rapid Response Team (RRT).

9.2. Sources of Appeals and Complaints

Individuals, households, and groups have a right to complain if they feel that they are left out of the program and/or any wrong decisions during the targeting process have been made. Table 9.1 presents data drawn from the qualitative fieldwork on responses to questions about the causes of appeals and complaints across regions.

Table 9.1. Sources of appeals and complaints, by region

	Regions				
Causes of appeals and complaints	**SNNPR**	**Oromiya**	**Amhara**	**Tigray**	**Total**
Exclusion	15	7	13	10	45
Inclusion	0	0	3	0	3
Partial family targeting	4	5	1	0	10
Delay of payment	0	2	1	0	3
Deduction of payment	1	2	0	0	3
Form of payment	0	0	1	0	1

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Fifty focus group discussions were conducted with the *woreda* and *kebele* level task forces and four community groups comprised of those who are benefiting and not benefiting from the PSNP. From 50 focus group discussions, exclusion emerged as the first cause for appeals and complaints. The response pattern was similar across the regions and all the respondents (the four community groups) strongly stressed that they felt they were excluded, despite having met the targeting criteria of the PSNP. In general, the inclusion error as a cause for appeal did not appear as strong as exclusion. This could be attributed to the fact that after the first year of the PSNP, lessons were learned and the community involvement in the targeting process stronger and, hence, this contributed to a lower number of appeal and complaint cases related to inclusion errors. During the focus group discussions with the *Woreda* Food Security Task Force, this was echoed as follows:

> After 2007, there are no significant complaints. Most complaints are about why I am not included, what can you do about it, rather than why he/she is included while I am not [SN_S/W-FG-1].

Among people who are not targeted in the program, there is a general perception that they were excluded from a government support package that should benefit all. People felt that the PSNP is a free government support that all poor people are entitled to benefit from. This

notion was eloquently captured in one focus group discussion with the KFSTF when they explained people's common perception of this issue as "the government is the father to everyone and not an uncle for some"[SN_S/KI-1]. This indicates there is a significant sentiment about exclusion from the program. This understanding could be attributed to the previously implemented emergency response and people's misunderstanding of the difference between the PSNP and an emergency response.

The one exception to this was conversations held with community focus groups in Amhara. When asked whether "anyone in the community has complained or appealed about the safety net targeting?," the "inclusion error" during the first phase of PSNP targeting was cited as a major cause for appeals and complaints. This was due to the fact that the Amhara region exercised a different targeting approach during the first year of the PSNP. At that time, Amhara targeted relatively better-off households who were the most likely to graduate from the program. (This was subsequently changed.)

The second cause for appeal is partial family targeting. A significant number of respondents mentioned that one or more of their household members were not included in the program. Given the PSNP resource limitations during the first years of the PSNP, almost all regions exercised a partial family targeting approach rather than a full family targeting (FFT). However, it is widely noticed that, currently, most of the *woredas* under this study has adopted or are planning to adopt a FFT. This was reflected in response of the *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces in different *woredas*:

> In 1999 EC (2007) we did retargeting, because there were complaints that there were both inclusion and exclusion errors and the targeting exercise did not take into account all family members of the selected households. It was not full family targeting. Then we undertook a fundamental retargeting by involving communities. At present, we have the list of beneficiaries of 1999 EC (2007) retargeting results [AM_E/W-FG-1].
>
> On 2007 retargeting was done uniformly in all *kebeles*. Earlier, if you have 10 household members, only two or three will be taken; this was corrected during retargeting. The number of beneficiaries has also increased from around 12,000 to 14,808 [SN_S/W-FG-1].
>
> From the outset, our *woreda* used to practice a full family targeting (FFT) in the previous years; later on changed toward reaching as many households as possible. But this year, the FFT has become mandatory for all *woredas* and, hence, we are implementing it in all *kebeles* [TIG_A/W-FG-1].

The third cause of appeals that were mentioned, particularly from Oromiya and Amhara, related to the delay of transfer and payments. Despite some improvements in this regard, respondents expressed their frustration with the delay of transfer of payments.

In addition, deduction of payment has also emerged as equally important to delay of transfers in SNNPR and Oromiya regions. The focus group discussions with men, women, and KFSTF groups' respondents revealed this. One respondent said, "…40 Birr are deducted from my payment. I do not know why it is being deducted. Where can I go to appeal? If we have grievances in other administrative issues, we talk to the *kebele* chairman.

But there is no one to talk to about the PSNP" [SN_S/FG-3/4]. The focus group discussion with a women group in Amhara region indicated that different forms of payment (in cash payment instead of food) are a concern and a cause for appeals.

9.3. Who People Appeal to

Ways of appeals and complaints against targeting decisions are illustrated in Table 9.2. When excluded from the PSNP, people made their appeals and complaints to various actors who are directly and indirectly involved with the PSNP in their locality. Out of the focus group discussions with men and women in four regions, 10 communities reflected that people made their appeals and complaints to the development agents (DAs), *kebele* cabinet, *kebele* administrator, *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF), *Kebele* Appeals Committee (KAC), traditional/village leaders, *Kebele* Women's Affairs Office, *woreda* administration, Agricultural and Rural Development Office (ARDO), and Disaster Prevention Office (DPO).

Table 9.2. Who appeals to whom?

	Appeals made to							
Appeals made by (in gender)	**DA**	***Kebele* cabinet**	***Kebele* administrator**	**KFSTF**	**KAC**	**Traditional (*ganda*) leader**	***Woreda* administration/ ARDO/DPO**	***Kebele* women's affair**
Men's group	0	5	3	2	2	0	1	0
Women's group	4	4	4	2	2	1	0	1
Total	4	9	7	4	2	1	1	1

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Notes: development agent (DA), *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF), *Kebele* Appeals Committee (KAC), Agricultural and Rural Development Office (ARDO), Disaster Prevention Office (DPO).

Table 9.2 disaggregates the responses in gender differences. Men appear to prefer appealing to the *kebele* cabinet, *kebele* administrator, and KFSTF and KAC, respectively, whereas women prefer appealing to the development agent, *kebele* cabinet, *kebele* administrator, KFSTF, and KAC. In addition, some women indicated that they felt more comfortable in appealing to the *Kebele* Women's Affairs Office. Interestingly, none of the women mentioned that they would go up to the *woreda* level to present their appeal and complaint. The focus group discussion with women in Gursum, Oromiya region, confirmed this:

> The appeal is usually to the development agent. We do not have the conviction that if we go to the *woreda*, we get justice. We do not feel that the *woreda* officials listen to us either. We believe that they listen to the peasant association and *kebele* leader rather than us. Moreover, we do not even know which office we should go to [ORO_G/W-FG-3].

9.4. How Appeals Are Presented and Resolved

Communities present their appeals and complaints against the decision of the PSNP targeting to the *Kebele* Cabinet, administrator, development agent, KFSTF, KAC, *Kebele* Women's Affairs Office, and village leaders. Focus group discussions with all categories of beneficiaries across all *woredas* indicated that 95 percent of the appeals and complaints are

undertaken verbally. In rare occasions, mostly for higher administrative levels, appellants are asked to present their appeal in writing. One respondent from the direct support group pointed out the following about appealing in writing:

> They excluded me from the program after two years. I requested to the then *kebele* chairman who was also the chairman of KFSTF verbally, but his response was negative. Then I presented my complaint to the *woreda* agriculture office in writing and they have responded. I got a timely response from them. I was not aware of why I was excluded [SN_D/FG-1].

The *Kebele* Appeals Committee (KAC) is responsible to listen to the appeal and complaint cases and provide timely responses. Table 9.3 illustrates the composition of KAC in the study areas.

Table 9.3. Composition of the *Kebele* Appeals Committee

		Composition of *Kebele* Appeals Committee											
Region	***Kebele***	*Kebele* chairman	*Kebele* manager	Two elders/ religious leaders	Women's representative	School teacher	Health extension worker	*Kebele* spokes-person	*Kebele* militia commander	Development agent	Food security secretary	*Kebele* secretary	Number of members
SNNPR	Gurade			✓	✓								5
	Furra						✓			✓		✓	3
	Soyame												0
Oromiya	Barite												0
	Dimtu Raretti		✓	✓	✓	✓				✓			6
Amhara	Serawudi	✓		✓	✓								3
	Shengo Defar	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓			5
	Wal			✓									3
Tigray	Adizata			✓	✓							✓	5
	Sendeda			✓	✓							✓	7

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

KACs had been established in 8 out of 10 *kebeles* covered in this study. In principle, the overall appeals and complaints process should be managed by an independent team of KACs that is different from the one involved in the targeting process. The composition of KAC members varies from religious leaders, women, and school teachers, to health extension workers, *kebele* administrators, and *kebele* managers. In Amhara region, Sayint *woreda*, however, the composition is slightly different, consisting of the *Kebele* chairman, the *Kebele* manager, a teacher, the *Kebele* cabinet's spokesperson, and the *Kebele* militia/security commander.

In Tigray region, however, the KAC members are independent and impartial and were selected from the community members. Further, they have a separate food security secretary at the *kebele* levels. When asked, “Who are the members of the KAC?,” the response was

> Those people who are impartial, honest, and with better level of know-how than the community and elected by each sub-*kebele* and they should not be members of the *kebele* administration [TIG_S/K-FG-1].

Prior to the introduction of the KAC, the appeals and complaints procedures were managed by the *Kebele* Cabinet, traditional leaders, the *Woreda* ARDO/Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office (DPPO) or council. The majority of respondents pointed out that the appeal process is transparent and easy to use. The focus group discussion with a men’s group in Tigray region, Ahferom *woreda*, strongly supported this view:

> Yes, the process of appeals and complaints is transparent and easy for those who have cases. You can present your case at any time in any form that could be written or verbally. If you need to present your appeal in written form, they can provide you a format to be completed there. They invite the person who complains and the other party and they listen to each party’s idea attentively and collect the necessary evidence from the concerned sources and finally decide based on the data. If one of the parties does not agree on the decision, the case will be sent back to the public for approval [TIG_A/FG-4].

However, there is a stark regional variation on the appeals and complaints case management. The discussion resulting from men’s groups in Oromiya and SNNPR indicated an opposite result about the transparency and easiness of the appeal process. Respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the appeal and complaint process and with the composition of the members of the KAC in general.

> The appeal process is not transparent. People working on the appeal case management are those who have created the problem during the targeting process. The same people involved in targeting are also involved in the appeal case management. That is why the process is not transparent [ORO/SN_G/S-FG-4].

> The appeal process is difficult. This is because the committees are running to fulfill their private daily activities and do not give time to this. It would be difficult to say to them, “sit and listen to our complaints” [OR_D/K-FG-3].

> There is an appeal committee in our *kebele*. But they usually endorse the proposals of the CFSTF and, hence, return complainers back [TIG_A/K-FG-1].

The gender dimension of the appeals and complaints process at the *kebele* level is investigated by looking at the following aspects: the composition of the KAC and the gender of the appellants. Table 9.4 illustrates the gender composition of the KAC.

Table 9.4. The composition of the *Kebele* Appeals Committee, by gender in study areas

Region	*Kebele*	Number of the KAC members	Number of men in the KAC	Number of women in the KAC
SNNPR	Gurade	5	4	1
	Furra	3	2	1
	Soyame	0	0	0
Oromiya	Barite	0	0	0
	Dimtu Raretti	6	5	1
Amhara	Serawudi	3	2	1
	Shengo Defar	5	4	1
	Wal	3	2	1
Tigray	Adizata	5	3	2
	Sendeda	7	6	1
Total		37	28	9

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

The above result indicated that while women are not equally represented on the KAC as men, they are evenly represented (at least one woman per *kebele*) across the study areas. No stark difference is observed in the number of women members in the KAC across the regions except Adizata *kebele* in Tigray, where two out of five members are women. Further attempt was made to capture the gender dimension of the appeals process by looking at the gender of appellants who have made appeals against the decision of the PSNP targeting and other program aspects. The focus group discussion with all KFSTFs across the regions could not yield a good sense about the gender of the appellants. The KFSTFs were not able to provide the research team with the records of the appeal cases during the study. However, the focus group discussion with the women's group in all 10 *kebeles* overwhelmingly indicated that they know women in their community who have complained or appealed about the safety net targeting.

An attempt was made to understand why there were so few appeal cases in the survey, despite such a large number of the PSNP beneficiaries nationwide. Acquiring clear and consistent information on this proved very difficult. We propose that the low incidence of appeals could be attributed to (1) the historical lack of success in appeal cases; (2) the passive role the KAC members, given that the role is likely to be underfunded due to all the other PNSP responsibilities; (3) the non-independence of the KAC; or/and (4) lack of confidence in the KAC by the community. Further, it was observed that the appeal cases are presented not only to the KAC, but also to various administrative officials, village leaders, and the development agents at the *kebele* and *woreda* levels. Often these appeals are made verbally, hence it is difficult to trace how many cases were presented and resolved.

The focus group discussion with the women's group in Gurade *kebele* of SNNPR also complained that the appeal and complaint process was not transparent. "The focus group discussion results with communities indicated that the type of responses from the KAC is known in advance, often similar, and negative." The focus group discussion with a women's group in Tigray region revealed their frustrations as follows: "…when we go to KAC with complaints, they tell us that it is because of the shortage in beneficiary quota allocated to the *kebele* and sub-*kebele*. Otherwise, you could have been included among the beneficiaries"

[TIG_ A/FG-3]. Discussion results with a men's group in Oromiya region also indicated that despite persistent appeal and complaints, the response was generally negative. "I have five family members. Only three of my family members were targeted. I appealed to the *Kebele* Targeting Committee to consider the remaining two family members. They said no to my appeal" [ORO-Z/FG-4].

It proved difficult to get a good sense as to how long it took for appeals to be heard. The response to the question, "How long did it take from complaint to resolution?," tended to vary from "two weeks to two months." But it is important to note that because most appeals appear to have been handled verbally, there is relatively little formal documentation of these appeals.

It is also worth noting the perception that there were limited gains to be had by appealing as the following quotations reveal:

> There are many people who appealed. They appeal to the *kebele* administration. There is nothing that they got after they have appealed. They are only moaning. The response they receive is that the included households are not any better off than they themselves, and that there is no regulation that allows to exclude them in order to include the appellant [SN_D/K-FG-3].
>
> Two of my family members were not registered for PSNP. I have brought this case to the *Kebele* Targeting Committee. But the *kebele* administrator refused my case [ORO_Z/K-FG-4].
>
> They usually get a response immediately because the answer is a quota [SN_D/FG-4].
>
> There are also appeals related to targeting. This could be such that I am not better off than some beneficiaries, but you excluded me. You favor based on kinship or money. We complain to the chairman. The outcome is that nothing happens. They may say you will be included during the next targeting [SN_S/K-FG-3].

The following comment from a focus group with direct support beneficiaries in Tigray region also suggests a lack of confidence in the KAC in resolving the appeal cases.

> It is not hard to complain, but as far as we know these people are not important in solving the problem, so we prefer keeping quiet rather than shouting endlessly [TIG_S/FG-1].

Responses to previous appeals may have also discouraged use of the appeals mechanism.[28] Focus group discussions with the KFSTF in Amhara and Tigray regions highlighted how the targeting errors and grievances were resolved:

> The appeal committee was following an approach to ask the appellant to identify someone who is better off but included in the safety net. If he/she identified a household who was incorrectly included, then the complaint or

[28] In fact, the quantitative household survey showed that only 185 households (out of more than 4,000) had made an appeal based on their exclusion from the PSNP.

appeal is supported. If he/she was not able to identity someone who is in the program incorrectly, his/her complaint will not be pursued [TIG-A/K-FG-1].

Such an approach clearly discourages an appellant to present his/her case in front of the appeals committee. Even if they could identify the better-off who is included in the program, this would create tension and possible confrontation within the community.

Although it lacks the depth of the information gleaned from the qualitative studies, there is some information on appeals in the household quantitative survey. Specifically, respondents were asked three questions: Did you ever feel the selection made [of beneficiaries] was unfair? If you thought the process was unfair, did you or anyone in your household ever lodge a complaint/appeal/grievance about the selection? And if you did lodge a complaint, did someone respond to your complaint? Table 9.5a gives the numbers of responses to these questions, while Table 9.5b expresses these as percentages.

Table 9.5a. Number of households perceiving selection process was unfair, lodging complaints, and receiving a response, by sex of household head and region

Region	Sex of household head	Sample size	Perceive that selection was unfair	Lodged a complaint	Perceived selection was unfair and lodged a complaint	Received a response
Tigray	Male-headed	584	165	119	76	38
	Female-headed	252	54	27	19	6
	All	836	219	146	95	44
Amhara	Male-headed	620	191	107	89	44
	Female-headed	226	66	27	22	7
	All	846	257	134	111	51
Amhara-HVFB	Male-headed	886	285	166	102	43
	Female-headed	261	67	18	10	2
	All	1,147	352	184	112	45
Oromiya	Male-headed	640	225	74	63	15
	Female-headed	222	67	20	18	3
	All	862	292	94	81	18
SNNPR	Male-headed	714	223	97	78	24
	Female-headed	203	56	18	13	4
	All	917	279	115	91	28

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 9.5b. Percentage of households perceiving selection process was unfair, lodging complaints, and receiving a response, by sex of household head and region

Region	Headship status	Percent of sample that:				
		Perceived that selection was unfair	Lodged a complaint	Perceived selection was unfair and lodged a complaint	Perceived selection was unfair, lodged a complaint, and received a response	Received a response given that they perceived selection was unfair and had lodged a complaint
Tigray	Male-headed	28.3	20.4	13.0	6.5	50.0
	Female-headed	21.4	10.7	7.5	2.4	31.6
	All	26.2	17.5	11.4	5.3	46.3
Amhara	Male-headed	30.8	17.3	14.4	7.1	49.4
	Female-headed	29.2	11.9	9.7	3.1	31.8
	All	30.4	15.8	13.1	6.0	45.9
Amhara-HVFB	Male-headed	32.2	18.7	11.5	4.9	42.2
	Female-headed	25.7	6.9	3.8	0.8	20.0
	All	30.7	16.0	9.8	3.9	40.2
Oromiya	Male-headed	35.2	11.6	9.8	2.3	23.8
	Female-headed	30.2	9.0	8.1	1.4	16.7
	All	33.9	10.9	9.4	2.1	22.2
SNNPR	Male-headed	31.2	13.6	10.9	3.4	30.8
	Female-headed	27.6	8.9	6.4	2.0	30.8
	All	30.4	12.5	9.9	3.1	30.8

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Some care is needed in interpreting Table 9.5. A household could perceive that the selection process was unfair either because they were excluded, or because they felt another household should have been included, or because they felt that another household should have been excluded.[29] Households could lodge a complaint even though they thought the selection process was fair.[30] Mindful of this, even when households perceive that the selection process was unfair, they are relatively unlikely to lodge a complaint. There is little regional variation. Everywhere, male-headed households are more likely to submit a complaint than female-headed households. Between 22 percent (Oromiya) and 46 percent (Tigray) of households that lodge a complaint when they perceive the selection process has been unfair report that they received a response; the questionnaire did not include a question as to whether their complaint was successfully resolved. These results are broadly consistent with results from the qualitative work.

9.5. *Woreda* Food Security Task Force and *Kebele* Food Security Task Force Views on the Visit of the Rapid Response Team

Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) are supposed to undertake field visits, identify implementation problems and bottlenecks, report these to relevant policy and administrative bodies, provide guidance and technical support, and track previously identified problems

[29] The household questionnaire did not distinguish between these possibilities. This could be added to the 2012 survey.
[30] In the 2012 survey, asking the nature of the complaint would be useful as would knowing the outcome of the complaint.

(GFDRE 2010; Sharp, Brown, and Teshome 2006, 43). As per this mandate, the RRT should visit most PSNP *woredas* on regular basis. The Oromiya regional FSTF indicated reasons why it did not do so:

> The regional rapid response team is expected to have a monthly field visit schedule. The intension is to cover all PSNP *woredas* every year. However, we were unable to realize this, mainly due to logistic constraints. We have limited vehicles to conduct regular visits. Also, we have a series of other duties which prevented us from conducting regular visits. The number of visits we conducted so far ranges between 8–10 times in a year [ORO_R-KI-1].

The focus group discussion results show that the majority the WFSF across all regions found that the RRT team visit was helpful in providing timely support and corrective measures. However, it seems there is a significant disconnect between the *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces and *Kebele* Food Security Task Forces. The focus group discussions with the KFSTF indicated that the RRTs from the federal, regional, and *woreda* levels paid infrequent and irregular visits to all *kebeles* over the past years, spending few days on the ground. However, a focus group discussion result suggested that the overall support received from the RRT is not well received among the KFSTF across all the regions. Compared with the WFSTF, overall, there is limited knowledge and comprehension among the KFSTF on the role and objectives of the RRT visit and the scope of responsibilities attached to their visit on the *kebele* level. It seems the KFSTF regarded the RRT team visit as a panacea for all PSNP-related problems in their *kebele*.

> They did not look for us. They did not talk with us [SN_S/K-FG-1].
>
> The visit of the RRT was of no use to the KFSTF [SN_D/K-FG-1].

In some regions (Tigray and Amhara), the role and responsibilities of the RRT are seen as trouble shooting and on-site technical backstopping rather than correcting issues that are affecting the overall PSNP implementation. The focus group discussions in Seiseamba Tigray indicated that, “They are not helpful in settling administrative related issues” [TIG_S/K-FG-1]. “This team assesses and technically backstops the undergoing PSNP activities, especially public works” [TIG_S/K-FG-1]. The focus group discussions with the WFSTF in Shebedino *woreda* indicated that the visit of the RRT helped them to resolve misunderstandings related to the graduation process.

> It is very helpful. Sometimes when the *kebele* didn’t believe what we say, we would call the RRT. Especially around graduation, since there is a resistance, they will come to persuade them. They play a great role in clarifying that it is not something we created [SN_S/FG-W-FG-1].

9.6. Summary

This chapter has summarized information collected on the appeals process. There are several salient findings.

- Exclusion from the PSNP is the principal cause of appeals. Partial targeting, inclusion errors, deduction of payment, and delay of transfers are other reasons for appeals and complaints.
- Appeals are made to the KFSTF, *kebele* cabinet, the development agents, *Kebele* Appeal Committees (KAC), village leaders, and others. Although KACs are widespread, they are not perceived as being effective.
- Women are fairly represented (at least one woman per *kebele*) in the KAC.
- It appears that, relative to concerns raised about the selection process, relatively few households appeal. There is a sense that the chances of appealing successfully are limited and this may discourage use of appeal mechanisms.
- Appeals are largely made verbally. It appears that decisions are made about these somewhere between two weeks and two months after the complaint has been lodged. The lack of written documentation surrounding appeals means that this figure represents a “best guess.”
- Views on the usefulness of RRT support differ. Several *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces believed that RRT visits were helpful in assisting with bottlenecks associated with PSNP implementation and in providing back-up support. However, *Kebele* Food Security Task Forces believed that the RRT visits are not as helpful as they should be.

10. The Other Food Security Program and its Transition to the Household Asset Building Programme

10.1. Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the Other Food Security Program (OFSP), challenges faced in implementation, women's access to credit/household packages, and the subsequent transition of the OFSP to the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) in the revised National Food Security Program of the Government of Ethiopia. It further explains the current rollout progress of HABP including the provision of credit, challenges encountered thus far, its linkage with other food security programs, and its role in facilitating the graduation process, as well as the role of development agents in implementing the HABP. It draws on a variety of data sources, including key informant interviews (KII) at the regional, *woreda*, and *kebele* level, focus group discussions in *woredas* and *kebeles*, and also the quantitative surveys fielded at the *kebele* and household level. Table 10.1 gives an overview of the evaluation objectives covered in this chapter.

Table 10.1. Evaluation objectives covered in chapter 10

Evaluation objective	Issue	Links to Log Frames and TOR
Document progress in the implementation of the HABP		
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	HABP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 42
	HAB clients have access to financial services	HABP Log frame Output 2.1
	HAB clients have access to desired input	HABP Log frame Output 3.2

Source: Authors' compilation.

10.2. The Other Food Security Program

In the initial phase of the Food Security Program (FSP), the PSNP was complemented by the "Other Food Security Program" (OFSP). The OFSP encompassed a suite of activities designed to support agricultural production and food security, and to facilitate asset accumulation. This included access to credit; assistance in obtaining livestock, small livestock, or bees, tools, seeds; and assistance with irrigation or water-harvesting schemes, soil conservation, and improvements in pasture land. In some cases, beneficiaries were provided with subsidized credit to purchase "packages," combinations of agricultural inputs sometimes based on a business plan developed with support from the extension service. In the first evaluation of the FSP, Gilligan et al. (2007) noted that outside Tigray, access to the OFSP was low. While this improved between 2006 and 2008, access to the OFSP remained limited (Gilligan et al. 2009) and few households had consistent access to OFSP resources.

This limited coverage reflected a number of other challenges associated with the implementation of the OFSP. One challenge was that the agricultural extension system was under resourced and there were too few development agents with sufficient skills to play their role effectively (World Bank 2010).

Focus group discussions and key informant interviews revealed considerable regional variations in the targeting of the OFSP, partly because, at least as perceived by

respondents, there were no clear guidelines on OFSP implementation, particularly who should be targeted. Some regions, concerned about the number of prospective graduate rates they would achieve by the end of the program, targeted the better-off households who were most likely to graduate. For instance, during the first phase of the PSNP, the Amhara region gave a priority to households who could easily achieve the graduation target, rather than the ultra-poor. Similar situations were noticed in Tigray region as well.

> Lack of clear guideline and procedure for targeting has hampered the implementation of OFSP [ORO-Z/W-KII-OFSP].
>
> OFSP had been implemented in an uncoordinated way by NGOs and government [Am/ R-FG-2].
>
> There was an absence of coordinating body for household packages in the *woreda*. Further, government provided household packages are not coordinated with NGO efforts in the area. Different actors intervening in the household asset building activities rarely work in coordinated manner to maximize impact [ORO-Z/W-KII-OFSP].
>
> We did not have information on who has to benefit from the federal resources (OFSP) in the first three years of the PSNP period. We were not informed on the targeting process too. As a result, we provided the federal resources to PSNP and non-PSNP beneficiaries. This has negatively impacted our intention for graduation by reducing the number of PSNP households benefited from OFSP [ORO-G/W-FGD-1].
>
> At the initial period, there were trade-offs, even tensions between pro-poor and pro-progress/growth opinions. Among the challenges was the question, "Is it development or addressing the households' food gap, which should come first?" [TIG_R/FG-1].

In Oromiya, targeting was based on instructions received from the *Woreda* Food Security Office and the DPPO, whereas in SNNPR, households were targeted in a lottery system. In addition, household's motivation and determination is seen as a positive step toward the selection criteria for the OFSP. This was well illustrated during the key informant interviews with the development agents when asked, "How were the OSFP clients selected?"

> The OFSP is based on the assumption of a daily income of 1 US dollar. Based on this assumption, any member of the community who is willing and able to take credit and is willing to implement the credit for the intended purposes [as in the business plan] can be targeted to receive the OFSP/household package assistance [TIG_S/W-KI-2].
>
> At first, when they collected the socioeconomic data, each PSNP household is surveyed and those who have more assets are selected and a business plan is prepared [AM_S/K-KI-1].

Provision of credit was also problematic. In 2008, only 72 percent of loans that had fallen due had been repaid. A slow start in establishing a revolving funds system meant that only 36 percent of loans that had been repaid were refinanced (World Bank 2010). In fact, there

was confusion as to whether beneficiaries were receiving a grant, a loan, or participating in a revolving funds scheme. This created confusion for both implementers and beneficiaries. Many recipients considered it a free grant, took it, and later were informed to repay. The focus group discussions with a men's group and the OFSP team illustrated these aspects mentioned above.

> For example, a lady who did not even have a pot and cannot earn money also took the loan thinking that it was for free [AM_SO/K-FG-4].
>
> Initially the development agents told us that it was free, and then when we were ready to collect the money after finalizing the loan procedures, they told us to collect the money from the cooperatives. The cooperatives told us that it is a loan, and to be repaid with interest [AM_SO/W-FG-4].
>
> It is expected that the OFSP resources operate on revolving fund basis. But no one knew whether it was a grant or a revolving fund. We are asked now to re-collect it and make it seed money for implementing the HABP. The challenge is that the extended funds were impossible to trace [ORO_Z/W-KI-2].

In addition to the Ethiopian government's OFSP support, various other actors are involved in funding and implementing household package programs in different regions. For instance, in Oromiya region, Gursum *woreda*, and SNNPR, in 13 *woredas*, the World Bank's Food Security Project (also supported by CIDA and the Italian government) provided similar support as the federal OFSP through a revolving funding mechanism. In Tigray and Amhara region, USAID funded various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement similar household package programs. The involvement of various actors in the implementation of the OFSP created considerable confusion at the beginning of the program, especially concerning the intended target population. This was well illustrated during the focus group discussion with the *Woreda* Food Security Task Force in Gursum *woreda*, Oromiya region:

> At the beginning, there was confusion between the World Bank (WB) credit and the federal credit schemes. Unlike the WB credit, the federal fund does not have clear guidelines as to how to go about it, its purpose and focus. We did not have information on who has to benefit from the federal resources in the first three years of the PSNP period. We were not given any information on targeting process for the federal government credit. As a result, we provided the federal resource to PSNP and non-PSNP beneficiaries. This has negatively impacted on the achievement of the graduation objectives [ORO-G/W-KI-1].

Finally, there were persistent concerns about the appropriateness of the OFSP packages and the lack of coordination across stakeholders.

> The other problem is that the menus did not fully address the interest of the beneficiaries; the menu is narrow and the community asks for activities outside it, and we influenced the beneficiaries to work within the given menu [AM_SO/W-FG-2].

10.3. Women's Access to Credit and Household Packages

The focus group discussions with women groups in all ten *kebeles* in the study areas overwhelmingly indicated that women can, in theory, access credit. However, many women indicated that the nature of the credit/OFSP targeting and implementation made it difficult for them to access. As indicated above, some regions gave priority of credit/packages to those who have better collateral or who have relatively better assets in their livelihood. In addition, the high interest rate was a significant barrier for women not being able to take the credit. The following has been captured during focus group discussions with the women's group across the regions when asked, "Can women get credit?"

> We can take credit from microfinances (MFIs). However, because the interest rate is too high, we do not dare to take loans from MFI. The interest is around 30 percent [SN-D/FG-3].
>
> Yes, women can get credit. But we are not sure, since many of us did not ask for credit [SN-S/FG-3].
>
> Yes, women can get credit. We go to the development agent declaring our interest to get credit. The development agent asks us what assets we have in the house. We tell him what assets we have, such as sheep, goats, house, etc... [AM-SA/FG-3].
>
> Women can get loan. For example, I got registered for the loan and they asked me what resources I have, like trees, vegetables, etc… They might think that I may not be able to repay the loan, so they did not give me the loan. But there are some women who have got this loan [AM-SO/FG-3].
>
> The packages include poultry, goat and sheep reproduction, water pump motor, modern bee hive, fattening, credit services. For instance, the financial institutions purchase and give us dairy cows in kind, not the cash. But when they give us the loans, they strongly advise us not to use the money for consumption [TIG-S/FG-3].

Beneficiaries across all groups in all the regions indicated that the amount of credit/package they received through the OFSP was generally insufficient to support the purpose for what they took the package. Despite the significant increase of the size of the credit/package since the early years of the PSNP, they expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the amount. From focus group discussions held with nine groups of transitioning households that received household packages over the last five years, seven said that the amount of credit/loan or package received through OFSP was insufficient to implement the overall business plan intended.

Further, the beneficiaries provided reasons why the amount of credit/package was not sufficient to implement the business ideas they had:

> Not sufficient. The amount was only 1,500 Birr. Most of us planned for animal fattening. Fattening is a lucrative business in our area. However, the credit given could not help us to buy a well-grown bull. It only buys small bulls, which required at least three years feeding. We were forced to buy small bulls and sold them before they had fully grown up to repay the debt. We sold them early because we were required to repay the debt within two years according to the agreement. The limited credit volume coupled with the short repayment period has reduced the impact of fattening, which has very high potential in the *woreda* [ORO-G/FG-F-2].
>
> The amount of credit we received was not enough. The 4,000 Birr do not exceed an ox. It would have been good if it has been raised to 8,000 Birr [SN-T/FG-2].
>
> It is not sufficient. Nowadays, goods are very expensive; I am involved in trade activities and have a small shop. The credit I received could not even buy 10 packs of beer. I am working for others and for myself; it is still not sufficient to take a better share of the market [AM-S/FG-2].

10.4. The Household Assets Building Programme

In light of the problems mentioned above, the Ethiopian government, in collaboration with donors and development partners, extensively redesigned the OFSP, naming the new program as the Household Assets Building Programme (HABP). The HABP is one of the four components of the Ethiopian government's National Food Security Program. As such, it contributes to the achievement of the FSP's expected outcome of an improved food security status of male and female members of food-insecure households in chronically food-insecure (CFI) *woredas*. The specific targeted outcome of the HABP is diversified income sources and increased productive assets for food-insecure households in CFI *woredas* (GFDRE 2009b).

The HABP differs from the OFSP in three ways. Along with the injection of new resources, there is an emphasis on increased contact and coordination with the extension services as well as other actors, such as the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency, programs for women and youth, and off-farm technical officers. Each *kebele* should have three development agents, one crop science development agent, one animal husbandry development agent, and one natural resources management development agent. They are supposed to disseminate "technology packages" and provide on-farm technical advice. These are demand-led with clients involved in the identification of new opportunities as well as the development of tailored business plans that can, where appropriate, include off-farm activities. Second, credit services have been de-linked from the extension service. Instead, credit will be provided through microfinance institutions (MFIs) and Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives (RUSACCO) (GFDRE 2009b).

A third significant change has been the clarification of access to the HABP. The government of Ethiopia (GFDRE 2009b) states that, "The clients of the Household Asset Building

component are food-insecure households in chronically food-insecure *woredas*" (GFDRE 2009b, 9). Initially, priority is to be given to expand the coverage of the HABP component as rapidly as possible to ensure graduation at scale. For this reason, PSNP clients are to be prioritized for support under HABP. There is increased emphasis on meeting the specific needs of women and female-headed households and an attempt to reach rural youth. Finally, direct support clients were not to be excluded from the HABP (GFDRE 2009b).

Key informant interviews with the main food security actors at the regional and *woreda* levels indicated that to facilitate the rollout and implementation of the HABP, new joint technical committees were planned or had been established. In Tigray and Amhara, the committees are already established. According to the HABP policy document,

> The Regional Agricultural Extension Directorate is in charge of the HABP, accountable to BOARD Head, and responsible for leading the coordination with other agencies through the HABP Joint Technical Committee (TC). In this coordination role, it is responsible for: (i) developing and consolidating annual implementation plans and budgets for the HABP in the region in line with proposals from the *woredas* and line bureaus; (ii) ensuring close collaboration with and coordination of implementing agencies both within and outside the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) sector; (iii) ensuring that NGO plans with household asset building activities contribute to the overall objective of the FSP; (iv) ensuring appropriate integration of the HABP plans and activities with plans and activities of other FSP programs in the region (including, notably, ensuring synergy between the HABP household level activity and the development of enabling community infrastructure through the PSNP public works and complementary community investment (CCI), and with other development interventions (GFDRE 2009b).

The Ethiopian government's policy document describing its food security program also clearly specified that complementary community investment is an important complementary food security component.

> The CCI component aims to facilitate an adequate level of infrastructure by populations in chronically food-insecure *woredas* in order that other development interventions, which might focus on households, can achieve their potential impacts. Therefore, CCI is not only complementary to the HABP component, it is inseparable from the household investment interventions. Activities should have a direct relevance to food security (GFDRE 2009b, 40).

10.5. Rollout of the HABP

The HABP was supposed to be rolled out in the highland regions from January 2010 onwards. Key informant interviews with the relevant technical committees and administrative bodies at the regional level indicated a positive response about the current state of the HABP rollout process. Overall, across all the regions covered by this study, it is found that the HABP launching awareness workshops have been undertaken and technical committees established. The overall ownership, technical aspects, and the facilitation role of HABP have

been given to the regional Agricultural Extension Unit, while the CCI is under the regional Natural Resources Unit, as stated in the policy document. The key informant interviews also indicated that at the regional level, overall, there is clear comprehension about the objectives of the program and the institutional arrangement. An excerpt from the regional food security team revealed the following about the objectives of HABP and institutional arrangement:

> As of 2010, the HABP is under the agricultural extension program…. What differentiates HABP from the OFSP is that it is going to be implemented in an improved way and with a new approach. But the thought is similar. Some work has been done to organize cooperatives in each *kebele* as initial work for the HABP, since there is difference in the credit system. Previously credit was disbursed through the governmental structure, but now it is going to be disbursed by microfinance institutions. Then, the agricultural extension department will provide technical support, especially in business plan development and providing different package menus that could be appropriate for a specific area [SN_R/FG-2].
>
> HABP has more potential to help farmers exert their efforts and benefit from the different alternatives in the package, while OFSP had limited opportunities and alternatives [TIG_R/KI-2].

However, considerable regional variations were observed in the HABP rollout progress. As of August 2010, HABP regional committees had been established to lead the program rollout and implementation process in all regions. In Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray, HABP orientation activities were taking place at *woreda* and *kebele* levels. However, in SNNPR, HABP orientations were limited to regional level offices. Key informants in SNNPR explained that the delays had occurred as a result of delays in receiving program implementation manuals (PIM) and Training of Trainers (TOT). All regions were finalizing the establishment of technical committees for HABP at the *woreda* level and providing orientation and training to these (see Table 10.2). However, in these key informant interviews, it was reported that credit disbursements had not yet begun.

Table 10.2. Rollout status of HABP, by region and woreda

Region	*Woreda*	HABP Committee established	Training provided on HABP	HABP manual distributed	Training cascaded for DAs/*kebeles*	HABP credit provided for households
Amhara	Ebinate	√	√	√	√	X
	Sayinte	√	√	X	X	X
	Sekota	√	√	√	√	X
Oromiya	Gursum	√	√	X	X	X
	Zeway D	√	X	X	X	X
SNNP	Demba G	X	X	X	X	X
	Shebedino	X	X	X	X	X
	Tembaro	X	X	X	X	X
Tigray	Aferom	√	√	X	X	X
	Saesi Tsedamba	√	√	X	√	X

Source: Interviews with regional and *woreda* level officials.
Note: DA = development agent.

For instance, the Amhara region has progressed well ahead of the three remaining regions in the rollout of the program and cascading to the lower levels. The technical committee of the HABP has already conducted three meetings since the establishment, the sensitization trainings are already conducted, and a draft Amharic version of the HABP manual has been prepared and distributed in the region. By contrast, in the Oromiya, SNNP, and Tigray regions, the progress is relatively slow. The following has been captured during key informant interviews with the regional Food Security Task Force (FSTF) when asked, "As of now, how much progress has been made in rolling out HABP in this region?"

> Not much. Even, the HABP committee is not functioning as anticipated [ORO_R-KI-1].
>
> We do not have the HABP PIM, and the training of trainers (TOT) has not been provided yet [SN_R-KI-1].
>
> Last December (2009), there was a big consultation workshop held at which all concerned parties were trained and a regional level technical steering committee has been established, composed of the various offices of extension (The Chair), cooperative, food security, youth and sports affairs, micro and small enterprises, and women's affairs. We believe that these parties have been well aware of the HABP, but actual implementation phase will be in 2003 EC (2010/2011). After that, the technical committee will be established and trainings [at different levels] are planned to be rolled out in early August (2010) [TIG_R/FG-2].

The overall progress in general and the claim made about the preparation of a draft HABP manual in the Amharic language by the Amhara region food security office is somehow surprising as the preparation of the HABP PIM at the federal level had not been completed and disseminated to the regions and lower administrative levels as of August 2010. Asked, "When HABP will be rolled out?," two key informants (a rural development advisor for the donor country and the donor group coordinator) at the federal level indicated the following about the progress of the HABP PIM:

> The HABP has been rolled out in most of the cropping areas (Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya, and SNNPR) since the beginning of 2010. Significant preparatory works have already been done and we are in the process of developing the program implementation manual (PIM) [FED_AD/KI-1].

The key informant interviews from the WFSTF indicated that the overall rollout process has not been uniformly cascaded to the *woredas* and *kebeles*. The Amhara region also progressed ahead in this aspect in comparison to the other three regions—*woreda* level HABP committees had been established and relevant training is provided for all *woredas* in the qualitative study by regional experts. It was indicated that the training was cascaded to the development agents at the *kebele* level. However, there is a dissonance between the WFSTF claim over the provision of HABP training to the development agents at the *kebele* level and the development agents' indications about the HABP in general and training in particular. The development agent in Sayint *woreda* revealed the following:

> I have no information; I heard from you about it for the first time [AM_SA/K-KI-1].

The focus group discussion with WFSTF in Sayint *woreda* also indicated a mixed result about the overall status of HABP.

> It is [HABP] rolled out since March 2010. Expert is employed for the program. However, no guideline, no training provided so far on the program [AM_SA/W-FG-1].

In SNNPR, Oromiya, and Tigray, the rollout of the HABP to the *woreda* level is slower than in Amhara. In SNNPR, in Demba Gofa and Tembaro *woredas*, there was no information about the HABP and no training has been provided to the WFSTF. In Shebedino *woreda*, the HABP awareness training is only provided to the experts from the *woreda* finance office but not for the *Woreda* Agricultural and Rural Development Office (WARDO). In Oromiya region, in Gursum *woreda*, training was provided for the WFSTF, while no information and training was provided in Ziway Dugda. Similar patterns were noticed in Tigray region. In Afheworm *woreda*, training was given to a staff member, but the information was not shared among the rest of the WFSTF, whereas in Saesi Tsaeda Emba, some training was provided, but there remains a lack of adequate knowledge and understanding about the program.

When asked, “What are the main challenges in rolling out HABP?,” key informant interviews with the regional food security task force and OFSP/HABP committee in all regions indicated that the absence of the HABP PIM, the formalized training manual, and the limited capacity and awareness gap about the program were the main challenges they faced in the HABP rollout process. In addition, respondents indicated that limited financial capital and limited capacity of RUSSACOs to handle the fund management are other main challenges the rollout of the program has faced. Last but not least, limited numbers of RUSSACOs, absence of concise instructions and clarity from the federal level, and lack of adequate training of trainers are other obstacles encountered by the regions during the rollout process.

Key informant interviews with the rural development advisor for the donor country at the federal level also revealed that the limited number of RUSSACOs at the country level is a main challenge with significant impact on the overall implementation of the HABP. The excerpt from the interview is as follows:

> The plan for the HABP covers eight regions (countrywide). So we need to establish 5,000 RUSACCOs. Some RUSACCOs were created under an IFAD program. Establishing a RUSACCO is not simple. It requires mobilizing the community, providing training, then implementation support. Under HABP, the intention is to establish RUSACCOs across the country within one or two years [FED_A/KI-D].

10.6. Knowledge about HABP and its Linkages with the CCI, OFSP, and the PSNP

Overall, among key stakeholders at the regional level, there is significant knowledge and understanding about the objectives and the purpose of the HABP and its linkages with other ongoing food security programs. This was illustrated during the key informant interviews, when asked to explain the differences between OFSP, HABP, and PSNP.

> Earlier, credit was dispersed and collected by the government agriculture extension unit. This has created a problem in collecting the credit. However, organizing RUSACCOs in each *kebele* where this program will be implemented is now mandatory, as they will disperse and collect the credit. The government's role will then be to facilitate and give technical support. The credit will flow through RUSACCOs. The 'Cooperatives renaissance movement' document has been developed. There were discussions and plans to establish at least one RUSACCO in areas where there is no RUSACCO yet, and to strengthen RUSACCOs where they are already in place and available [SN_R-FG-2].
>
> HABP is a new program; previously it was OFSP or household package, hence it is the extension of the OFSP. We had provided household packages for more than 160,000 PSNP beneficiaries. What differs between HABP from OFSP is that it will be implemented in a strong way and with a new approach. But the idea is similar. Some work has been done to organize cooperatives in each *kebele* as an initial work for HABP, since there is a difference in the credit system. Previously, credit was disbursed through the governmental structure, but now it is going to be disbursed by local finance institutions [SN_R-FG-2].
>
> The HABP has more potential to help farmers exert their efforts and benefit from the different alternatives in the package, while the OFSP has limited opportunities and alternatives [TIG-R-KI-1].

Further, the respondents clearly outlined the linkage between different components of food security programs and how this linkage could facilitate the overall graduation process that the government set as an ultimate objective of the program. Excerpt from the regional food security actors strongly signaled this:

> PSNP alone cannot bring about graduation. If we strengthen the HABP and provide credit services through preparing business plans with the intended beneficiaries, we will register better results in graduation [AM_R/KI-1].
>
> Graduation can't be realized with PSNP only. Other household asset building interventions should be rolled out to enhance graduation [ORO_R/KI-1].

Overall linkages between the complementary community investment (CCI), HABP, and PSNP do not appear well-coordinated across regions. For instance, in Oromiya region, CCI has already been started in lowland areas with potential for large-scale irrigation agriculture.

> CCI has already commenced in Oromiya. It intends to graduate communities. The region has been allocating more funds for this than the HABP [ORO_R/KI-1].

Whereas, in the remaining regions, there is not much progress in terms of rollout and efforts to link CCI with PSNP and HABP. In Tigray region, CCI has not been planned and started yet.

> CCI are infrastructures developed to facilitate graduation as part of any food security program. So far, in this region practically this program has not yet been implemented; we are in the process of preparation for the near future [TIG_R/KI-1].

A similar trend was noticed in SNNPR region.

> CCI is not yet implemented. CCI is a huge investment. If activities require 20 percent of capital budget, then it will be considered as CCI, for example, bridge constructions. We heard that the CCI document is getting prepared, but we haven't received it yet [SN_R/KI-2].

However, significant variations were observed in the degree of knowledge among the actors, such as the WFSTF and WOFSP focal persons at the *woreda* levels. Particularly, considerable confusion exists in terms of differentiating the two programs (OFSP and HABP) among these actors. Focus group discussions with KFSTFs in all 10 *kebeles* covered in this study indicated that they have not heard about HABP. This could be attributed to the lack of harmonized training and awareness creating campaigns, which are yet to be carried out across most of the *woredas*. The following has been captured during key informant interviews with the WFSTFs and WOFSP focal persons across the regions when asked, "How is HABP different from previous Household Credit/Livelihoods Packages?"

> There is basically no difference between the two programs; the real difference is the focus. The HABP has received a lot of attention this time [AM-E/W-KI-1].
>
> I do not know this program [HABP]. There is the letter I heard about it [AM-SO/W-KI-1].
>
> HABP has a business plan for three years, assuming that the beneficiaries will graduate after that. However, the OFSP business plan is prepared on an annual basis and consists of different activities—SME [(small and medium enterprises)] and income-generating activities—and it does not forecast graduation period [AM-SO/W-KI-1].
>
> As to me, HABP is better targeted; independent on and off-farm committee is established and better focused than OFSP [AM-SO/W-KI-1].
>
> There could be a possibility in which non-PSNP beneficiaries could get credit through HABP. The cooperatives will become stronger and this benefits the community. They will make saving a tradition and as the result of this, their living condition will be improved [SN-T/W-KI-1].

10.7. The Role of Development Agents in the HABP

Development agents have a key role to play in the overall food security and livelihood program of the Ethiopian government, including the implementation of the HABP. This includes, among others, the following tasks: (1) be member of both the KFSTF and CFSTF; (2) support the CFSTF in prioritizing community needs and preparing annual HABP plans; (3) assist households in the preparation and implementation of business plans, ensuring that

the business plans are the outcome of household decisions, not the supply (package) driven approach of the past (GFDRE 2009b, 65).

In order to undertake this wide range of activities, considerable efforts have been made to increase the number of development agents working at the *kebele* level.

Figure 10.1 and Table 10.3 provide some information on the availability of development agents at the *kebele* level. Apart from SNNPR, nearly all *kebeles* have a development agent's office. In SNNPR, the median distance to the closest office, when one was not situated in the *kebele*, was 4.5 km. Apart from Oromiya, most have a crop specialist. Fewer have livestock specialists and development agents with specialist knowledge of off-farm income are rare. There are a relatively large number of development agents whose specialty is described as "Other"; it is possible that many of these individuals have training in Natural Resource Management. Respondents perceive that there have been improvements in development agent support since the 2008 survey. This may reflect the fact that many of these development agents are relatively recent appointments. Many of these individuals have been in place for a relatively short period of time, with 48 percent having been working in their current location for one year or less, and 67 percent having been in place for no more than two years. Approximately 16 percent of development agents are women. In Tigray, Amhara, and Oromiya, approximately one-third of *kebeles* have a female extension agent. This percentage is much lower, 18 percent, in Oromiya.

Figure 10.1. Percentage of development agent offices with 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more agents



Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

Table 10.3. Development agent staffing at the *kebele* level

Region	DA office in *kebele*	Three or more DAs	*Kebeles* with a development agent specialist in:				Improvement in DA support in last two years
			Crops	Livestock	Off-farm income	Other	
Tigray	91.7	75.7	83.3	72.2	8.3	69.4	66.7
Amhara	100.0	55.3	74.3	79.5	23.1	61.5	82.1
Amhara-HVFB	100.0	82.5	85.0	47.5	45.0	90.0	67.5
Oromiya	85.7	34.8	60.7	50.0	10.7	25.0	64.3
SNNPR	72.2	88.5	94.4	52.8	33.3	80.6	52.8

Source: *Kebele* quantitative questionnaire.
Note: All figures are percentages. DA = development agent.

However, linking development agents to HABP implementation has been limited. The key informant interviews with the development agents across all regions under this study indicated that the overall knowledge regarding their role in HABP is nearly nonexistent. Of a total of 10 *kebeles* covered in the qualitative study, only 3 development agents in Oromiya, Amhara, and Tigray regions had heard about the HABP and were (somewhat) able to explain their role in its implementation. Among the development agents who had heard about HABP, the overall knowledge and understanding about the program was shallow. For instance, the development agent at Sokota *woreda* of Amhara region has associated HABP with only the public works beneficiaries:

> The HABP is for PSNP public works beneficiaries only. I wish this credit would have been extended to non-PSNP households as well [AM_SO/K-KI-1].

Quotations from the development agents in Oromiya and Tigray regions below indicate similar levels of understanding:

> I do not understand the difference between OFSP and HABP. I feel both focuses on household asset creation. I think PSNP beneficiaries and drought affected communities should benefit from the HABP [ORO-Z/K-KI-1].

> We were given training on the HABP; for three development agents and six sub-*kebele* representatives. But we cannot describe its difference from the OFSP [TIG_S/K-KI-1].

It is unclear whether they are equipped with the necessary knowledge to carry out the HABP within their existing capacity. This issue was well illustrated when they responded to the question, “Do you know what the role of development agents is in implementing the HABP?”:

> Yes, my role is to provide technical support to HABP beneficiaries in the future. But we expect details of roles from the *woreda* offices in the future ORO_Z/K-KI-1].

> My role is to assist households to create assets [AMR_E/K-KI-1].

10.8. Household Knowledge and Access to the HABP

Given this information on the roll-out of the HABP as seen at the regional, *woreda*, and *kebele* level, it is interesting to consider whether households know about the HABP and have gained access to its products. Tables 10.3 and 10.4 give some insights into this. Less than half the households living in Oromiya and SNNPR had heard of the HABP. This is consistent with the findings of the qualitative study. Somewhat surprising in light of the qualitative data described above, however, knowledge of the HABP appears widespread in Tigray, but much less so in Amhara.

In all regions, at least 40 percent of households had had some sort of contact with a development agent, an increase relative to the number of households that had received OFSP packages. Male-headed households were more likely to have had contact with development agents than female-headed households. Direct support beneficiaries were less likely to have contact than non-beneficiaries or households receiving public works payments. This contact occurred primarily in meetings convened by development agents, although between 20 and 30 percent of these contacts (depending on the region) occurred on an individual basis.

Table 10.4. Household knowledge of HABP and access to development agents (DA)

Region	Have heard of HABP	Have had contact with DA	How contact with DA came about		
			DA convened a meeting that I attended	Had individual meeting with DA at my home or their office	Other
Tigray	72.5	50.3	54.5	23.1	22.4
Amhara	37.8	57.8	61.9	16.8	21.5
Amhara-HVFB	59.2	61.8	64.5	19.9	15.6
Oromiya	48.7	44.1	50.4	29.8	19.8
SNNPR	47.6	55.7	47.4	28.1	24.5

Source: Household quantitative questionnaire.
Note: All figures are percentages. DA = development agent.

Table 10.5. Household knowledge of HABP and access to development agents (DA), by sex of head and beneficiary status

	Have heard of HABP	Have had contact with DA	How contact with DA came about		
			DA convened a meeting that I attended	Had individual meeting with DA at my home or their office	Other
Male-headed	51.3	58.7	56.3	24.0	19.2
Female-headed	38.3	39.7	59.4	18.1	21.9
Receives PW	57.8	66.1	56.7	22.3	20.2
Receives DS	28.6	31.8	54.4	24.6	21.0
Non-beneficiary	46.6	51.8	58.1	21.1	20.5

Source: Household quantitative questionnaire.
Note: All figures are percentages. PW = public works; DS = direct support; DA = development agent.

A key component of HABP-supported activities is the development of a business plan. Slightly more than 15 percent of surveyed households reported that they had developed such a plan and had showed it to the development agent. Among households with a plan, 58 percent reported receiving assistance from a development agent when developing it. *Kebele* officials also appear to play a role in the development of these plans, with 22 percent of respondents stating that they had been helped by these individuals. Consulting either development agents or *kebele* officials was clearly an important part of getting approval for these plans. Approximately 90 percent of plans where development agents or *kebele* officials had been consulted were approved by development agents compared to 78 percent of plans where no prior consultations had occurred. Female-headed households and households receiving direct support were less likely to develop business plans than other household types. Conditional on developing a plan, however, approval rates were comparable across all household types.

Table 10.6 describes the type of information that households received from development agents.

Table 10.6. Information provided by development agents

Development agents:		Tigray	Amhara	Amhara-HVFB	Oromiya	SNNPR	All
Suggested:	new crops	69.95	43.55	56.51	33.49	50.27	51.06
	when to plant	71.39	49.10	67.34	38.31	55.31	56.94
Assisted:	in getting credit	70.67	50.30	61.18	30.32	43.59	51.66
	in obtaining seeds	73.56	57.42	67.34	38.54	58.60	59.55
	in obtaining fertilizer	76.68	55.97	63.56	39.72	58.05	59.02
Advised:	when to apply fertilizer	73.56	54.52	61.27	37.13	55.31	56.59
	how to apply fertilizer	74.04	53.44	61.36	37.49	55.20	56.54
	how to deal with insects	65.50	49.58	64.26	33.25	43.48	51.87
	how to deal with crop disease	65.63	48.97	65.14	33.02	44.58	52.18
	when to harvest	65.87	48.49	64.17	37.72	48.85	53.63
	how to market crops	60.82	45.72	57.13	32.20	44.36	48.52
	how to construct bunds	72.00	59.95	69.10	42.66	52.57	59.72
	on irrigation and water harvesting	65.87	52.96	57.04	34.55	37.13	49.73
Helped:	with poultry production	65.14	42.94	49.74	29.96	38.88	45.45
	with honey production	57.81	41.25	42.34	23.38	28.15	38.59
	with non-agricultural income	43.39	33.41	32.39	21.03	21.36	30.26
	obtain credit for agricultural production	40.02	34.62	31.25	18.57	20.04	28.85
Provided:	training on financial management	41.35	36.31	34.33	23.74	23.11	31.75

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

The overwhelming impression provided by Table 10.6 is that development agents have been active in the provision of a wide array of information. A closer examination, however, provides a more nuanced view. First, households in Tigray are more likely to report that they have received information on virtually every topic, compared to households located elsewhere. The provision of this information is also relatively high in Amhara-HVFB localities followed by other areas in Amhara and SNNPR. Provision of information and assistance appears lowest in Oromiya. This pattern corresponds to development agent staffing levels

described in Table 10.3. Second, much of this assistance focuses on standard cropping issues, such as when to plant, how to deal with plant or insect infestations, and so on. "Nontraditional" topics such as helping establish nonagricultural income sources or the provision of financial management trainings are less frequently reported. Third, it is less clear whether development agents are providing generic advice or information specific to the needs of individual households. One piece of evidence consistent with the view that generic information is being provided comes from questions posed to households about nonagricultural own business activities that they operated. Only 15 percent of these enterprises received technical support or credit and only one-third of this 15 percent received this support directly from development agents or local financial institutions.

10.9. Access to Credit

An important component of the revised HABP is improved access to credit. This is to be provided by microfinance institutions (MFI) and Rural Saving and Credit Cooperatives (RUSACCO). As part of the qualitative fieldwork, information was obtained about the activities of these organizations.

Table 10.7. Number of RUSACCOs and their operational status, by woreda

Region	*Woreda*	Number of existing RUSACCOs	Operational status
Amhara	Ebinate	None	-
	Sayinte	No RUSACCOs	Three multipurpose cooperatives are engaged in saving and credit services for their members.
	Sekota	No RUSACCOs, but 23 basic cooperatives	Twenty-three multipurpose cooperatives established and providing agricultural loans
Oromiya	Gursum	15	All have started saving and completed one-time disbursement of credits. Credits are being repaid without default.
	Zeway D	12	Three are administering revolving funds from a World Bank project.
SNNPR	Demba G	No RUSACCOs, but 22 basic cooperatives	Sometimes cooperatives are providing credit.
	Shebedino	None	-
	Tembaro	None	-
Tigray	Aferom	18	Thirteen are at the resource mobilization stage. Only five have started disbursing loans.
	Saesi Tsedamba	None	-

Source: Qualitative PSNP survey.

Table 10.7 shows that across these 10 *woredas*, there are some where RUSACCOs have been established but these are by no means widespread.

In the Zewaydugda and Gursum *woredas* of Oromiya, RUSACCOs have benefitted from the presence of a (now-ended) World Bank Food Security Project. Twelve RUSACCOs have been established, three of which administer revolving funds from the World Bank project. In Gursum, 15 RUSACCOs were established in 15 *kebeles* where the World Bank project had been active. These have started collecting savings from and disbursing credit for their members. While they are showing good progress in managing these funds, it appears that

their organization capacity may be limited. Leaders have relatively limited training on cooperative management, only a few have a bank account, and most have no office space and facilities to support their operations.

At the time of the survey, RUSACCOs were being established in Ahferom *woreda*, Tigray. Out of 33 *kebeles*, 18 have RUSACCOs. Most of these cooperatives are at the stage of resource mobilization by initiating members and only five had started disbursing loans. In Amhara Region, no RUSACCOs had been established. However, there were some multipurpose cooperatives in Sayint and Sekota *woredas* (3 in Saynit and 23 in Sekota) that have been providing agricultural credit services. However, these are not formally linked to either the OFSP or HABP. Similarly, there were no RUSACCOs in the sample *woredas* of SNNPR. According to the Regional Food Security Case Team, only 15 *woredas*, where the World Bank Food Security Project had been operational, have established RUSACCOs—none of these *woredas* were in our sample. However, the region plans to establish RUSACCOs in the future. "There is a clear goal set to establish at least one RUSACCO per *kebele* in areas where there are no RUSACCOs. Strengthening and establishing RUSACCOs is one of the future directions of the government" [SN/R-KII-OFSP].

There were three MFIs operating in these *woredas*: the Amhara Credit and Saving Institute (ACSI), the Omo Micro-Finance, and the Dedebit Saving and Credit Institute operating in Amhara, SNNPR, and Tigray regions, respectively. We did not come across any MFIs operating in the sample *woredas* of Oromiya.

We triangulate these data with information on sources of agricultural credit identified in the quantitative community questionnaire. This, too, shows that RUSACCOs, savings and loan associations, and cooperatives have very limited operations in Oromiya and SNNPR.

Table 10.8. Sources of credit for agriculture, by region

Region	Government	RUSACCOs, savings and loan societies, and cooperatives	NGOs	Private firms
Tigray	54.3	36.1	27.8	11.4
Amhara	66.7	29.0	18.2	0.0
Amhara-HVFB	82.5	44.7	10.5	0.0
Oromiya	32.4	2.9	20.6	0.0
SNNPR	62.2	2.9	11.8	0.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

This limited rollout suggests that relatively few households will have had access to new credit sources. To confirm this, we examined the credit data found in the household questionnaire.

Approximately 20 percent of households reported borrowing more than 20 Birr in the last 12 months. Most (87 percent) reported only one or two loans. The vast majority of loans were taken out for consumption purposes, with 45 percent of these loans being used for purchasing food or other goods; 12.5 percent were used to pay for health expenses and 11.2 percent were used to repay other debts. The two most common income-generating reasons for borrowing were to buy livestock (12.3 percent of all loans) or buying inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, or pesticides (6.3 percent of all loans). Only 33 out of the 2,420 loans

recorded in the quantitative survey were to support the establishment of a new nonagricultural business and most of these loans came from relatives, friends, or neighbors.

Table 10.9 shows the source of loans taken for agricultural purposes. Strikingly, households borrowing to buy inputs rely heavily on informal sources, such as relatives, friends, and neighbors. RUSACCOs and village savings and lending associations are a relatively larger source of loans for livestock, but fewer than 7 percent of all surveyed households were borrowing money for this purpose.

Table 10.9. Source of loans for agricultural purposes

Source of loan	Reason for loan	
	Buy inputs	Buy livestock
	(percent)	
Moneylender/arata	5.33	1.34
Relative	26.67	7.38
Friend/neighbor	21.33	3.02
Equub	2.67	0.34
Iddir	2.00	0.00
Cooperative, including rural savings and credit cooperative (RUSACCO)	10.67	30.87
Other local organization including village savings and lending association	8.00	19.46
Bank	0.67	3.69
Government/ministry/*kebele*	8.67	19.80
Microcredit institution or program /NGO	2.00	10.40
Other	12.00	3.69
Number of loans	150	298

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.

In Table 10.10, we explore whether access to formal and informal credit sources differs by sex of head and household beneficiary status. Formal sources include RUSACCOs, other cooperatives, village savings and loan societies, banks, government, MFIs, and NGOs. Informal sources are moneylenders, relatives, friends, neighbors, *equub*, and *iddir*. Consistent with the qualitative data noted earlier, women can borrow money from these formal sources but are less likely to do so compared to male-headed households. Very few households receiving direct support borrow money from formal sources.

Table 10.10. Sources of credit, by sex of head and household beneficiary status

	Did not borrow	Borrowed from formal sources	Borrowed from informal sources
Male-headed	52.66	11.17	36.17
Female-headed	61.54	6.50	31.97
Non-beneficiary	55.72	9.97	34.31
Receives PW	49.04	12.06	38.90
Receives DS	70.22	3.43	26.35

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: PW = public works; DS = direct support.

10.10. Conclusions

This chapter has assessed the rollout of the HABP, an important component of the revamped Food Security Program. Evidence from both qualitative and quantitative data sources point to a number of areas where progress has been made.

- The roadmap for the HABP implementation at the regional levels is almost complete and all necessary technical committees are established. The general comprehension about the objectives and purpose of the program among the regional actors is very strong.
- Significant variations were observed in the degree of knowledge among the actors, such as the *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces and development agents at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels. In particular, considerable confusion exits in terms of differentiating the two programs (OFSP and HABP) among these actors. Knowledge about HABP among the PSNP beneficiaries at the community level is nearly nonexistent.
- The links between the HABP and other food security programs is clear at the regional level. However, considerable differences are observed between regional and *woreda* actors in terms of understanding the relationship between the PSNP, OFSP, HABP, and CCI.
- Considerable effort has been made to increase the number of development agents at the *kebele* level. There is widespread acknowledgement that this has led to an improvement in support provided by development agents.
- Many households report contact with development agents and, in particular, note that they have received advice about new crops and how crops can be grown.

That said, a number of challenges remain:

- Rollout of the HABP below the regional level is uneven. In particular, development agents and households who were surveyed have limited awareness of the HABP. In the case of development agents, there is uncertainty as to how the HABP differs from the OFSP.
- Advice and assistance remains concentrated on crop production. There is limited capacity to assist nonagricultural enterprises.
- Access to new forms of credit, such as RUSSACOs, has been limited. Relatively few households report borrowing money to purchase inputs or buy livestock.
- Female-headed households and households receiving direct support rarely access formal sources of credit.

11. Graduation

11.1. Introduction

The notion of “graduation” has been integral to thinking about the PSNP since its inception. “Graduation” describes a process whereby recipients of support move from a position of depending on external assistance to a condition where they no longer need this support, and can therefore exit the program. A “Graduation Guidance Note” (GFDRE 2007) describes graduation from the PSNP as a transition from “chronically food insecure” to “food sufficient,” defined as follows:

> A household has graduated when, in the absence of receiving PSNP transfers, it can meet its food needs for all 12 months and is able to withstand modest shocks (GFDRE 2007, 1).

While the PSNP is designed to protect existing assets and ensure a minimum level of food consumption, the HABP (and the OFSP before it) is designed to assist households in increasing incomes generated from agricultural activities and to build up assets so that they will be able to “graduate” off the program. The diagram below (Figure 11.1) illustrates the theory behind the two stages of graduation. Starting at the lower left-hand quadrant of the diagram, ultra poor and chronically food-insecure households are targeted with PSNP transfers. Simultaneously, intensive support in the form of tailored products and financial literacy and savings facilities are encouraged and provided so that households can stabilize assets and, over time, move out of poverty. As households become less poor, extensions services, complementary community investment (where appropriate) and business advice (OFSP and HABP) are provided. As households’ economic base becomes stronger, they reach the first threshold for graduation—the first red line, denoting graduation from the PSNP. These households will likely need further support through extension and credit provision, provided under the FSP. This will enable them to accumulate assets. At some point the households will become strong enough to support themselves and will graduate off the FSP altogether (this is the second level of graduation).

Figure 11.1. The graduation process



Source: GFDRE 2009b.

Conversations—prompted and unprompted—about graduation occurred frequently in key informant and focus group discussions.[31] In this chapter, we summarize these, paying particular attention to how graduation is understood and how it is applied in practice, issues surrounding premature graduation, incentives and disincentives for graduation, and support needed at graduation and postgraduation. In so doing, it covers a number of evaluation objectives, as Table 11.1 notes.

Table 11.1. Evaluation objectives covered in chapter 11

Evaluation objective	Issue		Link to Log Frames and TOR
Assess trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients			
	Beneficiaries understand how the program works	Quant_HH Focus	PSNP Log frame Output 4.4
	Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries report that targeting and graduation processes are fair	Quant_HH Focus	PSNP Log frame Output 4.5

Source: Authors' compilation.

11.2. Prevalence of Graduation

As part of the community survey, key informants were asked to estimate the proportion of households that had graduated from the PSNP since Meskerem 2000 EC (September 2008) in their *kebeles*. Results are shown in Figure 11.2. In nearly half of these *kebeles*, no

[31] A more complete and comprehensive picture of the processes, constraints, and experiences of graduation is provided in "Assessment of Graduation" by Sandford et al. (2010).

graduation had been reported to have taken place and fewer than 5 percent reported graduation rates above 10 percent of beneficiaries. There are regional variations in these reports, with *kebeles* in Amhara and Amhara-HVFB more likely to report that graduation had occurred. Amhara-HVFB was the only area where more than 10 percent of *kebeles* reported graduation rates in excess of 10 percent.

Figure 11.2. Percentage of households that has graduated from PSNP based on *kebele* reports, 2010



Source: Community questionnaire 2010.

As part of the household questionnaire, respondents were asked if they were not hired for public works because they had been "graduated" from the PSNP. Only 84 households (71 male-headed and 13 female-headed)—3.3 percent of those not receiving PSNP benefits—provided this response. It is possible that this understates the extent to which graduation has occurred; for example, respondents who had graduated might describe themselves as "not being eligible" for the program. When we look at the data we have on PSNP payments for public works between 2008 and 2010, we find that 18 percent of households who received these payments in 2008 were no longer receiving these in 2010. Unfortunately, using our data in this way does not allow us to distinguish between households that have graduated and those that are being excluded so as to make room for others.

11.3. Understanding of Graduation

Interviews with regional level officials revealed a solid grasp of the concept and processes required for graduation—as described above. A focus group discussion with members of the OFSP task force at the regional level in Amhara provided a concise view of graduation within the program:

> R1: The safety net is to fill the food gap of households that have food security problems. This transfer by itself cannot enable them to create assets, become self-dependent, and graduate from the program. It is only to cover the food gap. Following this logic, other food security programs or different packages were designed to build their assets. The HABP is a program that provides

> credit services, various technologies, and inputs, and supports the creation of assets to enable households to graduate [AM/R-FG-2_OFSP].

A key informant interview with a member of the Regional Food Security Task Force in SNNPR likened the process to graduating from school:

> R1: When you attend a school and reach at some level, you will receive a certificate. Just like that, our vision is to protect their [beneficiary] household assets and, along with that, they will receive a credit that will help them to graduate. So, our final goal is graduation [SNNPR/R-KII-1_FSTF].

Regional respondents are aware of the main tenets of the graduation hypothesis underpinning the program. They typically emphasize the importance of "other" programs that facilitate assets creation, as well as credit provision and larger scale infrastructure, as fundamental to graduation. The logic of how all the separate components of the FSP work together is summed up by a respondent from a special OFSP task force:

> R2: The ultimate goal is the graduate [beneficiaries] and to change their livelihoods. To protect their [the beneficiaries] asset depletion and push them back up when they encounter localized shocks, they are supported by risk financing according to assessments. Mainly, the driving force of graduation is what we currently call HABP. Therefore, if food gaps are filled, localized shocks are resisted by risk financing, their lives are strengthened through different mini-HABP projects, then they improve the living status of their family, create assets, and after that they become free from CFI, become self-dependent, and graduate from the program [AM/R-FG-2_OFSP].

The concept, therefore, is well understood at the regional level. Less well understood was the finer distinction between graduating from the PSNP transfer and graduating from the FSP program. It was only at the *woreda* level in Tigray, Afherom, that officials spoke of the two-tier graduation concept: "there are two types of graduation: PSNP, that is, attaining 12 months of food gap and food security attainment"; "Food security attainment is difficult through food supply alone, rather building assets is the only option for food security" [TI_AF/W_FG_OFSP].

The understanding of graduation at the *woreda* level is also fairly consistent, although with some interesting variations. This may reflect, in part, the fact that the guidance notes on graduation were found in virtually all (92 percent) *woredas* where the *woreda* quantitative survey was carried out. Statements of graduation characteristics included "asset rich," "able to secure food independently," "able to secure health and education independently," "we consider different assets like ox, land, and permanent plants." A minority of interviews revealed that some *woreda* level officials believed that "graduation is quota driven," a topic discussed later in this chapter. At the *kebele* level, the understanding of graduation becomes very loose, at times completely uninformed, and sometimes incorrect as the diversity of responses below suggests:

> Graduation is the process of creating economically capable PSNP beneficiaries [TI_A/DA].

> For me, one is able to graduate if he has the capacity to withstand unfortunate conditions like drought, flood, or ice storm, independently at least for some time [TI_A/FGD_KFSTF].
>
> According to what we have heard, it is about the poor being able to farm, able to construct a house, have a pair of ox. Those who do not have grain and attain self-sufficiency through home production [SNNPR_D/FGD_KFSTF].
>
> But the minimum [for graduation] should be those who have a pair of ox and a milking cow, those who transformed from thatched houses to corrugated iron sheets roofing , and who met their food gaps better than others. This is between 10,000 and 15,000 Birr after adding everything up. This is the practical benchmark that we apply [SNNPR_T/KII_DA].

In focus group discussions with households, some indicated that graduation was a time-defined phenomenon—after five years of support, the household will graduate:

> We heard that people graduate from PSNP by the end of the fifth year. We also heard that some who leave safety net early by their own initiative [TI_A/FG1].
>
> Yes we heard about graduation from PSNP. We heard it from the agricultural office workers at gatherings/meetings, where they explained to us that in the five years time, if the living condition of a household changes, they graduate from the PSNP program. For some *kebele* leadership and sub-*kebele*/Gujile/Got representatives, a small booklet-like document is distributed which explains about the process [TI_S/FG-2].

Others, in SNNPR, only knew about it when they witnessed households in their community being taken off the program:

> We were not told initially. We heard about graduation. When the graduates went out, they told us that all of you will go out like them sometime in the future [SN_S/FG-2].
>
> We only saw those leaving out who should not have been excluded but have not heard clearly about graduation. What we heard is that they are given things essential to support graduation when they get graduated [SN_T/FG-2].

Others had a more informed understanding of the process.[32]

> A household having more than 18,000 Birr is supposed to graduate. The directive came from the WFSTF [OR_F/FGD-1].
>
> Individuals graduate if they can cover food gaps plus assets of 4,000 Birr per individual. We have been told by the development agents and in meetings to make ourselves ready for graduation [AM_S/FGD-2].

[32] We also explored households understanding of graduation criteria in the household quantitative survey. Most (48 percent) of respondents stated that households were eligible for graduation if they "had sufficient assets to ensure food security" or if it "could feed itself all through the year" (17 percent). However, in light of these qualitative findings, it is clear that this question was not sufficiently nuanced to elicit deep understanding of graduation criteria.

Disconcertingly, a number of graduates we spoke with appeared to be the least informed of why they were graduated.

> The process was not clear. We were told to graduate because we were in the program for five years. Two elders were assigned in each village to propose households for graduation. We were screened for graduation by these elders and finally we left the program. We did not know the process and how we were selected [OR_G/FGD-2].
>
> We first understood [we would graduate] on that day of the meeting. First, many individuals were selected saying 'you will be graduate in the future, however later on, after three months, they again included us and we started to work. Later on they called us, in January, and told us we are graduated. And we accepted this, since it is a directive of the government. However, we are not ready to graduate [AM_E/FGD-2].
>
> No, the process [graduation process] was not clear. They kicked me off prior to attaining enough capacity. I was kicked off after two years in the program and immediately I got a package with it, giving me forage seed or feed for the ox. I was not self-sufficient [SN_DG/FGD-2].

A PSNP coordinator working at the *woreda* level, Sokota, Amhara, summed up the confusion surrounding graduation in the following way:

> I feel that there is a problem with the concept of graduation. People, especially implementing bodies and individuals of the program, at all levels understand graduation in their own way [AM_SO/KII-PSNP Coordinator].

11.4. Graduation Benchmarks

The key source of guidance for graduation is the Graduation Guidance Note (GFDRE 2007). It identifies seven core principles for the introduction and use of benchmarks as well as 16 steps that regions, *woredas*, *kebeles*, and communities should undertake in identifying graduates. According to the guidance notes, benchmark levels of assets for graduation are as follows: Oromiya, 19,187 Birr per household; Tigray, 5,600 Birr per capita; Amhara, 4,200 Birr per capita; and SNNPR, 2,998 Birr per capita. Discussions with officials across the four regions consistently revealed that there was accurate knowledge of these benchmarks.

At the *kebele* and community levels, knowledge of the benchmark was much more imprecise. In the *kebele* quantitative survey, respondents were asked, "What criteria were used for graduation?" Out of the 92 *kebeles* that provided this information, 65 gave responses coded as "Household has sufficient assets to be food secure" and 60 gave information consistent with the pre-coded answer, "Household is able to feed itself throughout the year." Other responses are a source of concern: 13 stated that the household has enough able-bodied labor; 30 reported that the household had repaid the credit it had borrowed; it has repaid credit; 38 said that the household "is well off"; and 10 stated that the household had received its share of PSNP benefits (four of these responses came from Tigray).

Further, the benchmark values, while easy enough to quote at the regional and even *woreda* levels, need to be translated into measurable indicators at the *kebele* and community levels. Key informant interviews, especially with the development agents, showed that the determination of whether someone has reached a benchmark is often interpreted in different ways. Instead of specifying a single value benchmark, respondents in focus groups believed that if a certain set of criteria was met, such as having corrugated iron sheets roofing on one's house, or owning two oxen, or having a certain amount of land, or credit, then that would define graduation. While these indicators do not reflect accurate knowledge of the benchmarks, they do, in fact, reflect how people actually experience the process of graduation.

We see from these interviews, especially with the development agents, that how to determine whether someone has reached a benchmark is interpreted in different ways. Table 11.2 shows the different elements included in the benchmarks at the *kebele* level (development agent and Food Security Task Force interviews).

Table 11.2. Elements included in benchmarks at kebele level (interviews with development agents and Food Security Task Force)

Kebele	CIS roofing	Land	Livestock	Technology	Income stream	Crops	Farms
SNNPR							
Shebedino	√		√	√			
Tembaro	√			√			√
Demba Gofa	√	√	√				√
Amhara							
Ebenat			√				
Sayint	√	√	√				
Sokota	√	√	√				√
Oromiya							
Ziway Dugda	√	√	√			√	
Gursum	√		√	√	√	√	
Tigray							
Ahiferom			√		√		
Saesi Tsaedamba				√	√		

Source: Authors' calculations based on the PSNP survey data.
Note: CIS roofing = corrugated iron sheets roofing.

A variety of views were expressed on the appropriateness of the benchmark.

> For me, one can graduate if he has the capacity to withstand unfortunate conditions like drought, flood, or ice storm independently at least for some time, animal may not indicate even they can be abolished in one day but someone who have saved capital, better innovativeness, model farmers should be the criteria for graduation [TI_A/KII-KFSTF].
>
> Yes, we already discussed that there was no formal graduation, rather exclusion due to budget limitation; the excluded people are also poor and incapable to lead their family safely. Some of them are suffering food insecurity problems [TI_S/FG-4].
>
> If we talk openly, we do not know what will happen to us tomorrow. The two who were excluded should not have been so. Here in this *kebele* if one

constructs corrugated iron sheets roofed house, then it is considered as if he has made improvement [SN-D/FG-3].

Those who should graduate should be those who can teach other PSNP beneficiaries or attain a stage where they can be examples for others. This is when they fully use agricultural extension services, from living house construction to using livestock barns. But now as a resistance to their exclusion they go to court sometimes, even selling their assets to cover their expenses [SN_S/KII-DAS].

The benchmark from the region is not appropriate. Because I have an opinion that it is too low. Ours is appropriate. There is a pressure from above to have graduation. The minimum should be those who have a pair of ox and a milking cow, those who transformed from thatched houses to corrugated iron sheets, and those who met their food gaps better than others. This is between 10,000 and 15,000 Birr after adding everything [SN_S/KII-DAS].

The 18,000 Birr benchmark is not adequate to guarantee year-round access to food for families. Also, some assets like house are basic and not convertible to food in case of shortage [OR_Z/KII-EW].

The second thing is there are assets incorporated when we do the calculation [or graduation benchmark]. I think these things have to be revisited. For example, there are livestock dependent areas and crop dependent areas. Now since we consider only productive assets, in the livestock region they can easily reach graduation. Whereas in crop dependent areas, people can harvest 30 or 40 or 50 quintals, but there is no common understanding to consider this harvest...there is also variation: for example, the standard [quality] of ox [AM/KI-OFSP].

We were told to graduate safety net households from this *kebele* two, three times. We know that there is a benchmark and a calculation for graduation. When this calculation was made, there was no household that can graduate from our *kebele* [AM_S/KII-KFSTF].

11.5. Is there Premature Graduation?

As noted in Section 11.2, relatively little graduation has occurred. But given the importance of graduation within the context of the Food Security Program, an imperative is increasingly sensed that graduates should be identified and taken off the program. This imperative is felt and discussed at all levels. Sometimes respondents, particularly at regional level, discuss these targets in relation to quotas and required future rates of graduation. However, at lower levels, these “quotas” are often seen as administratively imposed and at odds with the time required for sustainable graduation.

These pressures provoked discussion as to whether households were graduating too early. Box 11.1 provides a range of these responses. The perception of quota-driven graduation was mainly seen in a negative light. In the SNNPR *woredas* we worked in, we found there are no standard benchmarks applied for graduation; instead, graduation was based on the

local perceptions that somebody has attained self-sufficiency. Whether a household is ready for graduation was often determined by a relative comparison of people who are subject to community judgment in regard to the attainment of a set of criteria. Development agents and community leaders in most cases are not comfortable with the criteria, because, according to them, emphasis is given to quota fulfillment rather than a real change in the situation of the household.

Box 11.1. Responses to the question: "Why are people graduating too early?"

Woreda level

- The *woreda* had planned for 100 percent graduation of all public work beneficiary households in the last five years. In 2009 alone, the region gave us 30 percent graduation quota. But so far, only 9,017 people graduated from the program. This was forced graduation because most of the graduates left the program before they were able to fill their family's food gap [OR_G/KII-WFSTF].
- Yes, most of the graduates left the program early. This is because there is a quota that the *woreda* FS and DPPO gives us to fulfill [OR_Z/WKII-EW].

Kebele level

- This is because of the quota limitation given to us from the *woreda* to exclude 126 household heads...of the excluded beneficiaries some of them are suffering food gaps [TI_A/KII-DAS].
- Most of them are not able to be food secure; it is just that they have been excluded to fulfill the quota given from the *kebele* [TI_A/KII-KFSTF].
- We were told to graduate safety net households from this *kebele* two, three times. We know that there is a benchmark and a calculation for graduation. When this calculation was made, there was no household that can graduate from our *kebele* [AM_S/KII-KFSTF].

Community level

- People are graduating too early. When they are subject to a pressure from upper bodies, they said if graduation is a must, then somebody has constructed a house, has a calf, and should get graduated, but in reality it was not on the basis of attainment of the required capacity. Particularly when one has a household package, the cattle from this package attracts the attention of people [SN-D/FG-2].
- The chairman deleted my name to make a replacement for his own relatives. On that day, the chairman included five extra people. The father and mother of the chairman are in the program. I was excluded based on the alleged retargeting. They told me that the government said that is enough for you and another person should be included [SN-D/FG-2 case study].
- We believe that it is because that the development agents are told to get promotion and rewards as a result of our graduation...it is only for the purpose of reporting to the *kebele* and to the *woreda* but did not do it based on knowledge about our improvement. It is not done to help us. When we hear on the radio about other areas, the graduates get graduated when they themselves declare that is enough for us. But here graduates are excluded even without making them clear about its objective [SN_S/FG-2].

Source: PSNP survey data.

Given the variety of criteria that appears to be applied when considering if a household should graduate, it is difficult to assess quantitatively the extent of premature graduation. This is exacerbated by the fact, as discussed above, that few respondents explicitly indicated that they were not receiving transfers because they had graduated. However, what we can do is assess whether those individuals who were receiving public works payments in

2008 but not in 2009 or 2010 had characteristics that, in light of the criteria described above, looked like they were candidates for graduation.

Table 11.3 considers three groups of households by their PSNP status: those that do not receive payments for public works in 2008, 2009, or 2010 ("No PW"); those that received payments for public works in 2008 only; and those that received payments for public works in 2008, 2009, and 2010. For each group, Table 11.3 shows values of livestock holdings as of June 2008—the period at which the 2008 round of public works activities was starting to draw to a close—at different points along the distribution (poorest 10th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and richest 90th percentile) for each region and group.

Table 11.3. Value of livestock holdings (Birr), *Sene* EC 2000 (June 2008), by beneficiary status between 2008 and 2010, and region

Region	Status	10th percentile	25th percentile	Median	75th percentile	90th percentile
Tigray	No PW	120	1,736	4,859	9,660	14,860
	PW in 2008 only	320	2,600	5,596	13,400	21,000
	PW in 2008, 2009, 2010	470	2,270	4,950	8,400	13,000
Amhara	No PW	0	2,000	6,000	11,060	17,962
	PW in 2008 only	0	600	3,385	5,600	9,110
	PW in 2008, 2009, 2010	0	1,005	3,000	5,245	9,000
Amhara-HVFB	No PW	360	3,000	6,240	10,590	17,398
	PW in 2008 only	0	1,800	4,315	6,920	9,450
	PW in 2008, 2009, 2010	0	1,270	3,560	6,000	8,495
Oromiya	No PW	80	1,785	5,625	11,200	20,400
	PW in 2008 only	400	2,700	7,600	13,200	23,400
	PW in 2008, 2009, 2010	0	1,200	4,700	9,030	16,000
SNNPR	No PW	0	1,000	3,000	6,000	11,800
	PW in 2008 only	0	1,000	1,600	2,560	6,890
	PW in 2008, 2009, 2010	0	200	1,750	3,600	6,800

Source: Household survey, 2010.
Note: PW = public works.

We begin with Tigray. Looking at the row "PW in 2008 only," we see that households in this category had median livestock holdings of 5,596 Birr. Given the regional benchmarks described in Section 11.4, this looks low. However, those households at the 75th or 90th percentiles have livestock holdings that are close to the benchmark (and, of course, this ignores consideration of other assets). Further, at all points in the distribution, those households that were removed from the PSNP after 2008 look like households that were not receiving payments in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (if anything, they look slightly better off). They are clearly better off than households that continued to receive benefits after 2008. Data from Oromiya tell a similar story. But in Amhara, households that were dropped after 2008—either because they were "graduated" or because they were rotated off—do not look any better off than those households that were retained in the program. While this also appears true in SNNPR, the generally low levels of livestock holdings suggest, as does Table 11.1, that other criteria were being used.

11.6. Incentives for Graduation

Sandford et al. (2010) classify and document the various incentives and disincentives that PSNP clients face with respect to graduation. Regarding the former, they report that graduates at the individual and community level shared five factors that motivate them to graduate: (1) pride in graduating; (2) receipt of agricultural inputs and other prizes during graduation; (3) availability of other more attractive livelihood options; (4) encouragement by model farmers; and (5) *woreda* level incentives. In our sample, we find little to no evidence with respect to (1), (3), and (4). We find a lot of evidence about (2); however, this concerns the "promise" of inputs and prizes rather than the actual receipt of inputs and prizes. We also find evidence of (5). As well, we document a further incentive related to the nonequivalence of transfers between PSNP, contingency funds, and risk financing.

The Promise (or Expectation) of Material Incentives

Responses from the community focus groups and also at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels indicated that there was much confusion about how households actually graduate. This was particularly evident in respect to whether incentives had been given to potential graduates. Focus groups recounted that they had 'heard of' material incentives being given to promote graduation:

> When we hear from other areas or *kebeles* when people get graduated, they are awarded about two thousand Birr and farm implements. Here, the graduates did not get such support. Here, there is not any support. If somebody constructs a house from his personal effort and has an ox, then he is classified as a graduate. Here, besides the advice, there is no other support [SN_D/FG-2].
>
> We heard that when there is graduation, money is going to be given [AM_E/FGD-3].

Respondents from transitioning households, that is, those households who actually have the potential to graduate or who have graduated, provided first-hand experience:

> Yes, we were promised to be given ox and/or cow after graduation [OR_G/FGD-2].
>
> Some graduates were promised to get support through various development activities, but this did not happen in reality. We were promised to be given beehives, but this did not happen [OR_Z/FGD-2].
>
> Last year 1,000 Birr was given as a credit for graduating households. This year we were expecting graduation money, but, due to a shortage of money, graduation did not take place. They were told to graduate and collected 1,000 Birr loan, but their expectation was 5,000–6,000 Birr [AM_E/FGD-1].

Are the perceptions held by the community about material incentives corroborated at higher levels of administration? Interviews with *Kebele* and *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces suggest that there is limited "encouragement" given for promoting graduation (for instance, access to credit or extension). For instance, in an Amhara *woreda*, a key informant interview

said that “The region did a good job that encouraged graduation. PSNP graduates were recognized as heroes of development and awarded” [AM_S/KII-WFSTF]. However, we find little to no evidence that specific prizes, awards, or payment (in cash or kind) is given in the event of graduation. The notion that graduation is associated with prizes was common in all *woredas* in SNNPR and many *woredas* in other regions.

The Nonequivalence and Fungibility of Transfers

The “nonequivalence of different transfers” is an interesting issue that was raised in some *woreda* and *kebele* level interviews. There appears to be an increasing awareness among beneficiaries that there is some room for “maneuver” between different types of transfer and assistance within the food security program. For instance, in Tigray, a focus group discussion with *woreda* level officials revealed that a significant number of people are “self-graduating” from the PSNP in order to then appeal, on the basis of food insecurity, to be put on another form of transfer (usually the contingency fund or risk financing). This has multiple benefits for the households: first, it is a timely payment (unlike the PSNP). Second, it is a grant and does not require a public work commitment. Therefore, people are able to claim support, receive it on time, and pursue other work opportunities. This is a possible challenge for the coming years.

It is also possible that enforcing graduation quotas will lead to premature graduation for many households, which will appeal to other transfer benefits within the FSP. A key informant interview with a development agent in Oromiya said that “due to pressure from *woreda* from graduation quota this led to early graduation” and “all graduated households were re-targeted through the 5 percent contingency fund” [In OR_ZD/KII_DA]. Premature graduation may simply transfer the food-insecure caseload to different budget lines within the FSP program.

11.7. Disincentives for Graduation

While sustainable graduation is seen as the ultimate goal of the FSP for the majority of households, a number of factors constrain the potential for households to graduate in a program-linear way. These, at times, can be administrative- or procedure-specific (the benchmark may not be set appropriately), beneficiary-specific (a lack of desire to graduate), or exogenously determined (due to weather-related shocks). In this section, we review the survey evidence for the constraints to sustainable graduation. We distinguish *benchmark graduation* (a static benchmark threshold either related to the PSNP or the FSP, as shown above) from *sustainable graduation* (the ability of the household to remain above the benchmark in the medium to long term). We make this distinction because identifying households according to a benchmark will attract different constraints (such as hidden information and administrative problems) than those enabling longer term fulfillment of that benchmark (such as weather shocks and access to markets).

Reluctance to be Self-Reliant

As with all forms of social assistance, concerns exist about whether the very provision of them will create a reluctance to be self-reliant or to become dependent upon them by the

recipients, and thus undermines (particularly in this case) the prospect for graduation. It is reasonable to expect that the transfer, in the case of the PSNP, for direct support beneficiaries may lead to what Lentz, Barrett, and Hoddinott (2005) refer to as positive dependency, as there is no expectation that this group will graduate. However, for the majority of the public works beneficiaries, dependency on the program could severely undermine the graduation and livelihood strengthening objectives.

Many respondents at the administrative levels mention “an attitude” of dependency as a critical problem facing the success of the FSP/PSNP.

> The most important problem is attitudinal, where households expect the safety net to remain there forever. The other issue is lack of hard work among some households [TI_S/KII-DAS].
>
> Of course, our people do not like graduation. They always want to take. There are some people that I do not agree with their inclusion. Many people have no sense of tomorrow. There are people who say the government will feed us and simply leave [SN_D/KII-DAS].
>
> There are individuals that say, “I will continue to get support for ten years as long as PSNP is continuing for ten years” [SN_S/KII-WFSTF].
>
> It seems that some graduates are reluctant to accept graduation because of dependency syndrome. Though not all, there are some graduates who can feed their family all the time, send their children to school without PSNP support, and buy and use improved farm inputs from own sources. For example, there is one graduate who has managed to produce number of livestock heads including two oxen, irrigation motor pump, and relatively good farm, but this graduate insisted that his family still has a food gap [Comment on OR_G/FGD-2].
>
> Our *kebele* people do not want to graduate. There is no positive thinking about graduation. There is a problem of attitude towards graduation [AM_S/Case study].

The data from Amhara, Ebinat *woreda*, indicate that dependency on assistance is highly developed and deeply rooted within the culture of this *woreda*. “The problem is very grave. Every member of the society demands assistance because there has been blanket assistance of food aid for the last 30 to 40 years in this *woreda* for all members of the community” [AM_E/field report].

One graduate honestly admitted to a desire to remain dependent:

> R: Yes, I can feed my family throughout the year, and have some livestock heads. But I was not interested to lose PSNP transfer. I did not say I am enough with the transfer money. But, they pushed me and I left the program. [It seems dependency on aid is at the root of resistance to graduation.] [OR_Z/FGD-2]

Hidden Information

Many interviews with *woreda* and *kebele* level officials suggested that these officials believed that beneficiaries often attempt to hide true information about their assets, as they do not want to graduate.

> There is a huge challenge on what people do so as not to graduate. There are individuals that physically hide their cattle. From this, I think that such individuals that have been receiving support for the last five years, even if they will continue to get support for ten years, they will never graduate [SN_S/KII-WFSTF].
>
> There is hiding of assets on the part of households when it comes to graduation. This attitude has to be discouraged [AM_E/FGD-OFSP].
>
> For the graduation purpose there is a form that development agents fill through indirect community asset valuation, since the community hide their assets [AM_S/KII-OFSP].
>
> When we go for calculating individuals [ready to graduate], we cannot get as needed. Individuals hide what they have; they take their livestock to their relatives. They do not give you the right information [AM_S/KII-DA].

11.8. Support Needed for Graduation from PSNP

Interviews with members of the *Woreda* Food Security Task Forces, *Kebele* Food Security Task Forces, and other special committees at the *woreda* level provided some suggestions for necessary provision to support graduation. An interview with a member of the *Woreda* Food Security Task Force in Saesi Tsaedamba, Tigray, summed up some points held by other similarly placed officials in other regions:

> When we look at the overall achievement of the PSNP support provided so far, we felt it was not implemented well. Even the OFSP packages were not utilized as per the intended plans. For instance, many took credits for weddings and other unproductive investments. But now we have embarked on full family targeting and are working very closely on the use of household packages, thus we hope to achieve better implementation and get more graduates [TI_S/KII-WFSTF].

The reference to the importance of full family targeting and effective use of packages is critical to the national vision of pathways for graduation. On the subject of packages, a key informant interview in SNNPR said that “There should be other packages in addition to the household package, like the World Bank that supports in other *woredas*...when one option is provided for a farmer, the other farmers will observe and learn from that person” [SN_D/KII-OFSP]. This view resonated with a more widely held perception that in *woredas* and *kebeles* where there are multiple players and packages (over and above the government), there would be a higher likelihood of sustainable graduation: “Graduation is more likely in areas where beneficiaries have access to adequate and productive farmland, credit, and irrigation. We have already observed this in some *woredas* like Fentalle, Melka Ballo, Goro Gutu *woredas*, etc. World Bank credit has played a key role in this regard” [O/KII-RFSTF]**.**

In addition to full family targeting and more effective packages, respondents at *woreda* and *kebele* levels frequently discussed the importance of large-scale irrigation, dams, and access to agricultural technologies as critical activities to support large-scale graduation.

> Complementary community infrastructures like expansion of irrigation facilities should be strengthened [TI/FGD-FSTF].
>
> There should be full family targeting; big community investments like check dam need to be strengthened; agricultural technologies like improved seed, fertilizer, and irrigation facilities need to be introduced widely [TI_A/FGD-OFSP].
>
> The main thing is awareness creation. The beneficiaries should believe that they could improve themselves if they work hard. And we need to prepare ways in which farmers could be able to produce two or three times per year. New agricultural technologies should be transferred to the farmers. They should be able to get water nearby; if the water table is near to the surface, they should be assisted to take the water out by pump and use it to cultivate vegetables in their garden, so that they can sell their vegetables [SN/KII-FSTF].
>
> If the climate is conducive and when people continue working on irrigation and year-round production is possible, we hope that 70 percent will graduate in the coming five years (2010–2014). If irrigation is successfully used, graduation will be realized; 18/28 *kebeles* have got water. Therefore if (a) we enhance work ethics training, (b) enhance irrigation facilities, (c) water pump maintenance training for farmers, and (d) buy quality motors [OR_Z/FGD-OFSP].

Views from the focus group discussions with community members on how to facilitate graduation were sometimes of a different nature than those expressed from administrative levels. They tended to focus on household-specific needs, rather than activities and investments that would lead to graduation at scale. So, for instance, many said that the provision of oxen to households or schooling for children would be facilitators for graduation. One respondent explained the assistance that PSNP households need to graduate as, “if the households does not have ox, then provision of farming ox, if the households does not have milking cow, then making a provision, if living in grass thatched house make him have a house with 42 corrugated iron sheets, if all these are provided by being told after this you have to be self-dependent, then they can do.” Some, especially those who were in the transitioning focus groups, identified very specific assets as necessary for graduation. “If there is availability of irrigation with technological packages given to them, I think they will reach the benchmarks” [TI_S/FG-1].

11.9. Support Post-PSNP Graduation

Graduates from the PSNP are supposed to continue to obtain support in the form of extension and credit for a defined period. After this time, they are expected to graduate from

the FSP. Interviews with officials at regional and *woreda* levels were aware of this, and claimed to provide this support:

> Once households are graduated from PSNP, they are still supported to fill their food gaps for the subsequent one year, with the amount of food equivalent to what they have been getting when enrolled for safety net. For the higher level graduates (who passed to full self-reliance), to prevent them from going back to their previous status, they are supported in different ways, including close follow-up, repeated trainings, creating market linkages, constructing postharvest storages [TI/KII-OFSP].
>
> There is technical support and training; the graduates will not be out of our focus [AM_E/FGD-OFSP].

However, in keeping with the findings reported by Sandford et al. (2010), we find that none of the PSNP graduates interviewed continued to receive credit or further support from the FSP.

11.10. Summary

- There appears to have been relatively little graduation to date.
- There is a solid understanding at regional levels of the concepts and mechanisms of graduation; however, there was only one mention of two-tiered graduation. Understanding at *woreda* level is also fairly consistent. Below *woreda* level, the understanding of the concept becomes very loose, at times completely uninformed, and at times completely incorrect. Perhaps most disconcerting is the finding that the graduates we spoke with appeared to be the least informed of why they were graduated.
- The knowledge of the process by which people graduate was very varied at the community levels, with some thinking that it was time-dependent, others believing it to be political, quota-driven, and others knowing the specific benchmark value for graduation. The experience of graduates themselves indicated that the process was in most cases not transparent or well-explained.
- Officials at most levels are well informed of the actual graduation benchmarks. However, when the official regional benchmarks are translated into specific criteria for targeting potential graduate households at the *kebele* and community levels, a plethora of criteria result.
- Given the intention of the government to meet and fulfill the FSP graduation targets, there is an imperative that graduates are increasingly identified and taken off the program. This imperative is a reality and is felt and discussed at all levels, from regions right down to the communities. Sometimes respondents, particularly at the regional level, discuss these targets in relation to quotas and required future rates of graduation. However, at lower levels, these “quotas” are often seen as administratively imposed and at odds with the time required for sustainable graduation.
- The incentives for graduation include (1) the promise (or expectation) of material incentives; (2) the nonequivalence and fungibility of different transfers; and

(3) regional/*woreda* level incentives. These incentives may increase the incidence of benchmark graduation, but may undermine sustainable graduation. The main finding on disincentives for graduation has to do with a reluctance to be self-reliant.

- A number of constraints/enablers of sustainable graduation were identified, including (1) full family versus partial family targeting; (2) the level of household and community assets, particularly land; (3) price changes; and (4) natural, climatic shocks. Many respondents believed that if sustainable graduation was to be achieved at scale, then large investments in community level agricultural technologies and irrigation are critical. This is in keeping with the vision of complementary community investment, however complementary community investment is currently intended for lowland areas only.
- While support is available for new PSNP graduates, we found little evidence of graduate households receiving this support.

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Annex

Annex A. Tag System for Direct Quotes

Region	***Woreda***
SNNPR [SN]	Shebedino [S]
	Tembaro [T]
	Demba Gofa [D]
Amhara [AM]	Ebenat [E]
	Sayint [SA]
	Sokota [SO]
Oromyia [ORO]	Zeway Dugda [Z]
	Gursum [G]
Tigray [TIG]	Ahiferom [A]
	Saesi Tsaedamba [S]
Method	**Respondent**
R-KI-1 *or* R-FG-1	Regional key informant or focus group FSP committee
R-KI-2 *or* R-FG-2	Regional Special committee (EW, HABP, or PW—specify)
W-KI-1 *or* W-FG-1	*Woreda* key informant or focus group FSTF
W-KI-2 *or* W-FG-2	*Woreda* special committee (EW, HABP, PW—specify)
K-KI-1 *or* K-FG-1	*Kebele* FSTF
K-KI-2 *or* K-KI-2	*Kebele* DA interview (KI or FG)
K-KI-3	Other *kebele* level key informant interview
FG-1	Direct Support Focus Group
FG-2	Transitioning Focus Group
FG-3	Women's Focus Group
FG-4	Men's Focus Group

Source: Authors' compilation.
Notes: DA (development agent), EW (extension worker), FG (focus group), FSP (Food Security Program), FSTF (Food Security Task Force), HABP (Household Asset Building Programme), KI (key informant), PW (public works).

Examples of how these tags are used in the report are as follows:

A quote from the transitioning focus group discussion from Gursum is referenced as [ORO_G/FG-2].

An interview with one development agent in Tembaro is referenced as [SN_T/K-KI-1].

Annex B. Characteristics of *Woredas* Surveyed Using Qualitative Methods

B.1. Introduction

This annex provides a description of the livelihoods found in *woredas* surveyed using qualitative methods. It also gives their population size and the proportion of households enrolled in the PSNP or having access to the HABP or OFSP.

B.2. Livelihood Profiles

The livelihood zones and the major crops and livestock produced are shown in Annex Table B.1. Most *woredas* are characterized by a mixed farming system in which crop and livestock husbandry goes together. Climate-related risks such as drought, erratic rainfall, and hailstorms are common. The severe drought crisis of 2009 affecting the Greater Horn of Africa was felt in some of the *woredas* covered by this evaluation. Crop pests, livestock diseases, and malaria were also found to be most important sources of livelihood risks. Moreover, cash crop growing *woredas*, mainly coffee growing SNNPR *woredas*, were identified as areas affected by market shocks due to reduced terms of trade between coffee and food crops during 2007–2009. In Annex Table B.1 and the discussion that follows, livelihoods are based on characterizations provided by the Livelihood Integration Unit, Disaster Management and Food Security Sector, MOARD (July 2010 for Amhara and Oromiya; January 2009 for Tigray and SNNPR).

Annex Table B.1. Livelihood zones, strategies, and risks in the sample *woredas*

Woreda	Livelihood zone	Major crops grown	Dominant livestock type	Livelihood risks/shocks
Ziway Dugda (Oromiya)	Rift Valley Maize and Haricot bean (RVM)	Maize, haricot beans, teff	Cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, and chickens	Drought, crop pests and diseases, flooding, and livestock disease
Gursum (Oromiya)	Gursum Babile Groundnut (GBG)	Sorghum, maize, groundnut, chat	Cattle, shoats	Shortage of moisture
	North East Agro-pastoral (NAP)	Sorghum, maize, groundnut	Camels, cattle, and shoats	Shortage of moisture
	Sorghum and Maize and Chat (SMC)	Sorghum, maize, chat	Cattle, shoats	Shortage of moisture
Ahferom (Tigray)	Central Mixed Crop (CMC)	Sorghum, teff, hanfets, finger millet	Cattle and shoats	Erratic rainfall
	Gesho and Wheat, Highland (GWH)	Gesho, wheat, hanfets	Cattle and shoats	Erratic rainfall
	Mereb Basin (MRB)	Sorghum, finger millet, maize, teff	Cattle and shoats	Environmental degradation
Saesi Tsaeda Emba (Tigray)	Atsbi Womberta Highland (AWH)	Barley, wheat, pulses	Cattle and shoats	Erratic rainfall
	Eastern Plateau Livelihood (EPL)	Barley, hanfets, wheat, maize	Cattle and shoats	Erratic rainfall
	Irob Mountain (IRM)	Barley, wheat, maize, pulses	Cattle and shoats	Erratic rainfall
Ebenat and Sekota (both are in Amhara)	North East Woynadega Mixed Cereal (NMC)	Barely, wheat, sorghum, teff		Environmental degradation and erratic rains
	Tekeze Lowland Sorghum and Goat (TSG)	Sorghum, teff, haricot beans		Environmental degradation and erratic rains
Sayint (Amhara)	Abay Beshlo River Basin West (ABB)	Teff, sorghum, maize	Cattle, goat, and sheep	Drought, hailstorm, and landslide
	South Wollo Meher (SME)	Wheat, teff, barley, red sorghum (zengada)	Cattle, goat, and sheep	Drought, hailstorm, and landslide
Demba Gofa (SNNPR)	Gamo Gofa Enset and Barley (GGE)	Enset, barley, wheat, sweet potato	Goats and poultry	Erratic rainfall
	Gamo Gofa Maize and Root Crops (GMR)	Maize, enset, sweet potato, taro, teff	Goats and poultry	Erratic rainfall
Shebedino (SNNPR)	Sidama Coffee (SCO)	Enset, coffee, maize, sorghum	Cattle	Drought, hailstorms and frost, crop diseases, market shock (fluctuation in crop price, particularly coffee)
	Sidama-Gedeo Highland Enset and Barley (SEB)	Enset, barley, wheat, horsebeans, peas	Cattle	Drought, hailstorms and frost, crop diseases, market shock (fluctuation in crop price, particularly coffee)
Tambaro (SNNPR)	Hadero Ginger Livelihood Zone (HGZ)	Maize, haricot beans, sweet potato	Cattle and goats	Drought, livestock disease, and malaria
	Hadiya-Kembata Cereal and Enset (HWE)	Enset, wheat, potatoes, baley	Cattle and goats	Drought, livestock disease, and malaria

Source: Authors' compilation.

More detailed descriptions are given below.

Ziway Dugda Woreda

Ziway Dugda *woreda* lies in the Rift Valley Maize and Haricot Bean (RVM) livelihood zone (LZ). The *woreda* is located in central parts of Oromiya and lies in the central rift valley. The agroecology is mostly midlands or *woinadega* with some lowland or *kolla* areas. The topography includes hills, plains, and undulating landscapes with the rift valley escarpment. The major types of vegetation are bush scrub and grasslands.

The main crops grown are maize, haricot beans, and teff, all of which are both for consumption and sales. Although the *woreda* is a crop producing area, livestock is also very important to livelihoods and is a major source of income. The main livestock kept are cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys, and chickens. Milking cattle and goats provide milk as food and to generate income. Sale of livestock (cattle and shoats), and livestock products, such as butter, skins, and eggs, are sources of cash income. Poorer households sell their labor in rural areas and towns. Firewood collection and selling is also quite an important income generating activity for poor households. The road access in the *woreda* is good and includes many large trading centers. The main hazards are drought (failure, delay, and/or erratic rainfall), crop pests and disease, flooding, and livestock disease. Drought occurs about once every five years, affecting not only crop production, but also leading to a decline in water and pasture availability, and thus the physical deterioration of livestock.

Gursum Woreda

Gursum *woreda* straddles three livelihood zones, namely Gursum and Babile Groundnut (GBG), North East Agro-pastoral (NAP), and Sorghum, and Maize and Chat (SMC). Parts of Gursum *woreda* found in GBG and NAP LZs encompass areas that share a boarder with the Somali region to the east. Agroecologically, Gursum is dominantly *kola* or lowlands with some *woinadega* or midland areas.

In all the three livelihood zones, sorghum and maize are the major food crops grown and, in addition to these, groundnut is produced as a cash crop in GBG and NAP livelihood zones. Besides groundnut, *chat* is also produced as a cash crop in the *woreda* with the exception of NAP LZ. The major livestock kept in the *woreda* include cattle, sheep, and goats, while camels are also important in NAP LZ. However, the very poor households do not own livestock. Those households who have livestock sell them whenever cash is needed to cover some of their expenses and food needs, although a large source of annual income for the households comes from sale of *chat* and groundnuts where they are grown. Poorer households also generate income from the collection of firewood, agricultural labor, and through participation in the Safety Net program. Market access is considered good as most parts of the *woreda*, with the exception of NAP LZ, have adequate access to all-weather roads and good access to markets. Market access in NAP LZ is moderate. In the *woreda*, moisture shortage either due to inadequate rainfall (in terms of total volume) or in the distribution of showers over the growing season is a major chronic hazard, which may result in loss of overall crop production.

Ahferom Woreda

Ahferom *woreda* encompasses three livelihood zones, namely Central Mixed Crop (CMC), Gesho and Wheat Highland (GWH), and Mereb Basin (MRB). MRB LZ is predominantly a *kolla* lowland agroecological zone, with undulating terrain; CMC is a midland ecology characterized by undulating hills and imposing mountains alternating with plains; and GWH is a mountainous area in a *dega* agroecology zone.

In Ahferom *woreda*, the production system is mixed farming, with both crop and livestock production. In CMC and MRB livelihood zones, the major crops produced are sorghum, finger millet, maize, and teff, but with varying order of importance. In CMC LZ, *hanfets* (a crop combining properties of barley and wheat) is also an important crop. *Hanfets* is cultivated to mitigate the risk of drought, because it is relatively drought resistant. Teff, *hanfets*, and finger millet are the most important food crop in CMC, while the staple food crops in MRB LZ are sorghum and finger millet. The main crops cultivated in GWH LZ are *gesho* (equivalent to hops) and wheat. *Gesho* is a perennial shrub whose leaves are used for the preparation of local beer, and it is a valuable cash crop. Wheat is the staple food crop in GWH LZ. In the *woreda*, the main livestock kept are cattle, sheep, and goats. Livestock are important for providing draught power, income, and food. The *woreda* faces a chronic food insecurity problem primarily because land available for cultivation is limited and cannot support the dense population residing there. The sale of agricultural labor, both locally and outmigration, is an important source of income for the very poor and poor households. Poor households also rely heavily on food from the PSNP program to supplement what can be grown and purchased. The condition of road access in the *woreda* varies from place to place and is rated well in MRB LZ, moderate in CMC, and poor in GWH LZ. Poor road conditions in GWH LZ are a significant impediment to marketing activities and there are no local markets. Commodities are transported to and from the market on donkeys. Erratic rainfall is the biggest natural hazard in CMC and GWH LZs, which occurs once every three years. In MRB LZ, land degradation arising from deforestation and poor land management practices poses a major threat to food security.

Saesi Tsaeda Emba Woreda

Saesi Tsaeda Emba *woreda* has three livelihood zones: Atsbi Wonberta Highland (AWH), Eastern Plateau Livelihood (EPL), and Irob Mountain (IRM). Most of Saesi Tsaeda Emba *woreda* is an area with heavily deforested plains, and the remaining vegetation is predominantly scattered bush and acacia trees. The landscape in most parts of the *woreda* is mainly rugged mountains and hills spanning the *dega, woina dega*, and *kolla* altitudes.

Mixed farming is the major livelihood activity in the *woreda*, where crop production is more important in AWH and EPL livelihood zones while livestock rearing is the main economic activity in IRM LZ. Agriculture is dependent on *kiremt* rains. In the *woreda*, barley and wheat are the major crops produced, followed by maize and pulses. *Hanfets* (a mixture of wheat and barley) is also one of the important crops produced in EPL LZ. In IRM and EPL LZs, wild cacti that grow on private plots are also harvested for household consumption. The main livestock reared in the *woreda* are cattle, sheep, and goats. Cattle are the more valuable livestock as a source of draught power, food, and cash income. In much of the *woreda* (AWH and EPL LZs), wage labor is an important economic activity and even during normal

years, there is seasonal migration to Afar and Humera. Afar provides opportunities for participation in the salt trade. Humera is a source of agriculture labor on sesame farms during the weeding and harvesting seasons. The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is a source of additional income for the poor. The condition of market access in the *woreda* varies from place to place, ranging from good access to no access at all. Population pressure and erratic rainfall combined with shortage of suitable land for crop cultivation contribute to make this *woreda* a food-insecure area.

Ebenat and Sekota Woredas

Ebenat and Sekota *woredas* have two livelihood zones in common, namely North East *Woynadega* Mixed Cereal (NMC) and Tekeze Lowland Sorghum and Goat (TSG).

The main livelihood strategy of the two *woredas* comprising these two livelihood zones is mixed farming with smallholder crop production, livestock rearing, and paid agricultural labor. Agricultural performance is generally poor and this is attributable to environmental degradation and erratic rains. They are a chronically food deficit areas. In NMC livelihood zone, of the two *woredas*, barley, wheat, sorghum, and teff are the main crops cultivated for consumption, while *faba* bean, lentils, and oil seeds are grown in these areas for sale. In TSG livelihood zone of the two *woredas*, the main crops cultivated are sorghum, teff, and haricot beans, and the cereals are often quick varieties adapted to the rainfall conditions, including the lower-yielding *bunyi* teff. The cereals and pulses are used for household consumption, and sesame and Niger seed are grown for cash. Generally, market access in these two livelihood zones of the two *woredas* is poor; this is particularly due to the poor road network and rugged topography.

Sekota falls into NMC and TSG livelihood zones, while Ebenat *woreda* lies in the Tana Zuria (TZA) livelihood zone. TZA LZ of Ebenat *woreda* is situated around the biggest Ethiopian lake, Lake Tana. Here too, mixed farming is the major economic activity. The major crops produced in this part of Ebenat *woreda* are maize and finger millet. As opposed to NMC and TSG livelihood zones of Ebenat and Sekota *woredas*, here the market access is rated to be good. The good market access is attributed to the good road conditions in the area and the proximity of the area to the major urban centers, including the regional capital, Bahir Dar.

Sayint Woreda

Sayint *woreda* consists of two livelihood zones, namely Abay Beshlo River Basin West (ABB) and South Wollo Meher (SME). Agroecologically, the part of Sayint *woreda* with ABB LZ is predominantly *kola* with few peripheral parts characterizing *woinadega*, while SME LZ consists of both *dega* and *woina dega* agroecologies.

The major economic activity of the *woreda* in the two livelihood zones is cereals crop production supplemented by livestock rearing. Teff, sorghum, and maize are the major crops produced in the ABB LZ, while wheat, teff, barley, red sorghum (*zengada*), and pulses are the main crops grown in SME LZ. The part of the *woreda* with SME LZ is a chronic food deficit area unlike the ABB LZ of the *woreda* where there is no history of food aid in the past years. The soil is of a degraded nature in many parts and loses its potential for crop production, although there are some parts with moderate soil fertility. Cattle, goat, and sheep

are the prominent livestock types commonly reared. Sale of charcoal and firewood and also migratory labor are the major sources of cash income in the *woreda* apart from the crop and livestock production. Much of the *woreda* is inaccessible. There are few roads across this rugged topography and the *woreda* lies quite far from the main highways and big towns. Drought, hailstorm, and landslide are the major hazards of the *woreda* and copping strategies are very wealth-specific.

Demaba Gofa Woreda

Demba Gofa *woreda* has two livelihood zones, Gamo Gofa Enset and Barley (GGE) and Gamo-Gofa Maize and Root Crop (GMR). The area that is found in GGE LZ is mountainous and includes wet *woina dega* and *dega* agroecological zones. The ecology in GMR is midland (*woina dega*) and upper lowland, with a hilly or undulating topography. Most of the rural population in GGE LZ is self-sufficient in food, while the part of Demba Gofa *woreda* that is found in GMR LZ is highly food-insecure.

The major crops produced in the chronically food-insecure part of the *woreda* are maize, *enset*, sweet potatoes, taro, teff, and yams. The combination of cereals and perennial/root crops offers some insurance against at least moderate rain failure, since maize is more susceptible than either root crops or *enset* to shortage of rain. Lack of grazing and fodder affects oxen production, so that only the better off and middle wealth group households, which own plow-oxen, are able to till the land efficiently. Most households possess goats and poultry, but livestock numbers are modest among all households. Market accessibility is generally poor in the *woreda* due to the poor state of the roads, most of which are only suitable for dry-weather transportation and are crossed by seasonal rivers. Better-off households use horses, mules, and donkeys for transport, but seasonal rivers often cannot be crossed during the rainy season and it is difficult to get to markets. Apart from the state of the roads, most areas of the *woreda* are distant from major urban markets and major transport routes in the region. As a result, the prices of the goods that households sell tend to be low and the prices of the goods that they purchase tend to be high. Erratic rainfall is a major risk factor affecting livelihoods in the *woreda*. It is a periodic problem and can include a late-start and/or an uneven distribution. A late start to the *belg* rains is especially significant, resulting in an extended and more severe hunger season than usual by delaying the green maize harvest.

Shebedino Woreda

Shebedino *woreda* falls in Sidama Coffee (SCO) and Sidama-Gedeo Highland Enset and Barley (SEB) livelihood zones. The part of Shebedino under SEB LZ is relatively food secure, with no history of food aid distributions.

The area that is found in SCO LZ is a relatively productive midland area that attracts migrant laborers from nearby highland areas during the busy coffee picking season. The landscape is characterized by undulating hills and, due to the high population density, most of the land is cultivated. This is a visibly green part of SNNPR, with eucalyptus, fruit, and coffee trees prominent throughout the area and *enset* growing around every household. However, there is no natural forest and very limited communal grazing land. Coffee is the main cash crop and *enset* is the main food crop, and these are supplemented by small quantities of other

rainfed food crops (including maize, sorghum, haricot beans, yams, taro, and sweet potatoes) and fruits (including avocado and pineapple). Annual food crops are generally intercropped among the coffee and *enset* plants. As a result, plough oxen are rarely used for cultivation in this part of the *woreda*; most cultivation is done by hand. Cattle are the most important type of livestock in this area. Grazing land is in short supply, however, so cattle are generally raised using a “zero-grazing” system. Labor migration is relatively uncommon, but poorer households do resort to this income-generating option in bad years. In normal years, poor households find casual work locally, including agricultural work for better-off farmers and daily labor in the pulping stations during the coffee harvest season. Market access is generally good in this part of the *woreda* and major urban markets for crops and livestock are nearby. Due to small landholding sizes and the large proportion of land that is dedicated to coffee production, most households do not produce enough food crops to last throughout the year, even in a year of good crop production. Market reliance is therefore quite high in this area, suggesting that both cash crop and staple food prices should be closely monitored. The main hazards affecting the *woreda* are shortage of rain and drought, hailstorms and frost, crop diseases, fluctuating coffee production and prices, and increase in prices of staple foods.

Tambaro Woreda

Tambaro *woreda* consists of two distinct livelihood zones, Hadero Ginger livelihood zone (HGZ) and Hadiya-Kembata Cereal and Enset (HWE). Part of the Tambaro *woreda* that is found in HWE LZ has historically been self-sufficient in terms of crop production and households are generally food-secure and thus this section describes the livelihood situation of HGZ LZ, which is chronically food-insecure. The area that falls in HGZ LZ consists of rugged terrain and vast areas of unproductive land that do not support the cultivation of crops due to poor soil. Agroecologically, this area stretches from *kolla* (lowland) to *woina dega* (midland).

The major food crops grown are maize, haricot beans, and sweet potato. In recent years, there has been a gradual shift of emphasis from cereal crop production to root crop production (i.e., from maize to sweet potatoes), to the extent that sweet potatoes are now the most important food crop. The major income earners for households in this area are ginger and coffee. However, the continuous dry spell is affecting coffee production and farmers are increasingly relying on ginger production for their cash income. Although ginger is susceptible to wide price fluctuations, it is drought resistant and a significant income earner in most years. Self-employment and labor migration are additional sources of income for very poor and poor households. Self-employment includes timber, grass, and firewood sales. Cattle and goats are the main livestock types reared in this area. There is a form of arrangement for sharing cattle (and sometimes goats) whereby poor households care for the livestock of the rich in return for the skimmed milk and a share of the offspring. As a result of this type of agreement, all households in the area keep cattle. Despite poor feeder roads within the area, market access is good due to the geographical location of the area, which is proximate to major roads and market centers. The major natural hazards experienced by households in the ginger zone are drought, livestock disease, and malaria. Drought is a recurring problem in recent years, resulting in crop failure and loss of livestock assets.

B.3. Population and Participation in the PSNP and HABP/OFSP

The population of the ten *woredas* is estimated at 1.7 million (Annex Table B.2). Approximately 28 percent—445,328 people—are PSNP beneficiaries. The male-to-female proportions of the PSNP beneficiary populations are roughly equivalent. About 47 percent of PSNP beneficiary households are led by women.

Annex Table B.2. *Woreda* population, household size, and number of PSNP and HABP/OFSP beneficiary households

Region	*Woreda*	Total population	Total households	PSNP beneficiary					PSNP/OFSP beneficiary		Non-PSNP population
				Female	Male	Total	Female-headed households	Male-headed households	Female-headed households	Male-headed households	
Amhara	Ebinate	259,053	51,688	40,763	36,855	77,618	10,107	3,626	1,748	3,168	181,435
	Sayinte	152,091	36,881	27,053	28,392	55,445	7,474	13,018	139	1,446	96,646
	Sekota	112,259	22,452	15,315	25,215	40,530	6,565	6,857	132	505	71,729
Oromiya	Gursum	211,705	37,338	21,653	22,639	44,292	3,314	6,336	1,432	4,447	167,413
	Zeway Dugrad	136,286	17,933	5,400	14,590	19,990	375	500	318	842	116,296
SNNPR	Demba Goffa	88,425	17,685	11,715	11,144	22,859	2,228	4,696	754	2,262	65,566
	Shebedino	239,881	40,796	6,738	7,048	13,786	507	1,834	317	1,463	226,095
	Tembaro	115,999	23,199	12,383	11,827	24,210	2,367	2,975			91,789
Tigray	Aferom	194,488	36,524	40,783	32,516	73,299	5,657	10,825	8,362	21,272	121,189
	Saesi Tsedamba	153,112	53,159	40,783	32,516	73,299	32,364	30,842	5,207	14,349	79,813
Total		1,663,299	337,655	222,586	222,742	445,328	70,958	81,509	18,409	49,754	1,217,971

Source: *Woreda* Office of Agriculture and Rural Development of Assessment *woredas*.